



The People's Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization, 1955-63

Lorenz M. Lüthi

To cite this article: Lorenz M. Lüthi (2007) The People's Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization, 1955-63, Cold War History, 7:4, 479-494, DOI: [10.1080/14682740701621762](https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740701621762)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740701621762>



Published online: 08 Oct 2007.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 856



View related articles [↗](#)



Citing articles: 3 View citing articles [↗](#)

The People's Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization, 1955-63

Lorenz M. Lüthi

Communist China's relationship with the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) was dependent on its alliance with the Soviet Union. As the Sino-Soviet pact deteriorated over the late 1950s and early 1960s, Beijing's loose institutional links to the WPO collapsed. In 1955, China committed itself to the aims of the WPO without becoming a full member. Against the background of Mao's domestic radicalization, military and political cooperation between the pact system and the Chinese observer faltered from 1957 to 1961. In an afterlude, the Soviet Union—unsuccessfully—tried to reorient the WPO from Europe to Asia in 1963. Afterwards, China and the WPO did not maintain any formal or informal links.

The relationship of the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) always remained in the shadow of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Beijing's deteriorating partnership with Moscow thus had a disproportional influence on its formal links with other Eastern Bloc capitals in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Chinese, Russian, and East European published and archival sources provide valuable insights into the complex association between the PRC and the WPO during these years. In general, the relationship passed through three distinct phases followed by an unsuccessful Soviet attempt to turn the Warsaw Pact Organization against the People's Republic in 1963. From May of 1955 to late 1957, Beijing and Moscow talked about the possible institutional association between the PRC and the WPO beyond Communist China's contemporaneous observer status. The period from early 1958 to early 1960 witnessed the failure of any attempt at integration on the political (formulation of general strategy and of overall political goals) and the military level

Born in Switzerland, Lorenz M. Lüthi studied history, political science, international law, Chinese and Russian at the University of Zurich (MA 1995) and at Yale (2003). He is currently an Assistant Professor in History of International Relations at McGill University. In early 2008, his first book – *The Sino-Soviet Split* – will be published. His new book project deals with the rise of the post-Cold War world in East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Correspondence to: Lorenz M. Lüthi, History Department – McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke West, Montreal, QC H3A 2T7, Canada. Email: lorenz.luthi@mcgill.ca

(weapons and troop standardization as well as joint military planning and exercises). Finally in 1961 institutional links broke down over the Albania issue. In an epilogue two years later, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev attempted to use the Warsaw Pact Organization against the People's Republic of China and thereby destroyed the basis for any further cooperation.

Any evaluation of PRC relations with the WPO must focus on the changing nature of the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Treaty that was signed on 14 February 1950, and thus preceded the founding of the Warsaw Pact Organization in May 1955. Being a part of both, the Soviet Union performed a hinge function between the two alliances. From the beginning, the PRC displayed an ambivalent relationship to the WPO which was linked to its increasingly similar approach to the Sino-Soviet partnership.

The alliance was based on utilitarian motives on both sides. In the late 1940s, the Chinese had decided to 'lean toward' the Soviet Union – a short-term device to gain immediate security and economic aid – while Iosif D. Stalin in return demanded access to warm water ports, railroads, and raw material deposits.¹ In the Korean War, the first test case for the Sino-Soviet alliance, Stalin not only was reluctant to follow through with his initial promises of military assistance but also made the PRC pay for Soviet military aid. His interest in binding as many US troops in East Asia as possible in order to relieve Western military pressure in Europe was largely responsible for the bloody stalemate from early 1951 to his death two years later. For the PRC, Stalin's policies were a sobering experience but provided an opportunity to raise the country's profile.² The change of guard in Moscow in 1953 led to the 'golden years' of the Sino-Soviet alliance.³ The general relaxation of Soviet foreign policy toward the People's Republic resulted in close cooperation at the Geneva Conference on Indochina and Khrushchev's visit to Communist China, both in 1954. The new Soviet leader tried to improve relations with Mao Zedong to garner support against his Stalinist rivals at home.⁴

The founding of the WPO in this period seemed to provide a vehicle for improved relations between the PRC and East Europe. Moscow's public call for an all-European conference on security in late 1954, following the NATO decision on 23 October to admit West Germany into the alliance on 5 May 1955, fell on open ears in Beijing.⁵ Although Communist China, like North Vietnam, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia, was only an associated observer to the WPO, it supported the formation of this organization without reservation. During the founding meeting in Warsaw, Defence Minister Peng Dehuai proclaimed that 'if European peace were to be violated . . . the Chinese government and six hundred million Chinese people will certainly stand together with our fraternal countries and peoples, and fight the anti-aggressive war until the final victory'.⁶

This public 'leaning toward' the WPO probably was linked to the military modernization needs of the PRC. Mao's emphasis on guerrilla tactics during the Korean War had turned out to be inadequate against the technologically superior American troops. Peng, supreme military commander of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in that conflict, emerged afterwards as the main spokesman

