Behavioral risk adjustments
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Behavioral finance is a recent field in economics which studies the impact of psychology on the behavior of practitioners and financial markets from a general point of view.

In a more specific context, behavioral risk affects the valuation of all financial instruments with embedded options, such as prepayment or extension options. A decision has to be taken, allowing one counterpart to terminate the contract or modify contractual conditions.

Behavioral risk arises whenever option holders do not act only on the strength of financial convenience, but follow an uncertain and sub-optimal exercise strategy if seen from the point of view of option seller.

However, quite surprisingly, there is no unique definition:

- Behavioral risk as prepayment risk
- Behavioral risk as residual risk
Assets or liabilities with embedded prepayment/extension options subject to behavioral risk

**Assets**

- Mortgages, residential mortgages
- Mortgage-Backed Securities
- Callable bonds
- Corporate loans, retail loans
- Loan commitments

**Liabilities**

- Short-sight/non-maturity deposits
- Puttable bonds
- Postal bonds (issued e.g. by CDP)
- Life insurance policies, annuities
Agenda

1. Early-Exercise Options: Classical approach
2. Early-Exercise Options: Real world
3. Behavioral Risk: Modeling approach
4. Behavioral Risk: Mathematical framework
Early-Exercise Options

Classical approach
In financial markets a large number of products allows one counterpart (or both) to terminate (or extend) the contract at certain conditions, specified in advance at the inception.

An option holder can benefit from the option owned, while the option seller faces a potential loss, which must be reflected in its price. Ceteribus paribus:

\[ V(\text{American}) \geq V(\text{Bermudan}) \geq V(\text{European}) \]
The classical pricing approach (1/3)

Main topics

- How to price a financial contract?

We assign different probabilities to events and define a **market price of risk**. The price is obtained as the cost of a **replicating strategy** and is given by the strategy maximizing the return for the investor. In practice, it is computed by means of **backward maximization**

\[
\begin{align*}
V_T &= E_T \\
V_h &= \max\{E_h, \mathbb{E}_h [V_{h+1}]\} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[ h = T \]

\[ h < T \]
The classical pricing approach (2/3)

Example: Bermudan Put (K-S)\(^+\)

\[ E_1 = (10 - 9)^+ = 1 \]
\[ \mathbb{E}_1[V_2] = 50\% \cdot 0 + 50\% \cdot 3 = 1.5 \]
\[ V_1 = \max\{1, 1.5\} = 1.5 \]
\[ E_2 = (10 - 12)^+ = 0 \]
\[ S_2 = 12 \]

\[ r = 0\% \]
\[ K = 10 \]

\[ V_0 = 40\% \cdot 1.5 + 60\% \cdot 4 = 3 \]

\[ S_0 = 8 \]
\[ 40\% \]
\[ S_1 = 9 \]
\[ 50\% \]

\[ E_1 = (10 - 6)^+ = 4 \]
\[ \mathbb{E}_1[V_2] = 70\% \cdot 2 + 30\% \cdot 6 = 3.2 \]
\[ V_1 = \max\{4, 3.2\} = 4 \]
\[ S_1 = 6 \]
\[ 70\% \]

\[ E_2 = (10 - 7)^+ = 3 \]
\[ S_2 = 7 \]

\[ 30\% \]

\[ E_2 = (10 - 4)^+ = 6 \]
\[ S_2 = 4 \]
The classical pricing approach (3/3)

Algorithm: Bermudan Put (K-S)°

\[ E_{1,u} = (K_1 - S_{1,u})^+ \]
\[ \mathbb{E}_{1,u}[V_2] = e^{-r}[q_2 \cdot E_{2,uu} + (1 - q_2) \cdot E_{2,ud}] \]
\[ V_{1,u} = \max\{E_{1,u}, \mathbb{E}_{1,u}[V_2]\} \]
\[ E_{2,uu} = (K_2 - S_{2,uu})^+ \]

\[ V_0 = e^{-r} [q_1 \cdot V_{1,u} + (1 - q_1) \cdot V_{1,d}] \]
\[ E_{1,d} = (K_1 - S_{1,d})^+ \]
\[ \mathbb{E}_{1,d}[V_2] = e^{-r}[q_3 \cdot E_{2,ud} + (1 - q_3) \cdot E_{2,dd}] \]
\[ V_{1,d} = \max\{E_{1,d}, \mathbb{E}_{1,d}[V_2]\} \]
\[ E_{2,dd} = (K_2 - S_{2,dd})^+ \]
Early-Exercise Options

