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Fighting with Formulas over China: Japan and the United Kingdom at the United Nations, 1961-1971

DESPITE THE UNITED Nations' description of itself as the pioneer of world peace, the member states used it as a theatre for international confrontation throughout the cold war. Nikita Khrushchev expressed his anger at the capitalist enemy by pounding his shoe on the table in the general assembly. Adlai Stevenson asked the Soviet ambassador, Valerian Zorin, about the Soviet missile bases in Cuba the famous question: 'Yes or no – don't wait for the translation – yes or no.'¹ On the evening of 25 October 1971, the United Nations witnessed a third memorable scene of international power politics when it voted to transfer to the People's Republic of China (PRC), ruled from Beijing, the seat held on the security council as well as in the general assembly by the Republic of China (ROC) ruled from Taipei. When the result of the vote was announced, some of the PRC's African supporters celebrated by 'jump[ing] up and down', rhythmically clapping, or dancing in the corridor.² For the losers, the vote marked the end of a diplomatic imbroglio that had lasted more than twenty years.

The origin of the imbroglio is simple. Following the Chinese Communists' victory over the Nationalists in the civil war, the PRC, proclaimed at Beijing on 1 October 1949, notified the United Nations in November of its claim to be the sole representative of China. The Nationalist government of the ROC, which fled to Taiwan in December, refused to renounce its claim or to resign its membership. Once the United States and the Soviet Union took sides, the stand-off became a feature of the cold war that lasted until October 1971. What should happen to China proved less difficult to resolve than what should happen to Taiwan.

I thank the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for financial support.

1 S. Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York, 1995), p. 146.

2 Crowe to Parsons, 28 Oct. 1971 [Richmond, United Kingdom National Archives], F[oreign and C[ommonwealth Affairs] O[ffice Records] 21/813.

Many member states of the United Nations treated as a fantasy the claim of the ROC, which ruled an island with less than eight million inhabitants (in 1949), to act as the sole legal representative of 450 million (in 1949) Chinese. The ROC's supporters, however, led by the United States, which saw the PRC as its most radical critic and the ROC as a deterrent to Communism, spent huge sums in canvassing on its behalf. Partly because other Western or pro-Western members, including France and most northern European states, had recognized the PRC, the anti-Communist regimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that recognized the ROC lacked enough influence to ensure the success of its cause. Thus, the issue of which China should represent China hinged on the actions of two of the United States' closest allies, Japan and the United Kingdom. Until 1971, the United Kingdom, despite having recognized the PRC in 1950, was the only permanent member of the UN security council other than the United States and the ROC consistently to vote for US-sponsored resolutions to exclude it. Japan drummed up support for the ROC from the moment of its own admission in 1956. Without the endorsement of the United Kingdom and Japan, the United States would have failed to sustain the ROC at the United Nations long before 1971. This article demonstrates that, for the United Kingdom and Japan, the precondition for the admission of the PRC to the United Nations had once been membership also for Taiwan. But the votes they cast at the general assembly in 1971 showed that they had developed conflicting views on the importance of Taiwan rather than towards the admission of the PRC.

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ON 7 DECEMBER 1951, the United Nations' general assembly adopted a resolution tabled by Thailand that postponed discussion of China's representation. A similar resolution, sponsored by the United States, was passed by the assembly on 25 October 1952. The so-called 'moratorium' resolution suspended discussion until 1961, despite the efforts of PRC supporters such as the Soviet Union and India. The United Kingdom, given its recognition of the PRC, refrained from acknowledging the ROC as the sole legal representative of China; thus, whenever the Soviet Union proposed to admit the PRC, the United Kingdom abstained rather than opposed.

In the view of the UK government, the status of Taiwan remained 'undetermined' because its return to China after the Second World War had not been authorized by international agreement: the Cairo declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam declaration of 1945, which recommended Taiwan's return to China, were merely declarations of intent. As Steve Tsang suggests, the legal argument disguised security interests in East Asia during

the cold war.¹ The special relationship with the United States, the wish to contain the spread of Communism, and sympathy for indigenous Taiwanese mistreated by the president of the ROC, Chiang Kai-shek, all contributed to pro-Taiwanese sentiment. Some officials preferred to leave open the future of Taiwan; others looked forward to its independence. The United Kingdom acted on the premise that Taiwan should not be 'abandoned', even if welcoming the PRC into the international community by granting it UN membership was seen to be the best way to contain it.²

Until 1972, Japan, which recognized the ROC, had only unofficial relations with the PRC, a choice determined by the United States before the termination of the Allied occupation in 1952. Yet Taiwan occupied a special place in modern Japanese history as a trophy in 1895 of Japan's first victory over another major Asian power. When surrendering sovereignty over Taiwan in 1951 by the treaty of San Francisco, Japan did not acknowledge Taiwan's reunification with China. The geopolitical importance of Taiwan to the security of Japan; the gratitude towards the ROC regime in Taiwan for generous treatment of Japanese civilians and soldiers left on the mainland after the war; and responsibility for Taiwanese seen as pro-Japanese: all contributed to Japan's wish to preserve Taiwan. They did not, however, rule out trying to normalize relations with the PRC.

Conservative governments in Japan faced criticism from opposition parties and opinion leaders that support for the ROC epitomized Japan's deference to the United States. For the first twenty years after the Second World War, the United Nations was highly regarded by most Japanese, who attributed Japan's failed imperialist adventures in the 1930s and 1940s partly to the decision in 1933 to withdraw from the League of Nations. Such a consensus was rare in Japan during the cold war, when foreign policy was the subject of political dispute. The fact that the United Nations rejected the PRC's bid for membership, and accused it in 1951 of being an aggressor in Korea, provided conservative Japanese politicians with the excuse for not seeking diplomatic relations.³

By 1960, the United Kingdom and Japan were crucial to the ability of the United States to prolong the moratorium at the United Nations over the admission of the PRC. At the general assembly that year, however, the resolution to prolong the moratorium passed by a mere eight votes. Both

1 S. Tsang, *The Cold War's Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950-8* (London, 2006), pp. 61-2, 86-7.

2 V. S. Kaufman, *Confronting Communism: US and British Policies toward China* (Columbia, MO, 2001), pp. 98-101.

3 L. Pan, *The United Nations in Japan's Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945-92: National Security, Party Politics, and International Status* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 168-9; Z. B. Chen, *Sengo nihon no chigoku seisaku - 1950 nendai higashi ajia hokusai seiji no bunmyaku* (Tokyo, 2000), pp. 201-2.

in the United States, and in the United Kingdom and Japan, new tactics were recognized to be needed to meet the expected outcomes of the shifts in the global order.¹

* * * * *

UK OFFICIALS IN 1960 recognized that the increasing numbers of the PRC's supporters in the general assembly reflected its rise to political and military power and illustrated the dangers of leaving it in isolation. The PRC's rise at the United Nations was matched by the United Kingdom's decline, owing to the admission of its former Asian and African colonies. The UK ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Patrick Dean, warned the foreign secretary, the earl of Home, in December 1960, not to rely on the moratorium: it was 'only a question of time before the United States [was] defeated and the [Chinese] Communists seated'. He advised Home to try to persuade the John F. Kennedy administration to agree to admit the PRC before the issue could be exploited by the Communists.²

Home agreed. Late in November, he had told the prime minister of Italy, Amintore Fanfani, that he 'privately thought' that the PRC should be admitted to the United Nations but 'had not said so publicly'.³ Two months later, he made up his mind to go public: 'we have always felt, and we feel now,' he told the house of lords on 8 February 1961, 'that the facts of international life require that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations.'⁴ The state department, taken by surprise, commented that a change in policy would 'confront the cold, hard fact of the Communists' own attitude'. The US press were also critical. But Home did not back down. On 21 February, at a luncheon for US journalists, he repeated his statement.⁵ Then, just when the United Kingdom seemed likely to abandon the defence of the ROC, the Harold Macmillan government assured the Kennedy administration that it had no intention of splitting with the United States over the exclusion of the PRC,⁶ but wished to ensure that Taiwan would not be excluded as the price for the PRC's

1 Memcon, Rusk with Yeh, 3 Feb. 1961, *F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates]*: 1961-3, xxii. no. 3.