for the professionalization of the armed forces, their technological modernization, and even their military integration with the armies of the socialist world.⁷ As early as 1955, Moscow, for reasons not clear from the available record, approached Beijing with proposals to intensify air defence cooperation, but initial negotiations led nowhere. On the way to and from the founding meeting of the WPO, Peng stopped over in the Soviet capital for talks with Khrushchev on a possible inclusion of the PRC, but no details have surfaced.⁸ After May of 1955, the Soviet Union continued to propose cooperation agreements and technology transfers to Communist China,⁹ especially during the Moscow Meeting of the world's communist parties in November of 1957, when a Chinese military delegation headed by Peng negotiated with its Soviet counterpart. On the basis of inadequate documentary evidence, it seems that Khrushchev advocated a merger of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the WPO, while Peng apparently favoured greater technological transfers.¹⁰ To summarize, events from 1955 to 1957 suggested that the PRC was moving toward military modernization along Soviet lines, possibly leading to greater integration with or even membership in the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Mao's domestic radicalization starting in late 1957 put a sudden end to any prospects of military integration. The Chinese leader seized the political liberalization of the socialist world after Khrushchev's Secret Speech to abrogate the Soviet development model for the Great Leap Forward.¹¹ Against that background, he revisited political forms of mass mobilization dating back to the Civil War period including the use of the PLA as an archetype of a revolutionary organization. This deliberate political instrumentalization of the armed forces, including the promotion of ideological consciousness, military frugality, and his own guerrilla warfare doctrines from the pre-1949 period, stood in sharp contrast to Peng's emphasis on professionalization, technological modernization, and military cooperation with the Soviet Union and, by extension, with the WPO.¹² As a result of Mao's ideas, the modernization of the PLA, with the exception of a small number of specialized areas (nuclear weapons, for example), was put on hold for more than two decades.

Mao's new focus had three consequences relevant to future relations with the Warsaw Pact Organization. First, in May 1958, Mao pushed for Lin Biao, a civil war hero loyal to him but in poor health, to be admitted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, a position higher than Peng's Politburo membership. Beforehand, Lin had already advocated the indoctrination of the army with *Mao Zedong Military Thought*, the emerging canon of Mao's military texts from the pre-1949 period.¹³ Second, even though Mao rejected the modernization of the army along Soviet lines, he was still interested in technology transfers. Also in May, he thus called for Peng 'to emancipate his thinking' from Soviet models, to collect Soviet 'samples, ready to be copied by ourselves', and to 'procrastinate' on Soviet requests for military cooperation.¹⁴ Third, following Lin's promotion and under Mao's pressure, Peng himself promoted the study of *Mao Zedong Military Thought* and resistance to Soviet dogmatism in the PLA.¹⁵

Conflicts with the Soviets subsequently emerged as an upshot of Mao's new military doctrine, but also as a result of Khrushchev's earlier nuclear blunders. Following the Sputnik shock in October of 1957, the Soviet leader had publicly bluffed with a large fleet of Soviet nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) threatening the United States. President Dwight D. Eisenhower reacted by sending intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey as a stop-gap measure to counterbalance the Soviet threat.¹⁶ At a Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (PCC) meeting on 25 May 1958, Khrushchev claimed that US missile bases in Europe had no relation to American defensive needs and announced countermeasures to restore strategic parity.¹⁷ In the absence of real Soviet ICBMs, moving IRBMs closer to US territory was the only solution. With the first Soviet nuclear missile submarines to enter service at that time, the Soviet Navy Supreme Command as early as the beginning of 1958 had proposed Khrushchev station submarines in all oceans and establish a communication network consisting of radio transmitter stations in southern India and on Hainan. Khrushchev eventually agreed to the Chinese option, convinced that this would not create any problems with the ally.¹⁸ Accordingly, Soviet Defence Minister Rodion Malinovskii on 18 April offered Peng the construction of a mutually owned joint radio transmitter station for 'communications with our submarine fleet operating in the Pacific'.¹⁹ Fearing that such a station would infringe PRC sovereignty, in early June Peng requested complete Chinese ownership but offered utilization rights in return. Moscow had no choice but to agree.²⁰

On 21 July, Soviet ambassador to the PRC Pavel Yudin eventually proposed to Mao the establishment of a joint Sino-Soviet nuclear missile submarine fleet.²¹ Although, in retrospect, the proposition seems to be reasonable with regard to the balance of power between the capitalist West and the socialist camp, it came at the most unfortunate moment in Sino-Soviet relations. The next day, Mao complained to Yudin about Soviet attempts to control 'our entire coastline', and even threatened that the Chinese Communists would be 'organizing guerrilla forces' as in the 1930s to wage war against the Soviet 'occupiers'.²² Stunned by the unexpected refusal of military cooperation, Khrushchev decided on short notice to fly to Beijing to talk with Mao personally. After much mutual finger pointing, the two leaders agreed that 'there will not be a joint fleet'.²³

The 'joint submarine fleet' incident revealed the limits of Chinese military cooperation with the Soviet Union, and thereby with the WPO. To be sure, Mao in his 31 July meeting with Khrushchev promised that 'in case of war, we'll definitely have to cooperate', but this reflected Mao's belief that prior coordination with the allies was not necessary.²⁴ However, for the Soviets, this meant that the chances for joint military planning with the Chinese comrades for such a conflict, including greater military integration if not a merger of the Sino-Soviet alliance with the Warsaw Pact Organization, had diminished greatly.

In May of 1959, Moscow made its last attempt to integrate Beijing militarily into the socialist world. During a friendship visit to several East European countries, the Soviet Union, and Outer Mongolia (24 April to 11 June), Peng met Khrushchev in Tirana and

in Moscow.²⁵ According to the memoirs of Liu Xiao, then Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, the Soviets had high hopes for the 'gradual integration' of the whole socialist camp. Khrushchev even proposed that 'the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty could be linked to the Warsaw Pact with the Soviet Union at its core, which would simply mean an extension of the Warsaw Pact'. Aware of Mao's aversion to 'joint' military ventures with the Soviet comrades, the Chinese defence minister evaded a clear answer.²⁶ With Mao's purge of Peng, Communist China's most ardent promoter of military cooperation, for unrelated reasons less than two months later, the chances of integration of the PRC into WPO decreased even more.