Real world
Empirical data of mortgage prepayments (1/2)

Observing the phenomenon…

- Some borrowers prepay when this is not convenient
- Some others do not prepay when this is convenient
- Prepayment rates exhibit **S-shaped dependence** on financial convenience measured by the rate shift
- **Residual variance** observed for the same market scenario
- Burnout effect as a function of loan age
Empirical data of mortgage prepayments (2/2)

Trying to explain data...

**Observed investor behavior**
- Early exercise rates are random variables
- Early exercise rates depend on exogenous factors, besides financial reasons
- Early exercise rates depend on the life of the contract
- A pool of investors is likely to be heterogeneous (i.e. different exercise behavior), granular, …

**Possible sources of sub-optimal exercise**
- No interest in early exercise
- Different valuation of the contract
- Move to more valuable investments
- Regulatory constraints
- Large transaction costs
- Lack of information or sophistication
- Discontinuous monitoring of markets
- Life events

Retail Investors
Time dependency due to burnout effect

Example

\[ t = 0 \]

\[ t = 1 \]

\[ t = 2 \]

FC = financial convenience
MR = marginal exercise rate

- Fully Rational investors
- Flipping Coin investors

MR: 50%
FC > 0
MR: 75%
FC < 0
MR: 25%
FC > 0
MR: 50%
FC < 0
MR: 83.8%
FC < 0
MR: 16.7%
Exercise times and cash flows (1/2)

"Without" behavioral risk – back to the classical world

- Rational option holders follow an exercise strategy maximizing their return
- For a mortgage with no prepayment penalty, optimal exercise time $\tau^*$ occurs when the exercise value (i.e. the remaining balance) is less than the continuation value
- Conditionally upon a market scenario and given a model for market factors, the optimal exercise time is univocally determined

![Diagram showing market refinancing rate and contractual rate with an optimal exercise time marker and inequality $E(t) < V(t^+)$]
In the presence of behavioral risk the exercise time is random even when the market scenario is specified.

Only option exercise probabilities can be estimated.

We define behavioral risk by identifying the additional cash flow variability that it generates.
Behavioral risk

Definition

Behavioral risk is the additional source of uncertainty in the future cash flows of a contract, when the option holder does not follow an optimal exercise strategy as seen from the point of view of the option seller.

Classical option pricing
- The behavior of all market players is fully predictable
- Exercise if and only if \( E_h \) vs \( E_h[V_{h+1}] \)

Behavioral option pricing
- Investors’ behavior is not fully explained by market
- Exercise probability is a function of \( E_h, V_{h+1} \)...

Given a market scenario…
Behavioral risk

Modeling approach
Literature background

Three main categories

**Econometric models**

The prepayment rate depends on a set of explanatory variables describing the investor behavior. The model must be calibrated on historical data. Applications require the generation of future scenarios of all variables in a risk-neutral framework. Subject to the realization of a market scenario, the prepayment rate at each point in time is deterministically given.

**Option-value models**

In this class of models early exercise occurs depending on the comparison between the redemption value of the contract and its continuation value. In order to take into account deviations from rationality, exercise constraints or frictions must be introduced. The existence of a baseline prepayment rate, due to exogenous reasons, is often assumed.