2 Memo, Dean for Home, 'Chinese Representation in the United Nations', 7 Dec. 1960 [UKNA], D[ominions] O[ffice Records] 169/6.

3 'Extract from Record of Meeting', 21 Nov. 1960 [UKNA], Pr[im]e M[inister's Office Records] 11/4673.

4 Oral Answers made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (The Earl of Home), Lords Sitting of 8 Feb. 1961, *Parl[iamentary] Deb[ate]*s, House of Lords, 5th series, cccxviii. 438.

5 Fowler to Pritchard, 15 Feb.; embassy, Washington, to F[oreign] O[ffice], no. 110, 18 Feb.; FO to representative in Commonwealth member states, no. 103, 24 Feb. 1961, DO 169/6.

6 FO to embassy, Washington, no. 1455, 10 March, and embassy, Washington to FO, no. 653, 14 March 1961, PREM 11/4673; memcon, Kennedy with Macmillan, 5 April 1961, *FRUS*: 1961-3, xxii. no. 18.

admission. In mid-March 1961, when the UK ambassador at Washington, Sir Harold Caccia, explained the goal to the secretary of state, Dean Rusk, he was asked whether the United Kingdom was serious about its support for PRC membership or, as Caccia admitted, whether it simply wanted 'to be on a better wicket in the UN'. Caccia gave a similarly affirmative answer to Rusk's next question, whether, if the West offered the PRC terms for admission and it turned them down, the Kennedy administration could 'assume that the British would not be overly bothered'.¹

Caccia's stance was endorsed by the Macmillan government. On 30 March, Dean, who had urged a change in policy, conceded that the United Kingdom shared with the United States 'the objective of improving the Western position at the United Nations by adopting a more realistic approach and, if possible, putting the Communists in the wrong'. As for PRC membership, he continued: 'It is not essential to this aim the Communist Chinese should actually take their seat.'² A week later, Home and Macmillan made similar comments to Kennedy and Rusk.³

The United States and the United Kingdom were seeking slightly different solutions: the United States hoped to block PRC membership by agreeing to debate its admission under the category of 'important question' under article eighteen of the UN charter. As an 'important question' needed a two-thirds majority to pass, the United States was confident of defeating it. Failing that, the United States proposed a 'two-Chinas' formula that would give both the ROC and the PRC seats at the United Nations as 'successors' to the formerly united state of China.⁴

The United Kingdom doubted whether either the PRC or the ROC would accept the 'two-Chinas' formula, as neither recognized the other. The United Kingdom's 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula aimed to create a 'sovereign state' named Taiwan that was not part of China. China's seat, with its membership of the security council, would be transferred to the PRC; Taiwan, as another 'country', would have its own seat in the general assembly. At the Anglo-American summit in April 1961, Home suggested that the ROC should 'voluntarily leave the UN', renouncing China's seat, before applying for readmission as Taiwan. But neither he nor Rusk was willing to try to persuade the ROC.⁵ Meantime, Japan, too, opted for a 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula. From January to June 1961, when the

¹ Memcon, Rusk with Caccia, 14 March 1961, *FRUS: 1961-3*, xxii. no. 13.

² Mission, United Nations, to FO, no. 75, 30 March 1961, PREM 11/4673.

³ Memcon, Kennedy, Rusk, Macmillan with Home, 5 April 1961, *FRUS: 1961-3*, xxii. no. 18.

⁴ Memo, 'Secretary of State's Meeting with Mr Rusk', 4 April 1961, PREM 11/4673; memo, 'Chinese Representation in the United Nations', 5 April 1961 [College Park, MD], U[nited] S[tates] N[ational] A[rchives II, Record Group 59, Records Relating to the] U[nited] K[ingdom 1962-74], box 5.

⁵ Memo, 'Meeting with Rusk'; memcon Kennedy, Rusk, Macmillan with Home, 5 April 1961, *FRUS: 1961-3*, xxii. no. 18.

ministry of foreign affairs re-examined Japan's China policy on behalf of the Ikeda Hayato government, officials reached consensus on two points: first, the conservative government should take account of domestic criticism of its China policy, and second, regardless of whether the PRC was admitted to the United Nations, the ROC should keep its membership. Officials disagreed, however, about how much support Japan should give to the ROC. Some preferred to try to maintain the status quo: rule over the mainland and Taiwan by different regimes;¹ others wished to take advantage of the UN debate on China's representation to try permanently to separate Taiwan from China.² As summarized by the vice foreign minister, Takeuchi Ryūji, on 28 May, officials disagreed whether support for Taiwan's membership in the United Nations as an independent state might offend the ROC as seriously as the PRC.³

By late April, the issue was taken up by Ikeda himself in preparation for an official visit to the United States in early June, when China would be the subject of talks with the Kennedy administration. The government concluded that, in the long term, relations with the PRC must be normalized, but, in the short term, higher priority should be given to the defence of the ROC's membership in the United Nations; to ensure a separate membership for Taiwan, even if the PRC, in protest, refused to take up the offer of membership. The prime minister, the chief cabinet secretary, Ōhira Masayoshi, and the foreign minister, Kosaka Zentarō, agreed to the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula.⁴ To persuade the ROC to concede that its sovereignty extended only over the island of Taiwan, the Ikeda government looked for help to the United Kingdom.

Majority opinion at the ministry of foreign affairs regarded the United Kingdom as a critical but unstable ally on the issue of China's representation at the United Nations. It was critical, owing to its influence over members of the Commonwealth such as Canada and Australia, and perhaps over the United States. But some officials wondered whether the United Kingdom's pro-PRC stance might lead to a split with the United States and thereby imperil the West's united front against the PRC's admission.⁵ The

1 Bureau of Asian Affairs, 'Chūkyō taisaku', 12 April 1961; Bureau of Asian Affairs, 'Ketsugi an (Ajia kyoku dai san an)', 17 March 1961 [Tokyo, Diplomatic Record Office], M[inistry] o[f] F[oreign] A[ffairs] D[eclassified] D[ocuments] 2006-725.

2 Con. gen., Hong Kong, to MOFA, no. 176, 20 Feb. 1961, MOFA, DD 2006-725; 'Ikeda sōri hō bei dai 6 kai uchiawase', 5 May 1961 [Tokyo], D[iplomatic] R[ecord] O[ffice], M[icrofilms] R[eleased] A-0361.

3 'Chūgoku mondai (Hakone)', 28 May 1961, DRO, MR A-0361.

4 'Ikeda sōri hō bei dai 2 kai uchiawase', 21 April 1961, 'Ikeda sōri hō bei dai 6 kai uchiawase', 'Ikeda sōri hō bei 8 kai uchiawase', 1 June 1961, and 'Chūgoku mondai (sōri hō bei shiryō)', *ibid.*; 'Chūkyō mondai no shozentei to kanōna taisaku (kaitei)', 18 March 1961, MOFA, DD 2006-725.

5 'Chūkyō mondai no shozentei to kanōna taisaku (kaitei)'; 'Dai 10 kai ajia, taiheiyō chūiki kōkanchō kaigi kiroku, jōkan', 1 June 1961, MOFA, DD 2004-1225; 'Ikeda sōri hō bei dai 5 kai uchiawase', 4 May

director of the Asian affairs bureau, Iseki Yūjirō, claimed that Japan's formula was 'slightly closer' to the United Kingdom's than the United States'. The Japanese ambassador at London, Ōno Katsumi, recommended that, in the event of a split, Japan should align with the United Kingdom rather than the United States. Or, if the future of Taiwan was the issue, abstain.¹ Although the government rejected Ōno's advice, it decided to try to persuade the United Kingdom to support the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula at the United Nations.