The prospects for political cooperation of the People's Republic with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization were not much brighter than those for military integration. In this case, a mixture of Chinese domestic factors and Soviet-American rapprochement undermined the possibility of any success. In the spring of 1959, following Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum half a year earlier, Mao was convinced that NATO would not outlast the antagonism that would materialize 'in the wake of the arrival of the economic crisis of the capitalist world' and concluded that an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement would arise in its place. Like Stalin a decade before, Mao followed the crude Leninist theory on the innate impossibility of long-term cooperation among capitalist states. He thus could not understand why Khrushchev wanted 'to appease America' in the wake of Anastas Mikoyan's trip to the United States which had tentatively prepared the ground for Khrushchev's seminal visit in September.²⁷ The official announcement of that trip on 3 August greatly disheartened Mao. The news arrived at Lushan just when the purge of the so-called 'rightists' around Peng was proceeding. The Chinese leaders feared that Khrushchev would negotiate with President Dwight D. Eisenhower over China's division into the PRC and the Republic of China on Taiwan and compromise the strategic position of the PRC in the world.²⁸

After the end of his trip to the US, the Soviet leader flew via Moscow to Beijing to attend the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic of China on 1 October. During talks with Mao, he raved about his visit to the class enemy and warned about provoking Eisenhower into a war. In the meeting the following day, the Soviet guest left the Chinese host with the impression that he had chosen great power cooperation with the American imperialists over the promotion of world revolution in collaboration with the Chinese comrades. When Khrushchev departed from Beijing on 4 October, Sino-Soviet relations were at a new low point.²⁹

In late 1959, Mao reviewed the speeches held a year before by the recently deceased US Secretary of States John Foster Dulles. Dulles had publicly promoted constructive engagement with the Soviet Union with the idea of changing the Soviet system from within. For Mao, this strategy of 'infiltration, corrosion, and subversion' was a new scheme that 'supplemented' the US 'policy of strength' toward the socialist world.³⁰ Mao's views on Khrushchev's supposed failings in this respect brought major changes in his assessment of his country's relation to the Soviet Union, and, with that, to the WPO.³¹ At the same time, the Soviets too reviewed the events of the year.

In early December, Khrushchev called on the socialist camp 'to synchronize our watches.'³² Stepan Chervonenko, the newly appointed Soviet ambassador to the PRC, unambiguously told Liu Shaoqi that any Chinese sabotage attempts of Soviet foreign policy would have a negative impact on all facets of Sino-Soviet relations. Liu, not as radical as Mao, tried to minimize the differences as 'temporary and dispensable'.³³

The contrary visions about the future strategy of the socialist camp clashed during the meeting of the PCC on 4 February 1960, in Warsaw, during which Khrushchev evidently attempted to get an endorsement of his rapprochement policy with the United States ahead of the Soviet-Franco-British-American summit, scheduled for May in Paris.³⁴ The Chinese observer delegation used the meeting for a show of displeasure. Kang Sheng, Mao's ultra-leftist representative, portrayed the US as an economically weakened, untrustworthy, and war-mongering power that pursued a policy of destabilizing Communist China. He warned: 'The imperialists, the modern revisionists, and the reactionaries of various countries continuously dream of changes in their favour within our countries, and of a crack in the unity of our ranks.'³⁵

Within only two years, Mao's domestic radicalization and Soviet-American rapprochement had undercut the prospects of Chinese military and political cooperation with the Soviet Union and the WPO. Although the U-2 incident on 1 May 1960, the subsequent abrogation of the Paris Summit by Khrushchev, and the Soviet leader's failed diplomacy during this second visit to the US on the occasion of the 15th anniversary meeting of the United Nations in early autumn seemed to support Mao's hard line toward the United States, no rapprochement with the Warsaw Pact Organization materialized. With Beijing's decision to make Sino-Soviet ideological differences public through the release of the so-called Lenin 90th Anniversary Polemics in April of 1960, any chance of Chinese military or political cooperation with the WPO had disappeared.

Despite the Sino-Soviet row on 4 February 1960, the PRC continued to send observers to the PCC meetings in late March and early August of 1961. One of the central topics of both gatherings was the widening rift between Albania and the Warsaw Pact Organization. Mao eventually used the Soviet-Albanian split in 1961 to sever the institutional links of the People's Republic with the Warsaw Pact Organization. Relations between Beijing and Tirana previously had been cool, but by 1961, Sino-Soviet-Albanian relations had changed dramatically. First, Mao had come closer to Enver Hoxha's unapologetic assessment of Stalin, which contradicted Khrushchev's positions since 1956. Second, in domestic politics, the Chinese leader at that time had been shunted aside after the complete failure of the Great Leap Forward in late 1960. Mao tried to restore his lost influence at home through greater activity abroad. Finally, after the withdrawal of all Soviet (economic *and* military) advisers from the PRC in the summer of 1960, the Sino-Soviet alliance had become less central to Communist China's reconstruction and security needs. It was in this situation that the Chinese leader used the emerging Soviet-Albanian estrangement to instigate conflict with the Soviet Union in the hope for a political windfall at home.³⁶

Since the Soviet–Albanian split emerged over Tirana’s interference with allied military vessels stationed at the Vlorë naval base, arguments inevitably evolved within the confines of the WPO. The PCC in a secret decision in late March of 1961 demanded that Albania adhere to the Warsaw Pact treaty by explaining its behaviour in Vlorë.³⁷ It is not certain whether the Chinese observer Liu Xiao knew about this decision, but the deterioration of Albania’s relations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization became obvious to all outsiders when the Soviets withdrew their vessels by the early summer.³⁸ This provided Mao with the sought-after opportunity to exploit foreign policy for domestic gains.³⁹