**Intensity models**

Factors possibly inducing the exercise of a prepayment option are not simulated directly: investor behavior is modeled by assuming a random prepayment rate and specifying the dynamics of an intensity function. In order to capture the dependency on market conditions, a non-zero correlation between the intensity process and other risk factors is introduced.
Exercise decision:
- Y (yes)
- N (no)

Financial convenience:
- R (right)
- W (wrong)
Risk-neutral pricing

Replication approach

• The price of an instrument equals the cost of a self-financing hedging strategy

• Risk premium is implied by market quotes and prices computed by simply taking expectations under risk-neutral probabilities

• Hedging is often unfeasible since instruments in the replication portfolio are not traded or liquid

• Risk can only be diversified in a large and granular portfolio

\[ V = \mathbb{E}_X^Q [\Psi] \]
Risk-adjusted pricing

Risk-charge approach

- The traditional risk-adjusted pricing approach consists in simulating the distribution of portfolio return under real-world probabilities.

- Risk premium is the **cost of remunerating risky capital** needed to cover unexpected losses.

- It depends on a target confidence level and hurdle rate for shareholders.

\[ V = E_X^P [\Psi] - RC \]
Behavioral risk premium

Mixed approach

Since behavioral risk originates from a combination of market X and exogenous factors Z, we adopt a **mixed approach**:

- Risk neutral dynamics for market factors are calibrated from market quotes.
- Exogenous factor dynamics are calibrated on historical basis.

The price $V(t)$ of a generic payoff $\Psi$ is given by

$$V(t) = V_E(t) - V_U(t) = \mathbb{E}_X^Q \left[ \mathbb{E}^{P}_{Z,\tau} \left[ \Psi | \bar{X} \right] \right] - k \cdot \Phi^{P}_{Z,\tau} \left[ \Psi | \bar{X} \right]$$
Behavioral risk

Mathematical framework
Behavioral risk adjustments (βVA)

Adjusting price…

- We can define behavioral-value adjustment (βVA) as

\[ V(t) = V_H(t) - OVA(t) + \beta VA(t) \]

- Behavioral-value adjustments can be split into two components having opposite sign

\[ \beta VA(t) = \beta VA_E(t) - \beta VA_U(t) \]

\[ \begin{align*}
\beta VA_E(t) &= V_E(t) - V_{sup}(t) \\
\beta VA_U(t) &= V_U(t)
\end{align*} \]
Parallel with credit risk modeling

Comparable items

**Credit Risk**
- Defaultable asset
- Defaultable counterpart
- Default event
- Debtor creditworthiness

**Behavioral Risk**
- Early-exercise option
- Option holder
- Option exercise
- Investor behavior
**Microstructural approach.** For each \( p \)-th contract and \( i \)-th investor, the marginal probability of option exercise is a function of a set of market and exogenous factors \((X, Z)\)

\[
Q^{ip}(t) = R\left(\bar{X}(t), \bar{Z}(t), \bar{\theta}\right)
\]

**Market factors** affect both contractual payments and exercise decisions

**Individual exogenous factors** are specified for all investors (each one having a systemic and an idiosyncratic component), like in the Vasicek model for credit risk

\[
Z^i(t) = \rho \cdot \xi^0(t) + \sqrt{1 - \rho^2} \cdot \xi^i(t)
\]
Mathematical framework (2/2)

Additional hypothesis

- **Long term averaging.** We assume that the effect of exogenous factors tends to cancel out over a long period of time

\[ \mathbb{E}^P [Z_\infty] = 0, \quad \mathbb{V}^P [Z_\infty] = 1 \]

- **Conditional independence.** Subject to the realization of a macro-scenario \((X, Z)\), prepayment decisions are taken independently by different investors for each contract type.

- **Coherent risk measure** (such as Expected Shortfall), linked to the capital absorption needed to compensate for unexpected losses through the entire life of the contract. If the distribution is not excessively skewed we can choose

\[ \Phi^P (\Psi | X) = \chi_q \cdot \sqrt{\mathbb{V}^P [\Psi | X]} \]
General payoffs

Main payoff

- Single contract discounted payoff, depending on exercise time $\tau$

$$\Psi = \sum_{k=1}^{T} D_k \cdot C_k \cdot \mathbb{I}(\tau > t_k) + \sum_{k=1}^{T} D_k \cdot E_k \cdot \mathbb{I}(\tau = t_k)$$