In Washington in June, Ikeda told Kennedy that the moratorium should be replaced by a formula that might 'actively raise Taiwan's status' at the United Nations, and that 'it may not be proper to seek a solution to the problem of Chinese Communist admission to the UN before taking action on the broader Taiwan question and securing this area for the free world.'² In a meeting with Rusk, Kosaka explained that, 'for Japan, the crux of the [Chinese representation] problem is keeping Taiwan free from Chinese Communist control.' At a second meeting, Kosaka added that Japan would not recognize the PRC until the issue of China's representation at the United Nations had been settled. Japan, which wished to support a formula agreed between the United States and the United Kingdom, sent Kosaka to London to rally the British.³

When Kosaka met Home on 7 July, he laid out three principles: first, 'Taiwan should not be passed to China'; second, 'the seven million indigenous Taiwanese people should not be sold to the Communist bloc against their will'; and third, whenever the PRC joined the United Nations, it should not inherit the ROC's permanent seat on the security council. He repeated his remarks to Rusk about the need to persuade the ROC to confine its territorial claim to Taiwan and hinted at the need for the United Kingdom's help. Home, while endorsing the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula, suggested that as Japan had closer ties than the United Kingdom with the ROC, it should persuade Chiang to renounce the Nationalists' claim to sovereignty over the mainland. Kosaka replied that 'Japan was not available to take the job of persuading the ROC because it had little influence over Taiwan' and because the Japanese felt 'indebted to the president, Chiang'.⁴ As Home warned Kosaka not to expect the United Kingdom to take the lead, as it 'had no influence over Taiwan', they agreed

1961, DRO, MR A-0361.

¹ 'Dai 10 kai ajia, taiheiyō chūiki kōkanchō kaigi kiroku, jōkan', *ibid.*; 'Chūgoku mondai (Hakone)', 28 May 1961, DRO, MR A-0361.

² Memcon, Kennedy with Ikeda, 20 June 1961 [Boston MA], J[ohn] F[.] K[ennedy] L[ibrary], N[ational] S[ecurity] C[ouncil Files]: Countries, box 125.

³ Embassy, Washington, to MOFA, no. 1655, 20 June and no. 1709, 22 June 1961, DRO, MR A-0361; memcon, Kennedy with Ikeda, 21 June 1961, *FRUS: 1961-3*, xxii. no. 337.

⁴ Embassy, London, to MOFA, no. 899, 8 July 1961, DRO, MR A-0363.

to foist the task onto the Kennedy administration which, in turn, decided to suggest what it claimed to be a less provocative formula.¹

By the end of July, the Kennedy administration had abandoned both the 'two-Chinas' formula and the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula, for the 'important question' formula. Chiang's opposition to the first was one reason; another was opposition in Congress to the PRC's admission, whether as one China or as one of two.² The United Kingdom treated the 'important question' formula merely as a 'pretty transparent device for delaying' the PRC's admission. Macmillan and Home neither turned down a US request for support, nor agreed to support the formula, because of their wish to improve long-term relations with the PRC; a modified formula was needed.³

The Macmillan government agreed in August to endorse the 'important question' resolution in the general assembly on two conditions: first, the Kennedy administration brought 'all possible pressure' to bear on the Nationalist regime at Taipei to concede that it was 'no more than the government of Formosa'; and second, the resolution should be combined 'explicitly' with a resolution that set up a committee to study the issue of China's representation. The Kennedy administration agreed on the assumption that the second resolution would, in Rusk's words, 'rally votes for postponing a decision on a motion to seat Peiping [Beijing]'. When Home suggested that the resolution should disguise what would otherwise 'appear to be no more than a device to prolong the moratorium under another guise',⁴ Rusk replied that the committee should not be limited to China's representation but also examine membership generally and the composition of UN councils: the 'consideration of these two broad questions ... would result in shelving the Chinese representation issue in the UN for at least another year and in taking at least some of the heat off this issue.'⁵

The exchange left the Macmillan government dissatisfied. On 26 August, Home told Caccia that he did 'not like the idea' of expanding the committee's responsibilities, and instructed him to warn Rusk that the

¹ Embassy, London, to MOFA, no. 901, 8 July, *ibid.*; memo, 'Visit of Japanese Foreign Minister', 19 July 1961, DO 169/7.

² Embassy, Taipei, to state dept., no. 824, 21 June 1961; 'Conference at White House on China Representation at United Nations and Outer Mongolia – United Nations Membership Application', 28 July 1961, *FRUS: 1961-3*, xxii. nos. 32, 44; Wallner to Cleveland, 30 June 1961, *FRUS: 1961-3*, xxii. no. 172.

³ Kaufman, *Confronting Communism*, pp. 155–6; 'Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr Rusk', 6 Aug.; 'Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State, Mr Rusk and M. Couve de Murville', 7 Aug.; 'China', 12 Aug. 1961: PREM 11/4673.

⁴ 'Conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr Rusk', 6 Aug. 1961, *ibid.*; memo, Home, 'Chinese Representation in the United Nations', Aug. 1961, DO 169/7.

⁵ Embassy, Washington, to FO, no. 1888, 9 Aug. 1961, DO 169/7; memo, 'Predictable Major Issues in the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations', Aug. 1961, JFKL, NSC, box 310A.

United Kingdom would find it 'impossible to support the projected American tactics'.¹ Nor did the United Kingdom expect the PRC's supporters to remain silent. If they tabled a counter-resolution proposing the PRC's admission, the United Kingdom would have difficulty voting against it.² Opinion polls showed that, by the end of 1961, a majority of the UK public supported the PRC's admission, whereas fewer than 10 per cent thought the ROC should be the sole representative of China.³ The Macmillan government had to try to forestall an open split with the Kennedy administration by voting for the 'important question' and committee resolutions while abstaining on the annual Soviet-sponsored resolution to admit the PRC.⁴

Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States was able to satisfy the other. Owing to the unpopularity of the proposed committee among member states, the Kennedy administration gave up the idea of sponsoring it on 28 November. The decision left the United Kingdom to choose between three options: voting for the 'important question'; voting for the Soviet resolution paving the way for the PRC's admission; or taking the initiative to table the study committee resolution. When asked by the Kennedy administration to sponsor the proposed committee, Home wondered whether doing so would regain some of the PRC's goodwill lost by supporting the 'important question'. Dean agreed with him, but the chargé d'affaires at Beijing, Michael N. Stewart, disagreed on the grounds that, if the United Kingdom sponsored the committee, it would be bound by the committee's decisions. On 8 December, Home told Dean not to sponsor the committee. As with the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula, the Macmillan government shied away from controversy.⁵

In the event, the United Kingdom voted in December 1961 for both the 'important question' and the Soviet resolutions. In supporting the second, Dean read a carefully phrased statement that the vote 'does not prejudice' the United Kingdom's position that 'the sovereignty over the island of Formosa is undetermined' and 'who should represent Formosa in the United Nations is also undetermined'.⁶ The Kennedy administration, if disappointed, could not complain because, with UK support, the 'important question' resolution passed with a comfortable majority: 'the United

1 FO to embassy, Washington, no. 5845, 26 Aug. 1961, DO 169/7.

2 Embassy, Washington, to FO, no. 2188, 1 Sept. 1961, *ibid*.

3 Murrow to Kennedy, 5 Dec. 1961, *FRUS: 1961-3*, xxv, no. 133.

4 Untitled memo, 1 Sept., 1961, PREM 11/4673.

5 Kaufman, *Confronting Communism*, pp. 153-4; London to New York, no. 5217, 24 Nov., embassy, Beijing, to FO, no. 599, 25 Nov., mission, New York, to FO, no. 2212, 25 Nov., FO to mission, New York, no. 5291, 28 Nov., and mission, Beijing, to FO, no. 610, 29 Nov. 1961, DO 169/7; FO to mission, New York, no. 5516, 8 Dec. 1961, DO 169/8.