Albania’s row with the Soviet Union and the WPO continued during the 3–5 August alliance summit. Given the swelling exodus of highly trained East Germans to West Berlin, Walter Ulbricht had asked for this gathering in order to discuss the construction of the Berlin Wall, but had also suggested a gathering of all *first* party secretaries of the member states *without* Hoxha. Khrushchev, however, agreed to convene only if all were invited—apparently with the aim to force the Albanian comrades to show colours, or else to use the opportunity for a censure. When Tirana sent a low-ranking delegation headed by a junior CC secretary, Ramiz Alia, Ulbricht convinced the other delegations to exclude the Albanian delegation on the ground that it was not ‘competent’ enough to debate the closing of the German–German border.⁴⁰ Beijing reacted by instructing its observer to the summit, Liu Xiao, to support Tirana with the argument that ‘no party has the right to reject the representative of another party to attend a conference’. The other two Asian observers who had arrived only with low-ranking delegations as well—North Korea and North Vietnam—neither voiced any opinion nor joined in the condemnation of Albanian behaviour.⁴¹

On 17 October, it was Khrushchev’s turn to fan the flames of the simmering Sino-Soviet conflict. De-Stalinization and Albania—the two red rags for the Maoist bull—initially were not on the agenda of the 22nd CPSU congress, but the Soviet leader made them issues shortly before and during this congress, respectively. In the summer, Stalin’s disgraced lieutenant Vyacheslav Molotov had called the new Soviet party programme ‘scandalous’ and thereby forced Khrushchev to denounce the late supreme leader once more during the congress.⁴² The Soviet leader’s criticism of Albania, however, entered his opening report only on the spot.⁴³ The Chinese comrades strongly believed that the attacks on Stalin and Albania had been well prepared and, in fact, were directed against them. Mao jumped once more at this new opportunity to intensify conflict for domestic purposes, instructing Zhou Enlai in Moscow to show displeasure in his greetings to the congress.⁴⁴ On 22 October, the Chinese premier even met with the Soviet leadership for a lunch and then for talks on Albania that lasted until 11 in the evening but ended in complete disagreement.⁴⁵

On 31 October, the WPO member states (except suspended Albania) sent a letter to the East Asian observer states (Communist China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia) replying to Liu Xiao’s complaints at the August Warsaw Pact summit. It announced the expansion of the unwritten rule that only first party secretaries of the member states could attend meetings of the PCC also to include observer states.

With the exception of the Outer Mongolian party boss, Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, none of the other first secretaries of the observer states had ever attended any of the meetings.⁴⁶ Unwilling to budge on this demand, the Chinese side perceived the letter as a ‘tactful’ suggestion not to send observers any longer. In fact, on 20 October, Mao had already decided that the Chinese Communist Party would not attend any meetings of the socialist camp to which Albania was not invited.⁴⁷ He had thereby severed institutional relations with the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Mao’s decision to cut institutional relations with the Warsaw Pact Organization had mainly domestic reasons. He tried to use the Soviet–Albanian split to increase his political influence, lost in 1960, in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. Khrushchev’s volatile personality without doubt contributed its share to the collapse of institutional relations of the PRC with the WPO. In the end, however, Mao’s partnership with the erratic Hoxha against Khrushchev neither served Chinese security nor its economic well-being.

The collapse of institutional links had an epilogue in the summer of 1963, when Khrushchev tried to reorient the East European alliance system against his East Asian ally. The Soviet leader failed because some of the East European member states of the WPO had very particular interests within the alliance. While Poland, neighbouring East Germany, was concerned with containing what it feared to be a West German rise of militarism, Romania did not want to demolish its increasingly close relations with the PRC.⁴⁸ Thus, both had reasons to keep the alliance as it existed and therefore opposed a conceptual reorientation against Communist China.

Starting in the early autumn of 1962, the Soviet leader faced two initially unrelated but increasingly intertwined developments in world affairs. First, Mao Zedong in August and September used his dissatisfaction with supposedly capitalist agricultural politics in the PRC to launch a successful comeback in domestic politics.⁴⁹ This, however, required an intensification of polemics against the so-called ‘revisionist’ Soviet Union, to which Mao had rhetorically tied his internal antagonists.⁵⁰ Second, the United States presented a new proposal for a Limited Nuclear Test Ban (LNTB) treaty on 25 August. Negotiations for such an agreement had already started in the 1950s, but had run into difficulties over verification issues and the inclusion of undeclared nuclear powers such as France and the PRC.⁵¹ In September, Beijing informed Moscow that it considered any LNTB agreement as ‘spearheaded against China’.⁵²

The Cuban Missile Crisis in October exacerbated Moscow’s dilemma of squaring nuclear talks with Beijing’s ideological attacks. Although triggered by Khrushchev himself, the Caribbean crisis persuaded the Soviet leader of the necessity to find a negotiated solution to the nuclear arms race together with the Americans and British.⁵³ Conversely, the public Soviet humiliation for the withdrawal of its IRBMs from the Caribbean served Mao as a pretext to declare Khrushchev unfit to lead the socialist camp in the face of the supposed American aggression in Cuba.⁵⁴

While the Soviet–British–American LNTB negotiations entered their final round in early 1963, the Vietnamese Workers Party managed to convince the Soviet and Chinese

comrades to agree to party reconciliation talks, to be held in the summer. During the first months of that year, the tripartite negotiations were unable to overcome disagreements on verification, nor did Mao show any willingness to make compromises in view of the upcoming party talks.⁵⁵ It was in this situation that Khrushchev decided to force both Mao Zedong and US President John F. Kennedy to show their colours. In a 30 March letter to Beijing, Moscow presented its ideological position and officially invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow for talks in July.⁵⁶ Two days later, Khrushchev demanded from Kennedy to make concrete proposals for a test ban.⁵⁷