- General formula for discounted portfolio payoff of instruments with embedded options

\[ \Psi = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{p=1}^{M} N^{ip} \cdot \left( \sum_{k=0}^{T} D_k \cdot M_{kp}^{P} \cdot \mathbb{I}(\tau^{ip} > t_k) \right) \]

\[ N^P = \sum_{i=1}^{N} N^{ip} \]

\[ \text{number of } p\text{-th contracts held by the } i\text{-th investor} \]
Portfolio pricing

General formula for portfolio pricing

\[
V(0) = \mathbb{E}^{Q}_{X} \left[ \Pi_{0}(X) - k \cdot \chi_{q} \cdot \sqrt{\Pi_{1}(X) + \Pi_{2}(X)} \right]
\]

\[
\Pi_{0}(X) = \mathbb{E}_{Z}^{P} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{\tau}^{P} \left[ \Psi \bigg| X, Z \right] \bigg| X \right] = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{p=1}^{M} \sum_{k=0}^{T} L_{k}^{ip} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{Z}^{P} \left[ S_{k}^{ip} \bigg| X \right]
\]

\[
\Pi_{1}(X) = \mathbb{E}_{Z}^{P} \left[ \mathbb{V}_{\tau}^{P} \left[ \Psi \bigg| X, Z \right] \bigg| X \right] = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{p=1}^{M} \sum_{k=0}^{T} L_{h}^{ip} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{Z}^{P} \left[ S_{\max(k,h)}^{ip} - S_{k}^{ip} S_{h}^{ip} \bigg| X \right]
\]

\[
\Pi_{2}(X) = \mathbb{V}_{Z}^{P} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{\tau}^{P} \left[ \Psi \bigg| X, Z \right] \bigg| X \right] = \sum_{i,j=1}^{N} \sum_{p,q=1}^{M} \sum_{k,h=0}^{T} L_{k}^{ip} L_{h}^{iq} \cdot \mathbb{V}_{Z}^{P} \left[ S_{k}^{ip}, S_{h}^{iq} \bigg| X \right]
\]

with \( L_{k}^{ip} = N_{ip}^{k} \cdot D_{k} \cdot M_{k}^{p} \)

revised cash flow expectation

granularity effect

variance induced by exogenous factors
Granularity limit

Approximations

well-diversified portfolio

\[
\begin{align*}
N & >> 1 \\
N^{ip} & \approx \frac{N_p}{N} \\
\forall Z \left[ S_k^{ip}, S_h^{iq} \mid X \right] & = 0 \quad \forall i \neq j
\end{align*}
\]

large number of counterparts

equally-sized contracts

purely idiosyncratic exogenous factors

behavioral risk is fully diversified and no $\beta VA_U$ is needed

\[ V(0) \approx E_X^Q [\Pi_0(X)] \]

granular portfolio

\[
\begin{align*}
N & >> 1 \\
N^{ip} & \approx \frac{N_p}{N}
\end{align*}
\]

\[ V(0) \approx E_X^Q [\Pi_0(X) - k \cdot \chi_q \cdot \sqrt{\Pi_2(X)}] \]

granularity indicator

\[ H^p = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{N^{ip}}{N_p} \right)^2 \]

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

\[ H^p \rightarrow 0 \] in the granularity limit
References

- M. Bissiri & R. Cogo (2014) Modeling behavioral risk, *Available at SSRN=2523349*
Thank you for your attention!

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Appendix
A specific behavioral intensity hybrid model (BIX)

- We assume the following response function $R$
  \[
  \ln \left[ 1 - Q_{k}^{ip} \right] = A^{ip} \left( t_{k}, \bar{X}_{k} \right) + B^{ip} \left( t_{k}, \bar{X}_{k} \right) \cdot Z_{k}^{i}
  \]
  
  \text{average responsiveness to market factors (fit)}

- Lognormal conditional survival probabilities
  \[
  S_{k}^{ip} (X, Z) = \prod_{h=1}^{k} \left[ 1 - Q_{h}^{ip} (X, Z) \right] = e^{W_{k}^{ip} (X, Z)}
  \]