6 Mission, New York, to FO, no. 2574, 16 Dec. 1961, PREM 11/4673.

States' success was so pronounced', Dean reported on 16 February 1962, 'that our vote [for the Soviet resolution] caused no public rancour'.¹

The PRC ignored the vote, even though it could have been interpreted as an expression of the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula to which the PRC objected. The PRC focused its criticism on the United States, and on Japan, which it stated had 'acted in the most shameless way'.² The criticism was justified: Japan had not only co-sponsored the 'important question' resolution, but, unlike the United Kingdom, had also voted against the Soviet resolution. The votes were the result of a sophisticated calculation of Japan's own interests.

When asked by the United States in mid-August 1961 to support the 'important question' resolution, Japan agreed, provided that the United Kingdom, France, and other Western states also supported it. When, in early November, the United States asked Japan to sponsor the resolution, Japan agreed unconditionally,³ but suggested that countries that either recognized the PRC or refused to have relations with both it and the ROC should also become co-sponsors. For a month, Japan and the United States tried unsuccessfully to recruit Canada, Malaya, Thailand, Turkey, and some former French colonies in Africa (many of which recognized the PRC) to co-sponsor the resolution. On 1 December, Japan, the United States, Italy, Australia, and Colombia, all of which recognized the ROC, were the five co-sponsors.⁴

The Ikeda government did try to leave room for an improvement in relations with the PRC. After some members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) cautioned against an overtly anti-PRC stance, Ikeda ordered the foreign ministry to tone down the Japanese ambassador's scheduled speech at the general assembly, of which the draft had questioned the PRC's qualifications as a peace-loving country. Ikeda, who had even wondered whether Japan should abstain, told the foreign ministry that 'in spite of our obligations to the ROC and the United States, we should not ignore the ultimate trend towards the PRC's admission to the UN'.⁵ Such long-term considerations always took second-place, however, to preserving Taiwan's membership in the United Nations as a sovereign state. This did not mean that the mainland was unimportant to Japan: quite the opposite. According to Iseki at the foreign ministry, 'British rela-

¹ Dean to Home, 16 Feb. 1962, DO 169/8.

² Mission, Beijing, to FO, no. 672, 22 Dec. 1961, *ibid*.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵ 'Kokuren ni okeru Chūgoku daihyōken mondai o meguru Matsumura, Takasaki ryōshi no ugoki', 27 Nov. 1961 and 'Chūgoku mondai ni kansuru ajiakyoku kaigi kiroku', 2 Dec. 1961, MOFA, DD 2002-181.

tions with Communist China are far less substantial than those between Japan and Communist China.¹ But geopolitics and history could not be ignored. The more Japan worried about its long-term relationship with the mainland, the more difficulty it had in cutting its ties to Taiwan. In time, this dilemma widened the split between Japan and the United Kingdom.

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AFTER 1961, THE 'important question' resolution was not put to the vote until 1965. The PRC's supporters failed each year to pass a counter-resolution and the ROC remained the sole representative of China at the United Nations and in most other inter-governmental organizations. Meantime, the ROC's supporters prepared for the inevitable face-off in the general assembly. The political context changed rapidly. The Soviet Union ceased in 1963 to organize support for the PRC at the United Nations, owing to the split in the Communist bloc after 1959; and, in 1962, the PRC also split with its other principal sponsor, India. To balance these setbacks, in 1962 the PRC helped to secure a fragile peace in Laos and, two years later, further weakened the ROC by winning recognition from France, a permanent member of the security council. The political victory was matched by a military victory: the successful test of an atomic bomb in October 1964 made the PRC the fifth member of the nuclear weapon holders' club.

The Macmillan government recognized the PRC's increasing importance in international affairs. Macmillan himself had an argument with Rusk in June 1962 over the United States' opposition to the PRC's admission to the United Nations, and his successor in October 1963 as prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was even more convinced of the need for a new China policy. Like Macmillan, Douglas-Home was alarmed by the emergence of the PRC as another nuclear power, and unless the United States agreed to allow the PRC to join the United Nations, the latter would not take part in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.² Douglas-Home had had the chance in 1962 to make a 'useful friend' (in his words) of the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi, at the Geneva conference on Indo-China. When he had asked Chen why the PRC refused to exchange ambassadors with the United Kingdom, despite its vote for the PRC's admission, Chen replied that the United Kingdom's support for the 'important question' resolution was tantamount to a 'half positive vote' when the PRC needed a 'full vote'.³ Although the United Kingdom used

¹ 'Dai 10 kai ajia, taiheiyōchiiki kōkanchō kaigi kiroku, jōkan', 1 June 1961, MOFA, DD 2004-1225.

² Kaufman, *Confronting Communism*, pp. 162, 167; memcon, Rusk with Macmillan, 24 June 1962, *FRUS: 1961-3*, xxii, no. 132.

³ A. Douglas-Home, *The Way the Wind Blows* (London, 1976), p. 169; S. D. Zhang, *Zhong Guo Chong*

the excuse of US pressure to explain its stance, its unwillingness to jeopardize Taiwan's international status remained the insurmountable hurdle to closer relations.

The foreign office and Dean continued to think 'one-China, one-Taiwan' the preferred formula,¹ even after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian War in 1962 and the normalization of the PRC's relations with France in January 1964. The foreign secretary, R. A. Butler, acknowledged to Japan's foreign minister, Ōhira Masayoshi, on 2 May 1964 that the PRC's membership in the United Nations would be 'salutary' and that the ROC's membership stood in the way. But he added that he 'did not necessarily mean that we thought Formosa should not have a seat in the United Nations'. Butler, confident in the viability of the formula, was willing to say so publicly.²

The success of the PRC's first nuclear test on 16 October 1964 and the election of a Labour government the same day led to a noticeable change in the United Kingdom's stance. The new prime minister, Harold Wilson, was known to support the PRC's admission to the United Nations, as was the foreign secretary, Patrick Gordon-Walker. During a visit to the United States in November, Gordon-Walker refused to give a firm commitment that the Labour government would continue to support the 'important question' formula. He also startled Rusk by hinting that the United Kingdom might lobby for the PRC's admission 'at future sessions' of the general assembly.³

Gordon-Walker was not alone among UK officials, who were being targeted in a PRC campaign against countries that defended ROC membership. On 25 November, the British chargé d'affaires at Beijing, Terence W. Garvey, was summoned to the foreign ministry to receive a memorandum warning Western countries (such as the United Kingdom) that recognized the PRC not to endorse UN resolutions that proposed separate representation by the PRC and the ROC.⁴ Such intransigence cast doubt on the feasibility of the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula. On 23 December, the foreign office warned Garvey that the formula might lead to a 'real chance

Fan Lian He Guo Jishi (Harbin, 1999), pp. 309-10.

¹ Memo, 'Chinese Representation in the United Nations', 16 Feb. 1962, DO 169/8; 'Ikeda sōri to Makumiran shushō to no kaidan yōshi (dai 1 kai)', 12 Nov. 1962, DRO, MR A-0363.

² Mission, New York, to FO, no. 1844, 31 Oct. 1962 and 'Record of a Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Japanese Foreign Minister', 2 May 1964, PREM 11/4673; 'Talking Points for Fifth Green-Nakagawa Conversation', 26 May 1964, USNA [Record Group 59, Subject Files of the Office of the Republic of] China [Affairs 1951-75], box 6.

³ Rec. con., Gordon-Walker with Rusk, 26 Oct. 1964, and Gordon-Walker to Wilson, 12 Nov. 1964, PREM 13/3533.

⁴ Mission, Beijing, to FO, no. 1147, 25 Nov. 1964, *ibid.*

of trouble' if tabled during the forthcoming general assembly.¹ The head of the foreign office's far east department, Murray MacLehose, even suggested that the 'best solution' from the UK viewpoint would be for the ROC 'simply to walk out of the UN': 'Taiwan's exclusion from the UN should not be a matter of overwhelming concern,' he told the US deputy assistant secretary for far eastern affairs, Marshall Green, on 28 November; 'West Germany, Switzerland, and others are not [UN] members.'²

Although the Labour government's change in stance caused a stir, the United Kingdom was not the only Western state trying to find a more viable formula to solve the problem of China's representation at the United Nations. Many US officials also saw the need for change: not towards the grant of membership, but towards a formula that allowed them to place the blame for refusal on the Chinese Communists themselves.³ Even though both the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' and 'two-Chinas' formulas met the need, as the PRC would refuse to accept either, both were flawed. Senior officials at the state department wondered whether restricting the ROC's sovereignty to Taiwan might provoke the Nationalists to try to make a deal with their Communist rivals. Even worse, support for the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula would do 'more harm with Chinese of all stripes' because they would 'interpret our action as an effort to separate off part of the national territory'.⁴ The Wilson government had similar doubts about the viability of the formula, while Japan, on the other hand, was unwilling to consider any formula that may cause difficulties for Taiwan at the United Nations.