The replies Khrushchev received six weeks later determined his further policies. On 10 June in a speech at the American University, Kennedy publicly announced his willingness to send a delegation to Moscow to negotiate on the LNTB. Khrushchev afterwards remarked happily that it had been ‘the best speech by any president since Roosevelt’. Two days later, *Pravda* published the speech in a rare show of Soviet political endorsement for an imperialist statesman.⁵⁸ On 14 June, the Chinese published the ‘Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement’, which insinuated that the Soviet Union had ceased to be a socialist country.⁵⁹ The Chinese reply achieved what it was supposed to—to kill any prospect for a Sino-Soviet compromise. The stark contrast between Kennedy’s conciliatory speech and Mao’s ideological declaration of war sparked Khrushchev into rethinking Soviet security policy. During the Central Committee plenum a week later, he ridiculed Chinese war-mongering and welcomed Kennedy’s representative to the LNTB talks, W. Averell Harriman, to Moscow with the words: ‘[O]ur guest, a sort of a comrade [nash gost, vrode kak tovarishch]’.⁶⁰

The strategic rethinking Khrushchev envisioned started to get into focus during his meeting with Walter Ulbricht, Władysław Gomułka, Antonín Novotný, János Kádár, and Todor Zhivkov in East Berlin from 28 June to 4 July. On 2 July, Khrushchev publicly replied to Kennedy’s ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech, held some days before, with rants against Western propaganda about the Berlin Wall, but then went on to laud the President’s step towards an LNTB agreement and refreshed his 1958 proposal of a NATO–WPO non-aggression pact.⁶¹ US governmental and public reactions were pleased with Khrushchev’s enthusiasm for negotiating on the test ban, but wondered why he renewed an old proposal.⁶²

On 10 July, a few days after his return to the Soviet capital for the LNTB negotiations and the Sino-Soviet party talks, Khrushchev sent a letter to all first party secretaries of the Warsaw Pact Organization members advocating Outer Mongolian membership in the alliance.⁶³ A second missive five days later even proposed the convocation of the PCC in late July to discuss this issue.⁶⁴ The few archival documents that have surfaced on Khrushchev’s talks in East Berlin a fortnight before provide no clear evidence that the Soviet leader had talked with his East European clients about this proposal.⁶⁵ Yet, given the brewing conflict with Communist China, the integration of Outer Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact Organization seemed to make sense, not only to Khrushchev but also to Tsedenbal. Since Tirana’s factual exclusion from the WPO

in late 1961, Ulan Bataar had increasingly sided with Moscow while moving away from Beijing. Whereas the PRC since 1949 had considered Outer Mongolia as a territory to be eventually incorporated into the Chinese motherland,⁶⁶ that country itself strengthened its claims to independence through membership in the United Nations in 1961 and in COMECON the year after. Consequently, Chinese economic assistance fell off so rapidly in 1962 and 1963 that Outer Mongolia had to turn to emergency aid from the Soviet Union and East Europe.⁶⁷

However, Khrushchev's plan for Outer Mongolian membership in the Warsaw Pact Organization did not meet the enthusiastic response among its member states Khrushchev might have hoped for. Already on 18 July the Romanian party leadership discussed the vagueness of information on and the 'implications' of Outer Mongolian membership. Given the contemporaneous Soviet–American–British negotiations on the LNTB treaty, the Romanians were firmly convinced that Khrushchev's proposal was directed against the PRC—creating 'military blocs within the framework of the socialist camp'.⁶⁸ An internal Polish Foreign Ministry memorandum two days later similarly deplored the lack of 'any information further clarifying the arguments to be made at the current stage of this measure', and clearly warned that the 'thrust [of the proposal] is directed against the PRC'.⁶⁹ For Poland, the primary focus of the alliance was West Germany, not East Asia.⁷⁰

Eventually, the Romanians sent a letter to Khrushchev warning that Outer Mongolian membership 'would transform [the Warsaw Pact] from a treaty concluded between European countries' into one directed against the PRC.⁷¹ In a particularly crafty move, the letter quoted from the *Soviet Diplomatic Dictionary* (which had been published under the name of Soviet foreign minister Andrei A. Gromyko) that treaties like the proposed expansion of the Warsaw Pact Organization would be 'directed against socialist countries' and thus constituted 'the aggression of war'.⁷² During the actual meeting of the PCC on 26–27 July, only the Romanians spoke against Outer Mongolian membership. Sensing discord among the WPO members, Tsedenbal suggested deferring any decision 'until the conditions become more favourable'.⁷³ The Outer Mongolian issue, however, was never proposed again.

At the end of July, Khrushchev thus had reached only one of his goals. With the non-aggression pact and Outer Mongolian membership rejected, he could only show the Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty—which was initialled on 25 July, banned nuclear tests in space, above ground, and in the seas, and called for non-proliferation—as a means to contain Communist China. Although the treaty did not prevent the PRC from developing its own nuclear weapons programme (in spite of Kennedy's previous desires and of Chinese claims to the contrary afterwards), it not only made it difficult for the People's Republic to acquire nuclear know-how and technology abroad, but also isolated Mao's country internationally. Within only a few months, 82 countries signed the treaty, except for Communist China, France, the Vatican, and several small countries.⁷⁴ For Khrushchev, however, this partial victory over the Chinese comrades had come at a high price: Sino-Soviet party talks, which were held in the Soviet capital in tandem with the Soviet–British–American LNTB negotiations and which were

supposed to find a compromise in the ideological disagreements between Beijing and Moscow, had collapsed in complete disarray.⁷⁵ And until its dissolution in 1990, the WPO and the PRC co-existed without taking much note of each other.

Communist China's association with the Warsaw Pact Organization was always under the sway of its relationship with the Soviet Union, which, in the form of the Sino-Soviet alliance, pre-dated the multilateral alliance. Being the hinge between the two, Moscow, since 1955, pondered closer cooperation, possibly even a merger. Until late 1957, the People's Republic of China seemed to be ready to integrate gradually, but Mao's launching of the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) and the Soviet–American Rapprochement undermined any military and political cooperation. In 1961, the Chinese leader exploited the Soviet–Albanian split for his domestic needs; as a result, China's institutional relations with the WPO were cut. The Sino-Soviet rift in 1963 as well as the LNTB negotiations caused Khrushchev to push for a reorientation of the Warsaw Pact Organization from Europe towards East Asia. Yet some of his East European allies knew to prevent this. With that, any association of China with the WPO, comradeship or hostile, was terminated.