- Exogenous factors are modeled by AR(1) process with parameters
  \[
  \{ \rho, \alpha, \beta, \xi_{0}^{0}, \xi_{0}^{i} = 0 \quad \forall i > 0 \}
  \]
  \[
  Z_{k}^{i} = \rho \cdot \xi_{k}^{0} + \sqrt{1 - \rho^{2}} \cdot \xi_{k}^{i}
  \]
  \[
  \xi_{k}^{i} = \alpha \cdot \xi_{k-1}^{i} + \beta \cdot \varepsilon_{k}^{i}
  \]
  \[
  \mathbb{E}_{Z}^{P} [ \xi_{\infty} | X ] = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad |\alpha| < 1
  \]
  \[
  \mathbb{V}_{Z}^{P} [ \xi_{\infty} | X ] = 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \beta = \sqrt{1 - \alpha^{2}}
  \]

20/02/2018
M. Bissiri, R. Cogo – Behavioral Value Adjustments – University of Tor Vergata
Pricing of a homogeneous portfolio (1/2)

Homogeneous portfolio pricing

\[ A^{ip}_k = A^{ip}_k, \quad B^{ip}_k = B^{ip}_k \]

- The first two terms \( \Pi_0(X) \) and \( \Pi_1(X) \) are linear with respect to the number of contracts

\[
V(0) = \mathbb{E}_x^Q \left[ \Pi_0(X) - k \cdot \chi_q \cdot \sqrt{\Pi_1(X) + \Pi_2(X)} \right]
\]

\[
\Pi_0(X) = \sum_{p=1}^{M} \left[ L^p_0(X) + \sum_{k=1}^{T} L^p_k(X) \cdot E^p_k(X) \right]
\]

\[
\Pi_1(X) = \sum_{p=1}^{M} \left[ H^p \cdot \sum_{k=0}^{T} L^p_k(X) \cdot I^p_k(X) \cdot E^p_k(X) \right]
\]

\[
L^p_k(X) = N^p \cdot D_k \cdot M^p_k
\]

\[
E^p_k(X) = e^{\mu^p_k(X) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^p_k(X)^2}
\]

\[
I^p_k(X) = L^p_k(X) \cdot \left( 1 - e^{\mu^p_k(X) + \frac{3}{2} \sigma^p_k(X)^2} \right) + 2 \cdot \sum_{h=0}^{k-1} L^p_h(X) \cdot \left( 1 - e^{\mu^p_h(X) + \frac{3}{2} \sigma^p_h(X)^2} \right)
\]
Pricing of a homogeneous portfolio (2/2)

- Since the last term $\Pi_2$ corresponds to the variance of a weighted sum of lognormal variables, we rely on Gentle’s approximation which was originally developed for the pricing of Asian options within BS framework.

$$\Pi_2(X) = \mathbb{V}_Z^P \left[ \sum_{p=1}^M \sum_{k=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^N L_{ik}^{ip}(X) \cdot S_{ik}^{ip}(X, Z) \bigg| X \right]$$

$$\approx \mathbb{V}_Z^P \left[ \prod_{p=1}^M \prod_{k=1}^T \prod_{i=1}^N \mathcal{L}_{ik}^{ip}(X) \cdot \mathcal{W}_{ik}^{ip}(X, Z) \bigg| X \right] = \mathbb{V}_Z^P \left[ e^{\Omega(X, Z)} \bigg| X \right]$$

$$\Pi_2(X) \approx e^{2 \cdot M \Omega(X) + \Sigma_\Omega^2(X)} \cdot \left( e^{\Sigma_\Omega^2(X)} - 1 \right)$$

In practice, one can simulate several market scenarios $X$, compute conditional values $\Pi_0(X)$, $\Pi_1(X)$, $\Pi_2(X)$, and then apply

$$V(0) = \mathbb{E}_X^Q \left[ \Pi_0(X) - k \cdot \chi_q \cdot \sqrt{\Pi_1(X) + \Pi_2(X)} \right]$$