At every meeting with Western politicians since 1961, the Japanese had been the most serious advocate of the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula. Some foreign ministry officials also suggested using the ROC's predicament at the United Nations to lever the Nationalist regime in Taiwan into declaring independence.⁵ News of France's recognition of the PRC took the Japanese by surprise: the government came under immediate pressure to change its stance. Owing to the lack of a mention of Taiwan in the Franco-Chinese communiqué, Japanese officials mistakenly concluded that France had adopted the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula, in which case Japan, too, could recognize the PRC without abandoning Taiwan. In

1 FO to mission, Beijing, no. 2102, 23 Dec. 1964, PREM 13/3533.

2 Embassy, Beijing, to FO, no. 1253, 22 Dec. 1964, and mission, New York, to FO, no. 2943, *ibid.*; memcon, MacLehose with Green, 28 Nov. 1964, USNA [Record Group 59, Office of] A[sian] C[ommunist] A[ffairs], Subject Files 1953-65], box 1.

3 Thomson to Bundy, 28 Oct., and memo, Komer to Bundy, 23 Nov. 1964, *FRUS: 1964-8*, xxx. nos. 63, 68.

4 Memo, 'The Republic of China', 11 Sept. 1964, *FRUS: 1964-8*, xxx. no. 48; Johnson to Rostow, 28 Jan. and Grant to Yager, 8 April 1965, USNA, ACA, box 1.

5 'Kokumin seifu taisaku ni tsuite', 6 Nov. 1963, DRO, MR A-423.

the event, after weeks of silence, France broke off diplomatic relations with the ROC: 'that [French] idea of solving the problem through a one-China, one-Taiwan formula has sadly failed,' Ōhira lamented in the upper house of the national diet on 11 February, the day the breach was announced.¹ The next day, he told the lower house that if the PRC was admitted into the United Nations with the 'blessing of the world', Japan would have to 'make a serious decision' about its relationship with the PRC.²

Ōhira's statement, which officially stipulated admission to the United Nations as the prerequisite for Japan's recognition of the PRC, had a dual effect. In the long term, it provided an excuse for switching diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC; in the short term, it stiffened the government's attitude. During the foreign ministry's annual meeting in early June of chiefs of missions from the Asia Pacific region, a number of officials aired misgivings about Ōhira's remarks. The ambassador to the ROC, Kimura Shirōshichi, said that Ōhira's 'ambiguous' position as to what Japan might do after the PRC had been admitted to the United Nations was causing 'suspicions' in Taipei. The consul general at Bombay, Yoshikawa Shigezō, said that Japan should not disclose its 'real intention' but disguise it until 'future bargaining with the Chinese Communists'.³

The prime minister echoed the criticism. The day after Ōhira's speech, Ikeda told the upper house that, although he agreed with Ōhira, the government would not cease to support the 'important question' resolution. On 4 March, he added that Japan would not normalize relations with the PRC simply because it had been admitted to the United Nations: the required 'blessing of the world' implied that Japan would reconsider its stance only when 'countries all around world', including Japan's allies, recognized that the PRC was a 'very friendly state'. In August, he assured the ROC that even if the PRC were admitted to the United Nations, it 'should not be considered automatic that Japan will recognize the Chinese Communists'.⁴

While the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula enjoyed wide support in the LDP and the foreign ministry, some officials were apprehensive about involving Japan in the movement for Taiwan's independence. Legally, such involvement could be regarded as intervention in the ROC's internal affairs, an act prohibited by the peace treaty signed with the ROC in 1952.⁵

¹ *Sangiin Gaimu Iinkai Kaigiroku Dai 2 Gō*, ed. Sangiin jimukyoku, 11 Feb., 1961, p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, 12 Feb. 1961, p. 4.

³ 'Dai 13 kai ajia, taiheiyō chiiki kōkanchō kaigi gijiroku', 2 June 1964, MOFA, DD 2004-979.

⁴ *Sangiin Yosan Iinkai Kaigiroku Dai 4 Gō*, ed. Sangiin jimukyoku, 13 Feb. 1961, p. 19; *Sangiin Yosan Iinkai Kaigiroku Dai 6 Gō*, ed. Sangiin jimukyoku, 4 March 1961, p. 4; 'Ikeda sōri to Chōgun hishochō to no dai ni kai kaidan yōshi', 20 Aug. 1964, DRO, MR A-395; 'Arubaniashiki ketsugian ga saitaku sareta baai no mondaiten (dai ni an)', 10 Dec. 1964, MOFA, DD 2006-719.

⁵ "“Taiwan jūmin no jiketsuken” o mitomeru sengenteki ketsugian (kanada teian) o teishutsu suru koto

And a commitment to independence for Taiwan would prohibit friendly relations with the PRC.¹

Whereas Ikeda was sympathetic towards the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula, Satō Eisaku, who succeeded him in November 1964, was aware of the danger that if Japan (and its allies) supported the formula too openly, it might anger both the PRC and the ROC.² But he did not change his predecessor's preference for 'Taiwan first'. Whereas the US and UK governments were re-examining the case for excluding the PRC from the United Nations prior to the general assembly's session in 1965, the Japanese government remained preoccupied with retaining Taiwan's membership, whether known as the ROC or by another name. Stewart, who replaced Gordon-Walker as foreign secretary in January 1965, tried to balance the United Kingdom's relationships with the PRC and the United States. While agreeing to support the 'important question' resolution in the general assembly, he also instructed the UK ambassador to the United Nations, Lord Caradon, on 4 November to 'speak more positively' of the PRC's admission by warning the assembly of the 'dangers of putting off this matter indefinitely'.³ This stance alarmed the Japanese who hoped, vainly, that the United Kingdom would not abandon Taiwan.⁴ While willing to support the PRC's admission, and not planning to take the lead in evicting the ROC, Stewart warned the Japanese that the ROC's unrealistic claim to sovereignty over the mainland might cost it its membership. The Japanese misinterpreted such statements as support for the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula. Whereas the United Kingdom's top priority were the terms of the PRC's admission, Japan's top priority was the attempt to prevent the ROC's eviction.⁵

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IN THE GENERAL assembly of 1965, the vote on a resolution sponsored by Albania that switched China's membership from the ROC to the PRC tied at 47 votes. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, aware that in 1966 such a resolution might pass, failed to agree on how to prevent it.

The Wilson government interpreted the vote to mean that the 'important question' formula was no longer a viable means of excluding the PRC

no chōtan', 8 Dec. 1964, MOFA, DD 2006-719.

¹ 'Chūgoku mondai', 14 Dec. 1964, 2002-175, *ibid.*

² 'Dai 13 kai ajia taiheiyō chiiki kōkanchō kaigi gijiroku'; 'Satō sōri to Randoru chūnichī ei taishi to no kaidan ni tsuite', 24 Dec. 1964, DRO, MR A-227; 'Satō Rasku kaidan', 12 Jan. 1965, DRO, MR A-441.

³ State dept. to embassy, London, CA-61, 1 July 1965, USNA, [Record Group 59] S[ubject]-JN[umeric] F[iles] 1964-6, box 2785; FO to overseas missions, no. 444, 4 Nov. 1965, PREM 13/3533.

⁴ Embassy, London, to MOFA, no. 1268, 22 Oct., and no. 1363, 10 Nov. 1964, DRO, MR A-427.