Although the available sources are ambivalent, in retrospect the relationship between the PRC and the WPO seemed to be accidental, the result of the Soviet Union being the hinge between East Europe and Communist China. Both alliance systems were clearly directed against a particular regional threat—Japanese militarism and its allies (the United States) in East Asia and West Germany and NATO in Europe. Apart from the overall task of battling imperialism in any of its manifestations, no real overarching strategic goals united the two. The movement towards integration occurred during the high point of the Sino-Soviet relationship and under the supervision of Peng, who sought closer collaboration largely for military ends, during the 1955–57 period. Once Mao Zedong had decided to use the PLA, in particular, and foreign policy, in general, for his own domestic needs, the delicate relationship between the PRC and the WPO crumbled quickly. While the particular orientations of both alliances prevented greater integration, they also thwarted Khrushchev's attempts to use the one against the other.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for comments from Vojtech Mastny, the participants of the Warsaw Pact/NATO conference at Kent State University in April 2004, O. Arne Westad, and one anonymous reviewer.

Notes

- [1] Niu, "Origins", 67. For an extensive coverage of Stalin's demands, see chapter 1 of Lüthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*.
- [2] Chen, *China's Road*.
- [3] Chen and Kuisong, "Chinese Politics", 257.
- [4] Goncharenko, "Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation", 145–6.

- [5] Pei, *Zhonghua*, vol. 1, 35.
- [6] “Peng Dehuai’s speech at the Warsaw Conference of European Countries on Safeguarding Peace and Security in Europe”, 12 May 1955, at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_11.htm#RelatedDocuments, accessed 25 February 2004.
- [7] Domes, *Peng Te-huai*, 67.
- [8] Liu, *Chushi*, 8–13.
- [9] Shen, *Khrushchev*, no page numbers.
- [10] Wang, *Peng Dehuai nianpu*, 665–6; Liu, *Chushi*, 71.
- [11] See extensive coverage in chapters 1 and 2 of Lüthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*.
- [12] See extensive coverage in chapter 3 of Lüthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*.
- [13] MacFarquhar, *Origins*, vol. 2, 63–6, 75–6, 95.
- [14] Wang, *Peng*, 680–81; Pei, *Zhonghua*, vol. 2, 224–5 (third quote).
- [15] Wang, *Peng*, 681–91, 697.
- [16] Nash, *Other Missiles*, 45–75.
- [17] “Speech of the Head of the Soviet Delegation, N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Minister Council of the USSR, on the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on 24 May 1958”, *AAAA-MfAA*, Konferenzen und Verhandlungen mit DDR-Beteiligung, Microfiche A 14702, 1349.
- [18] Catudal, *Soviet Nuclear Strategy*, 45; Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 266–8.
- [19] Mao, *On Diplomacy*, 480, footnote 172; Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The last testament*, 258 (quote).
- [20] Contemporary China Series, *Dangdai*, 112; Wang, *Peng*, 681.
- [21] Wu, *Shinian*, 158.
- [22] Mao, “Talk with Yudin, Ambassador of the Soviet Union to China”, 22 July 1958, in Mao, *On Diplomacy*, 254.
- [23] “First Conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, 31 July 1958”, in Wolff, “One Finger’s Worth”, 52.
- [24] “First Conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, 31 July 1958”, in Wolff, “One Finger’s Worth”, 55.
- [25] Wang, *Peng*, 733, 734.
- [26] Liu, *Chushi*, 110–11.
- [27] Mao, “The Western World Will Inevitably Split Up”, 25 November 1958, in Mao, *On Diplomacy*, 280; Mao, “Remarks and Revisions on a Text of a Speech by Zhang Wentian on the International Situation”, 5 July 1959, *JYMW*, vol. 8, 339–40 (first quote); Mao, “Remarks on a Preliminary Summary of the Chargé d’Affaires in England on the Development of Contradictions between England, America, France, West Germany, etc”, 5 January and 12 February, 1959, *JYMW*, vol. 8, 36–7 (second quote).
- [28] MacFarquhar, *Origins*, vol. 2, 226; Brezhnev, *Kitai*, 52.
- [29] Li, *Waijiao*, 178–83; Wu, *Shinian*, 221–22; “Record of Conversation of Comrade Khrushchev N.S. with CC CCP Chairman Mao Zedong, Deputy Chairman CC CCP Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Lin Biao, Politburo Members Peng Zhen and Chen Yi, and Secretariat Member Wang Jiexiang, 2 October 1959”, in Wolff, “One Finger’s Worth”, 65–8.
- [30] Wu, *Shinian*, 230, 236–9; Si, “Zhonggong duidai Duleise”, 59 (first quote); Bo, *Ruogan*, vol. 2, 1142 (other quotes).
- [31] Wu, *Shinian*, 233–4.
- [32] Khrushchev made this appeal during the Hungarian Party Congress on 1 December 1959, see: *New York Times (NYT)*, 2 December 1959, 4.
- [33] “Record of conversation with the chairman of the People’s Republic of China comrade Liu Shaoqi”, 10 December 1959, *AVP RF*, fond 0100, opis 53, delo 8, papka 454, 5.
- [34] Wu, *Shinian*, 250–52.