⁵ 'Eikoku no chūgoku seisaku to nichiei kan no mondaiten', 1 Oct. 1965 and 'Shiina, Schuātō ryōgaishō kaidan', 19 Oct. 1965, *ibid.*

without appearing to do so. Stewart's successor in August 1966 as foreign secretary, George Brown, was willing to abandon Taiwan: 'the problem', he told the foreign minister of Canada, Paul Martin, in October 1966, 'was not to get Red China in while keeping in Formosa, it was to get Red China in'.¹ While not recognizing the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan, the United Kingdom ceased to make an annual statement at the United Nations about Taiwan's 'undetermined' status. Caradon explained to the general assembly in 1966 that the 'position of the British government on this point is so well known now that it appears superfluous to restate it'. The true reason, as the foreign office admitted three years later, was that the statement was 'a perennial irritant in our relations with Peking'.²

Japan moved in the opposite direction from the United Kingdom. Even though most Japanese understood that the issue of China's representation might soon be decided, and some acknowledged the long-term risk from the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula,³ the Satō government remained committed nonetheless to trying to prevent the ROC's expulsion.⁴ When the foreign minister, Shiina Etsusaburō, on a visit to London in October 1966, asked for support for the formula, he was lectured about the need to admit the PRC. On the subject of Taiwan, the foreign office merely restated that the status of the island was legally undetermined and offered 'frequently to exchange views on this matter'.⁵

By the end of 1966, Japan's 'Taiwan-first' policy had isolated it even from the United States. Owing partly to the military deadlock in Vietnam, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration was reconsidering the 'two-Chinas' formula. Whereas Rusk preferred to refuse the PRC membership, the ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, the secretary of defence, Robert McNamara, and many senior state department officials preferred that both the PRC and the ROC should be members. Johnson himself stated in public on 12 July 1966 that 'lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world'.⁶

¹ 'Record of a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Canadian Minister of External Affairs', 16 Oct. 1966, PREM 12/3533.

² 'Lord Caradon's Explanation of Vote on Chinese Representation', 28 Nov. 1966, FCO 21/656; memo, Wilson, 7 Oct. 1969, FCO 21/453.

³ 'Chūgoku ni taisuru kihon seisaku (an)', 25 April 1966 and 'Nihon no tai chūgoku seisaku', 7 Oct. 1966, MOFA, DD 2002-1127.

⁴ 'Kokuren ni okeru chūgoku daihyōken mondai shigi no kekka ni tsuite', n.d., 1965, MOFA, DD 2006-893; 'Chūgoku daihyōken mondai no toriatsukai ni tsuite', 10 May 1966 and 'Daihyōken mondai ni kansuru jimintō gaikō chōsakai no tōgi (yōten)', 13 Sept. 1966, MOFA, DD 2006-898.

⁵ Embassy, London, to MOFA, nos. 1639 and 1640, 3 Nov., and 'Daijin hatsugen koshi', 14 Oct. 1966, DRO, MR A-427.

⁶ Goldberg to Johnson, 28 April, memo, 'Need for New Tactics on Chinese Representation', 14 May, and memo, 'DOD Interest in ChirRep', 1 Sept. 1966, with editorial note, *FRUS: 1964-8*, xxx. no. 178;

Other Western allies moved more quickly. Canada, encouraged by the United Kingdom, planned to propose the 'two-Chinas' formula at the general assembly. The Johnson administration endorsed an alternative, sponsored by Italy, that merely called for a 'study committee' to examine the representation of China.¹ When US officials asked for Japan's support, they received an unusually cold response: the Satō government thought both Canada's and Italy's resolutions 'untimely', but agreed to support Italy's resolution after the United States guaranteed that the proposed committee would not recommend the eviction of Taiwan.²

Japan's refusal to shift its stance happened to suit the times. In 1966, the PRC was not interested in joining the United Nations; after the Cultural Revolution began in May of that year, the PRC's foreign-policy-making system, like its domestic political system, was paralysed by infighting. Chinese diplomats were recalled to be replaced by radicals; relations with friendly countries became tense; and within a few months, the number of the PRC's critics had substantially increased. The resolution at the general assembly of 1966 to admit the PRC suffered a heavy defeat – 46 for and 57 against – and the 'important question' resolution again passed with 51 for and 37 against. The annual votes on the resolution yielded similar results until 1970.

The Johnson administration was satisfied. Boggled down in Vietnam, it wished to open a back-channel for communication with the PRC, seen as North Vietnam's leading sponsor, but, until the end of its term, did not change its stance on the representation of China. Most US officials wished to prevent Taiwan's eviction: to separate it from the mainland according to the 'two-Chinas' or 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formulas. Until this became viable, they recommended postponing a decision.³

Western countries such as Canada and Italy continued to search for an alternative to the 'important question' formula that would open the door to the PRC. They presented the United Kingdom and Japan, which had more at stake, with a difficult choice. PRC-UK relations reached their nadir during the early phase of the Cultural Revolution, owing to the attacks on UK facilities on the mainland and in Hong Kong. After Red

memo, 'Polls Shows Most Americans Favour Two-China Policy', 27 June 1966, PREM 13/3533.

1 Memcon, Rusk with Martin, 20 Sept., and 'Chinese Representation', 5 Nov. 1966, *FRUS*: 1964-8, xxx. nos. 189, 200.

2 MOFA to missions, New York, Washington, and Taipei, no. 4204, 22 Nov. 1966, MOFA, DD 2006-898; 'Dai 21 kai kokurei sōkai ni okeru chūgoku daihyōken mondai o meguru atarashii ugoki ni tsuite – Gōrūdōbāgu shi no "santabābara hatsugen" (1969 nen 1 gatsu) no shinsō', Jan. 1971, MOFA, DD 2006-795.

3 'Highlights of China Panel Meetings, February 1-2', 3 Feb., 'Comments on Professor Rowe's ChiRep Study', 8 Nov. 1967, 'Policy toward Communist China', 22 Feb., and 'Policy toward the GRC', 30 April 1968, *FRUS*: 1964-8, xxx. nos. 236, 286, 302, 309.

Guards set fire to the office of the UK chargé d'affaires at Beijing in August 1967, one might have expected the Wilson government to shift its stance on PRC membership. However, one month later, Brown told the general assembly that, 'despite the serious effect which recent events have had on Anglo-Chinese relations, we still hold fully to the view that the Chinese People's Republic should be seated.'¹ The foreign office hoped that participation in the United Nations would have an 'educative effect' on the PRC.² Given this stance, there was little room for a change in policy towards Taiwan. A suggestion from some foreign and commonwealth office officials in 1967 that the United Kingdom should show more support for Taiwan was ignored.³

In Japan in the late 1960s, support for a new China policy was increasing. The foreign ministry's division of Chinese affairs implied, like the majority in the foreign and commonwealth office, that UN membership would oblige the PRC to behave more rationally.⁴ But most politicians and officials, preoccupied with the fate of Taiwan, assumed that if the ROC lost its membership in the near future, the government would lose the opportunity to reach an agreement with the PRC on Taiwan's future and, in the worst case, might be forced by public opinion to recognize the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan.⁵ The foreign minister, Aichi Kiichi, spoke for the majority opinion in July 1969: 'So far, the traditional way of handling the [China] issue should be considered the best and has to be followed, but it is true we always think over the problem with a touch of unease.'⁶

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AFTER MORE THAN three years of turmoil, politics in mainland China began to return to normal in March 1969, when the ideological controversy with the Soviet Union escalated into a border war. By the end of the year, the PRC concluded that the best way to strengthen its hand in dealing with the Soviet Union was a rapprochement with the United States.⁷ The PRC's

¹ Douglas-Home, speech at UN, 26 Sept. 1967, FCO 21/48.

² Denson to de la Mare, 25 Aug. 1967, FCO 21/48; memo, Brown, 4 Sept. 1967 [UKNA], CAB[inet Office Records] 148/33/18.

³ Mission, New York, to FCO, no. 8, 9 Jan., Hopson to de la Mare, 17 Jan., and de la Mare to Allen, 6 Feb. 1967, FCO 21/48.