- [35] “Speech of Comrade Kang Sheng on the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Members of the Warsaw Pact”, [4 February 1960], *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/3386, 87–99.
- [36] Dodic, *Historischer Rückblick*, 15–21. See extensive coverage in chapters 5 and 6 of Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*.
- [37] “Secret Decision on Albania”, 29 March 1961, at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_3/PCC_meetings/coll_3_PCC_1961.htm, accessed 25 February 2004.
- [38] Biberaj, *Albania*, 38.
- [39] For Mao’s focus on this issue during the summer of 1961, see: Wu, *Shinian*, 173, 457.
- [40] Bonwetsch and Kuhfuss, “Chruschtschow und der Mauerbau”.
- [41] Pei, *Zhonghua*, vol. 2, 244–5.
- [42] “Summary Report of the CPSU CC”, 17 October 1961, *RGANI*, fond 1, opis 4, delo 89, 26–222 and fond 1, opis 4, delo 90, 1–99; Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 514–15 (quote).
- [43] Delyusin, “Nekotorie”, 19–20.
- [44] Wu, *Shinian*, 458, 471–9; Liu, *Chushi*, 137, 142–5.
- [45] PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, *Zhou Enlai waijiao*, 325–6.
- [46] “Letter from Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to Central Committee of the Communist Parties of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia”, 31 October 1961, in: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_11.htm#RelatedDocuments, accessed 25 February 2004; “Letter by Tsedenbal to the Polish and other CCs concerning the level of representation of Asian observer countries at Warsaw Pact meetings”, 31 October 1961, at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/news/UpcomingEvents/2004_ulaanbaatar_docs.htm, accessed 25 February 2004.
- [47] Pei, *Zhonghua*, vol. 2, 356 (quote); Wu, *Shinian*, 471–5.
- [48] Mastny and Byrne, *Cardboard Castle*, 22–8.
- [49] MacFarquhar, *Origins*, vol. 3, 273–83.
- [50] MacFarquhar, *Origins*, vol. 3, 334. See extensive coverage in chapter 7 of Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*.
- [51] See extensive coverage in chapter 8 of Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*.
- [52] Quoted in: Li, *Lengnuan sui yue*, 320.
- [53] Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 582–4; Cousins, *The Improbable Triumvirate*, 45, 46.
- [54] Wu, *Shinian*, 504; Prozumenshikov, “The Sino-Indian Conflict”, 254–5.
- [55] Wu, *Shinian*, 556–7.
- [56] “The Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to the Central Committee of the C.P.C., March 1963”, Berton, *Chinese–Russian Dialogue*, vol. 1, no page numbers.
- [57] “Message from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Ambassador to the United States (Dobrynin)”, 1 April 1963, *FRUS* 1961–63, VI, 250–62.
- [58] “Commencement Address at American University in Washington, 10 June 1963”, Kennedy, *Public Papers of the President, 1963*, 459–64; Seaborg, *Kennedy*, 212–13; quoted in: Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 602; *Pravda*, 12 June 1963, 3.
- [59] *Peking Review* [*Beijing Review*], 30 (26 July 1963), 10–26.
- [60] The transcript of the speech is in: “Seventh Session”, 21 June 1963, *RGANI*, fond 2, opis 1, delo 658, 87, 87a.
- [61] *NYT*, 3 July 1963, 4.
- [62] “Editorial Note”, *FRUS* 1961–63, VII, 762–4; “Editorial Note”, *FRUS* 1961–63, V, 712–13; Abramson, *Spanning the Century*, 596; *NYT*, 3 July 1962, 1, 4, 26; 4 July 1963, 3.
- [63] “N. Khrushchev to dear comrade Walter Ulbricht”, 10 July 1963, *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/3387, 47–9.
- [64] “N. Khrushchev to dear comrade Walter Ulbricht”, 15 July 1963, *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/3387, 52–3.

- [65] “Protocol no. 21/63”, 4 July 1963, *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/J IV 2/2/885, 1; “Notes on a talk of the first secretaries of the CCs of the communist and workers parties on a talk with comr. N. S. Khrushchev on 6/30/1963”, *SÚA*, Archiv ÚV KSČ, Fond 07/16, Antonín Novotný–Zahraničí, karton 140, Návštěva s. Novotného u příležitosti 70. narozenin W. Ulbrichta v Berlíně–29.6.–1.7.1963, 1–7.
- [66] Stolper, *China*, 18–19, 143–4.
- [67] “Annual Report by the embassy of the GDR in the MPR”, 1/2/1963, *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/IV A 2/20/308, no continuous page numbers in file.
- [68] English translation of “Stenographic Record of the Meeting of the Politburo of the Romanian Workers’ Party Central Committee”, 18 July 1963, at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_11.htm#RelatedDocuments, accessed 25 February 2004.
- [69] English translation of “Memorandum by the Polish Foreign Minister (Rapacki)”, 20 July 1963, t: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_11.htm#RelatedDocuments, accessed on 25 February 2004.
- [70] Mastny and Byrne, *Cardboard Castle?*, 22–8.
- [71] Quoted in: Opris, “Attempts”, 16 (*AMAE*, fund 9 Warsaw 3, file year 1963, f. 51).
- [72] Quoted in *ibid.*, f. 27–28.
- [73] Quoted from: Rijnoveanu, “Romanian Perspective”, 9 (Alexandru Osca, Vasile Popa, *Romania, o fereastră deschisă în Cortina de Fier*. Focsani: Vantrop Publishing House, 1997, 150–52).
- [74] Contemporary China Series, *Dangdai Zhongguo*, 120; Li, *Lengnuan*, 320–22; Wu, *Shinian*, 628–30; Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 192–3. For the list of signatory nations, see: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control*, 18–23. The author identified these states through comparison of a list of the signatory states and a list of the UN member states (ordered according to admission), see: Stearns, *Encyclopedia*, 1078–9.
- [75] For good coverage of the talks, see: Wu, *Shinian*, 601–27.