⁴ 'Ajia taiheiyō chūiki taishi kaigi tōgiyō shiryō – chūgoku mondai', 21 March 1968, MOFA, DD 2002-1128; 'Waga kuni no chūkyō seisaku', 1 May 1968, MOFA, DD 2002-175.

⁵ 'Shōwa 43 nendo ajia, taiheiyō chūiki taishi kaigi gijiyōroku', 29 May 1968, MOFA, DD 2004-501; 'Waga kuni no gaikō seisaku taikō', 25 Sept. 1969, 2006-718; 'Nicchū kankei ni kansuru kihon shisaku', 24 Aug. 1970, 2002-1129, *ibid.*

⁶ 'Shōwa 44 nendo ajia, taiheiyō chūiki taishi kaigi gijiyōroku', 1 July 1969, MOFA, DD 2004-984.

⁷ *Hua Shuo Zhou Enlai – Zhi Qing Zhe Fang Tan Lu*, ed. Zhong Yang Wen Xian Yan Jiu Shi Di Er Bian Yan Bu (Beijing, 2000), pp. 384-94; X. Xiong, *Wo De Qing Bao Yu Wai Jiao Sheng Ya* (Beijing,

timing was excellent, as for Johnson's successor, Richard M. Nixon, co-operation with China was the key to his plan for a dignified withdrawal from Vietnam. In December, the United States persuaded the PRC to reopen the suspended ambassadorial talks in Warsaw.

More friendly PRC-US relations changed the political climate at the United Nations. Although the 'important question' resolution passed in 1970, Albania's resolution also obtained for the first time a simple majority. The ROC's supporters found themselves fighting a losing battle against the rest of the world. The least committed soon abandoned ship: Canada and Italy, having announced their decision to recognize the PRC, voted for Albania's resolution. The United Kingdom and Japan took longer to adjust, even though UK officials had hoped to ensure that they should not miss a turn in the tide. At the climax of the Cultural Revolution, UK diplomats at the United Nations predicted that a 'significant shift' in the PRC's attitude towards the outside world 'could result in a rapid change in the balance of votes'.¹ In 1969, the foreign and commonwealth office, sensing the change in US-PRC relations, began to wonder how long the Nixon administration would defend the ROC's membership. Four months before the opening of the 1970 general assembly, the head of the far eastern department, John Morgan, suggested that the United Kingdom should reconsider the 'important question' formula.² However, the UK missions in the United States and at the United Nations were less certain that events were moving the PRC's way.³

The general assembly vote destroyed the illusions about the feasibility of the 'important question' formula. Immediately afterwards, the minister of state at the foreign and commonwealth office, Joseph Godber, instructed the office to 'adopt a clear and unequivocal attitude' towards PRC membership not later than March 1971.⁴ During January 1971, senior officials notified both the PRC and the United States that the United Kingdom was considering a change of stance towards the representation of China at the United Nations.

In the talks with the PRC, the status of Taiwan stood in the way. On 15 January 1971, the parliamentary under-secretary of state at the foreign and commonwealth office, Anthony Royle, suggested to the PRC's chargé d'affaires at London, Pei Jianzhang, that the two countries should move

1999), pp. 170-201.

¹ 'Chinese Representation', 6 Dec. 1967, FCO 21/49.

² 'Chinese Representation: The Important Item', 29 May, and 'Chinese Representation at the United Nations: The Important Question Resolution', 3 July 1970, FCO 21/656.

³ Wilford to Morgan, 8 June, 'Chinese Representation at the UN', 14 July, 'Chinese Representation at the United Nations', 30 July 1970, FCO 21/656.

⁴ 'Chinese Representation in the United Nations', 10 Dec. 1970, FCO 21/658.

towards the exchange of ambassadors. In reply, Pei set two conditions: first, 'articulate' support for PRC membership in the United Nations; and second, close the UK consulate in Taiwan.¹ He did not mention the PRC's objection to the United Kingdom's view that the status of Taiwan was undetermined. Two months later, the PRC's premier, Zhou Enlai, during a conversation with the UK chargé d'affaires, John B. Denson, stressed that the obstacle to an exchange of ambassadors was the United Kingdom's endorsement of the 'important question' formula. Because his comments on the United Kingdom's view of the legal status of Taiwan were vague,² the PRC's reaction was interpreted in London as a less rigid stance on Taiwan.

The UK government's mistaken perception that the PRC was flexible about Taiwan arose from the reluctance of some senior officials and politicians to withdraw their support for 'independence'. Douglas-Home (again foreign secretary after the Conservative Party led by Edward Heath returned to office in June 1970) proposed to tell the Nixon administration that the United Kingdom would 'recognize' Taiwan if 'they were to opt to be a separate country'.³ Such support for the ROC, however, did not go unchallenged. The far east department wished the government not to commit itself to support for the independence of Taiwan. The deputy under-secretary at the foreign and commonwealth office, Stanley Tomlinson, commented in January 1971 that a declaration of Taiwan's independence by the ROC would place the UK government in 'a most awkward dilemma'. It was 'perhaps fortunate for us that this [Taiwan's independence] is a remote contingency'.⁴

The Heath government hoped to arrange the exchange of ambassadors without touching upon the future status of Taiwan. To make this happen, UK officials believed that they had to act swiftly: after a thaw in Sino-US relations, the PRC might raise the price for normalization by asking the United Kingdom to change its view of Taiwan's legal status.⁵ Thus, the

1 FCO to mission, Beijing, no. 29, 15 Jan. 1971, FCO 21/808; Zhang, *Chong Fan*, p. 310; 'Zhong Ying Jian Jiao Shi Mo', Xinhua News Agency article, 16 May 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-05/16/content_6106647.htm (last accessed, 22 March 2009).

2 *Zhou Enlai Nian Pu 1949-76 xia juan*, ed. Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Wen Xian Yan Jiu Shi (Beijing, 1997), p. 440.

3 Minute, Denza, 1 Dec. 1970, FCO 21/709; 'Chinese Representation at the United Nations', 7 Dec. 1970, FCO 21/658; 'Record of a Meeting of the Secretary of State's Advisory Group on United Nations Affairs', 23 Feb. 1971, FCO 21/808; 'Record of a Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Japanese Ambassador', 7 May 1971, FCO 21/897; minute, Douglas-Home, 10 April 1971, FCO 21/833.

4 Minute, Tomlinson, 28 Jan. 1971 and 'Chinese Representation in the United Nations', 1 Feb. 1971, FCO 21/808.

5 'Admission of China to the UN', 27 April 1971, FCO 21/808; 'Relations with China: Proposals for Improvement', 14 June 1971, CAB 148/116.

government accepted Pei's two conditions. On 22 June, Royle told Pei that the foreign office had already selected its first ambassador to the PRC and would withdraw its representatives in Taiwan. Under questioning from Pei, he confirmed the United Kingdom's opposition to the 'two-Chinas' formula but avoided making a clear statement about the 'one-China, one-Taiwan' formula that the United Kingdom preferred.¹ His caution did not go unnoticed. On 10 July, the PRC's vice foreign minister, Qiao Guanhua, showed Denson the draft of a communiqué on the exchange of ambassadors that contained an article that implied the recognition by the United Kingdom of Taiwan as a province of the PRC.² Some UK officials had been expecting such an eventuality. One of them, the assistant to the head of the United Nations (political) department, M. B. Chitty, had warned in January 1971 that by leaving the future status of Taiwan undetermined, 'we may be stuffing a rather bigger problem under the carpet than we had realized.'³ When the PRC understood what was under the carpet, the negotiations stalled.