References

- Abramson, Rudy. *Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891–1986*. New York: William Morrow, 1992.
- Arkhiv Veshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF)* (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia).
- Berton, Peter, ed. *The Chinese–Russian Dialogue: A Collection of Letters Exchanged between the Communist Parties of China and the Soviet Union and Related Documents*. Volume 1. Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1964.
- Biberaj, Elez. *Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986.
- Bo Yibo. *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* (Recollections of certain important decisions and events). Volume 2. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1993.
- Bonwetsch, Bernd and Peter M. Kuhfuss. “Chruschtschow und der Mauerbau: Die Gipfelkonferenz der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten vom 3.–5. August 1961.” (Khrushchev and the construction of the Wall: the summit conference of the Warsaw Pact States on 3–5 August 1961). *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte* 48, no. 1 (2000): 155–98.
- Brezhnev, A. A. *Kitai: ternisty put k dobrososedstvu: vosponminaniya i razmysleniya* (China: the thorny path to good neighbourhood: reminiscences and reflections). Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1998.
- Catudal, Honoré M. *Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: A Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking*. Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1988.
- Chen Jian. *China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

- Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong. "Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance." In *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963*, edited by Odd Arne Westad. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998, pp. 246–95.
- Contemporary China Series. *Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao* (Contemporary China: foreign relations). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1987.
- Cousins, Norman. *The Improbable Triumvirate: John F. Kennedy, Pope John, and Nikita Khrushchev*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1972.
- Delyusin, L. P. "Nekotorye razmyshleniya o nachale sovetско-kitaiskogo konfliktka" (Some reflections on the beginning of the Soviet–Chinese conflict). Paper presented at the conference "Sino-Soviet Relations and Cold War: International Scientific Seminar", Beijing, China, October 1997.
- Dodic, Lazar. *Historischer Rückblick auf die Stellung Albaniens im Welkommunismus (1941–1968)* (Historical review of the Albania's position in world communism (1941–1968)). Trittau: Jürgen Scherbarth, 1970.
- Domes, Jürgen. *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985.
- Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, various years.
- Goncharenko, Sergei. "Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation." In *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963*, edited by Odd Arne Westad. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998, pp. 141–64.
- Kennedy, John F. *The Public Papers of the President, 1963*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. *Khrushchev Remembers*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970.
- . *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974.
- Lewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai. *China Builds the Bomb*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.
- Li, Lianqing. *Lengnuan suiyue: yibosanzhe de ZhongSu guanxi* (Years of changing temperature: the twists and turns of Sino-Soviet relations). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1998.
- Li Yueran. *Waijiao wutai shang de xin Zhongguo lingxiu* (New China's leaders on the diplomatic stage). Beijing: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989.
- Liu Xiao. *Chushi Sulian banian* (Eight years as ambassador to the Soviet Union). Beijing: Dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1998.
- Lüthi, Lorenz M. *The Sino-Soviet Split: The Cold War in the Communist World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2008.
- MacFarquhar, Roderick. *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*. Volumes 2–3. *The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, 1997.
- Mao Zedong. *On Diplomacy*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998.
- . *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (JYMW)* (Mao Zedong's manuscripts after the founding of the PRC). Several volumes. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, several years.
- Mastny, Vojtech and Malcolm Byrne, eds. *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991*. Budapest: Central European University, 2005.
- Nash, Philip. *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
- Niu Jun. "Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance." In *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963*, edited by Odd Arne Westad. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998, pp. 47–89.
- Opris, Petre. "Attempts at Expanding the Warsaw Treaty Organization Towards Asia". Paper presented at the conference "New Central and Eastern European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia", Budapest, 30 October–2 November 2003.

- Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bestand: Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (PAAA-MfAA)* (Political Archive of the Office for Foreign Affairs, Files: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, Germany).
- Pei Jianzhang. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi* (A diplomatic history of the People's Republic of China). Volumes 1 and 2. 1949–1956. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994, 1998.
- PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp. *Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949–1975* (A record of Zhou Enlai's diplomatic activities, 1949–1975). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993.
- Prozumenshikov, M. Y. "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives". In *CWIHP Bulletin* 8–9 (Winter 1996/97): 251–7.
- Rijnoveanu, Carmen. "A Romanian Perspective on the Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1960–68". Paper presented at the conference "New Central and Eastern European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia", Budapest, 30 October–2 November 2003.
- Rossiiski Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI)* (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Moscow, Russia).
- Seaborg, Glenn T. *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- Shen Zhihua. *Khrushchev, Mao and the Unrealized Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation*. Available from: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_11/texts/Zhiua_engl.htm, accessed 25 February 2004.
- Si Fu. "Zhonggong duidai Duleise 'heping yanbian' zhanle de qianqian houhou." (The whole story how China handled Dulles' strategy of 'peaceful evolution'). In *Zhiqingzhe shuo* (Those who know the facts speak), edited by Chang Cheng. Volume 8. Beijing: Zhonghua qingnian chubanshe, 1999, pp. 42–71.
- Státní Ústřední Archiv (SÚA)* (Central State Archive, Prague, Czech Republic).
- Stearns, Peter N. *The Encyclopedia of World History*. 6th edition. Boston: Houghton & Mifflin, 2001.
- Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch)* (Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the Federal Archives, Berlin, Germany).
- Stolper, Thomas E. *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1985.
- Taubman, William. *Khrushchev: The Man and his Era*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2003.
- US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ed. *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 1959–1972*. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972.
- Wang Yanzhu, ed. *Peng Dehuai nianpu* (A chronicle of Peng Dehuai's life). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1998.
- Wolff, David, ed. "One Finger's Worth of Historical Events': New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959." *CWIHP Working Paper* No. 30 (August 2000).
- Wu Lengxi. *Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966: ZhongSu guanxi huiyulu* (Ten years of debate, 1956–1966: recollections of Sino-Soviet relations). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999.