In fact, the attitude of the United States rather than the PRC had bewildered UK officials. The Heath government had notified the Nixon administration in January 1971 that it would not support the 'important question' resolution at the forthcoming general assembly. US officials, aware of the shift in the United Kingdom's stance and hoping for co-operation for as long as possible, asked the foreign office to postpone the announcement of the shift for five or six weeks while the United States reconsidered its own stance.⁴ The Heath government reluctantly agreed. Royle noted on the 26th: 'We must be careful not to push the Americans too hard ... I fear they may react by stonewalling.'⁵

To protect the ROC's membership, the state department was seeking support for 'dual representation' based on the 'two-Chinas' formula. This formula was less attractive to the PRC's supporters than the UK proposal to replace the ROC with the PRC. Meanwhile, Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, secretly planning a rapprochement with the PRC, worried about the response from US conservatives loyal to

¹ 'Record of Meeting between the parliamentary under-secretary and the Chinese chargé d'affaires', 22 June 1971, FCO 21/810.

² Mission, Beijing, to FCO, no. 628, 10 July 1971, FCO 21/834; 'Zhong Ying Jian Jiao Shi Mo'; Zhang, *Chong Fan*, pp. 311-12.

³ FCO to mission, Beijing, no. 374, 18 June 1971, FCO 21/834; 'Chinese Representation in the UN', 27 Jan. 1971, FCO 21/808.

⁴ 'Record of a conversation between the British chargé d'affaires and the assistant secretary for International Organization Affairs', 20 Jan. 1971, FCO 21/808; 'NSSM 106 - The Need for Coordination of US China Policy with the United Kingdom', 9 Dec. 1970, USNA [Records relating to the] U[nited K[ingdom], box 5.

⁵ 'Chinese Representation in the United Nations', 26 Jan. 1971, FCO 21/808.

the ROC. If the 'dual representation' formula was announced too early, the rapprochement with PRC might be jeopardized by the taint of appeasement; hence Nixon's attempts to persuade Douglas-Home to wait, and, until mid-June, the only message received from Washington on the subject announced a further delay in the US decision.¹

The United Kingdom was not the only US ally not told about Nixon's wish for a rapprochement with the PRC. Japan, the ROC's most stalwart defender at the United Nations, was also not told, and alone fought for the ROC's membership to the bitter end. Yet despite the appearance of consistency, Japan's goal also gradually changed. By the spring of 1971, the 'Taiwan-first' principle was replaced by a stance that treated Taiwan and the mainland as equally important. Considering the current of détente with the PRC, Japanese officials wished Japan to try to normalize relations without jeopardizing Taiwan's international status. The obstacle was membership in the United Nations. If the United Nations, in recognizing the PRC's right to represent China, expelled the ROC, normalized relations with the PRC could be achieved only at the cost of injuring Japan's ties with Taiwan.²

As the 'important question' formula had ceased to be an effective device for postponing the PRC's admission,³ the ministry of foreign affairs and the LDP leadership fell back on 'dual representation': a de facto 'two-Chinas' formula that granted both the PRC and ROC separate membership met Japan's wish to regularize relations with both regimes. To increase the chances of success, the ministry of foreign affairs combined 'dual representation' with an 'important question variation': the 'important question' would no longer ask whether the PRC should be admitted to the United Nations but whether the ROC should be expelled.⁴

While the Japanese agreed that they should try to postpone the decision on PRC membership, they disagreed about the purpose. The Asian affairs bureau and the division of China affairs wanted to take advantage of the postponement to prepare to normalize relations with the PRC after it was

¹ Minutes, National Security Council, 25 March 1971, 'Meeting among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)', 27 May, and Nixon to Rogers, 30 April 1971, *FRUS: 1969-76*, v. nos. 342, 358, and 351; embassy, Washington to FCO, no. 776, 4 March 1971, FCO 21/808; 'Secretary of State's Meeting with Mr Rogers', 4 June 1971, FCO 21/809.

² 'Chūgoku seisaku kentō no genjō', 11 Feb., and 'Chūgoku mondai shorijō no kansō', 20 Feb. 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-5.

³ 'Chūgoku daihyō mondai shingi ni okeru jūyō mondai ketsugian no yūkōsei ni tsuite', 6 Jan. 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-5; 'Chūgoku mondai ni kansuru nichibei jimu reberu kaidan (dai 2 kai)', 7 Jan. 1971, MOFA, DD 2002-1008.

⁴ 'Kokuren sōkai ni okeru chūgoku daihyōken mondai ni kanshi kangaerareru shoketsugian oyobi kore ni taisuru gendankai ni okeru waga kuni no taido', 12 Jan. 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-9; MOFA to embassies, Paris and Brussels, no. 2023, 8 April 1971, *ibid.*, 2003-3.

eventually admitted. Attempts to defend Taiwan's seat should be subordinated to Japan's relationship with the PRC.¹ A group of more pro-Taiwan officials hoped that if the ROC's membership could be preserved long enough, there would be time to attract international support for an 'independent' Taiwan on the principle of 'self-determination' once the Nationalist leaders were ready to abandon their opposition to independence. They expected that, if the general assembly voted for 'dual representation' and the 'important question variation' by a large majority, the PRC might reconsider its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.²

Japan's stance caused difficulties with its allies. The United Kingdom was sceptical about the feasibility of Japan's goals. The foreign office doubted whether the majority of UN members would support the 'important question variation' which, in its view, was 'riddled with errors'. Japan's confidence in the viability of 'dual representation' was also 'very puzzling' in the eyes of British officials.³ Similarly, after the United Kingdom notified Japan in May 1971 that it would no longer endorse the 'important question' formula, the Satō government, including the prime minister himself, saw the United Kingdom as an obstacle rather than as a support. Despite the continuing communication between the two countries, they had chosen opposite sides at the United Nations.⁴

If the United Kingdom's decision to support PRC membership did not take the Japanese by surprise, they were surprised at the Nixon administration's decision to turn the PRC from a primary enemy into a primary strategic partner. When the secretary of state, William Rogers, told the Japanese ambassador at Washington, Ushiba Nobuhiko, of Nixon's visit to Beijing, a few minutes before Nixon went on television on 15 July to announce it, Ushiba asked whether he would mention China's representation at the United Nations.⁵ To an extent, the alarm was misplaced. The Nixon administration continued to support ROC membership even after opening the door to the PRC.⁶

¹ 'Anglo/Japanese Planning Talks: Tokyo 1-4 April 1971', April 1971, CAB 164/945; 'Chūgoku seisaku kentō no genjō', 11 Feb., and 'Waga kuni no chūgoku seisaku', 20 April 1971, MOFA, DD 2002-1132.

² 'Konshū no kokuren sōkai ni okeru "chūgoku daihyōken mondai" taisho hōshin no kettei ni kanrenshite nentō ni oku beki mondaiten (memo)', 11 Jan. 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-9; mission, New York, to MOFA, no. 43, 11 Jan., no. 1126, 9 June 1971, *ibid.*, 2003-4, 2003-15; 'Chūgoku mondai tokuni kokuren no chūgoku daihyōken mondai ni tsuite', 6 May 1971, *ibid.*, 2003-14.

³ 'Chinese Representation', 5 April and 9 July 1971, FCO 21/816; 'Chinese Representation: Japanese Views', 21 May 1971, FCO 21/864.

⁴ 'Chūgoku mondai ni tsuite no Hōgen gaimu shingikan to Gurin jikanho to no kaidanroku', 17 March 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-10; 'Waga kuni no chūgoku seisaku (shōrai no hōkō)', 20 April 1971, *ibid.*, 2002-1132.

⁵ Embassy, Washington, to MOFA, no. 2001, 15 July 1971, 2002-1234, *ibid.*

⁶ 'Memorandum for the President's File by the President Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs', 21 May; 'Meeting among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, and the Presi-

Nonetheless, henceforth, for the United States, the relationship with the PRC took precedence over the defence of the ROC: if the two could not be separated, the United States would not risk offending the PRC.¹ The need to work alongside the Japanese to promote the 'dual representation' formula and the 'important question variation' embarrassed many US officials. The PRC was likely to resent Japan's proposed addition to the draft resolution of a sentence that emphasized the status of the ROC and the PRC as rulers of Taiwan and the mainland respectively, because it seemed to imply the 'one-Taiwan, one-China' formula.² Similarly, Kissinger doubted at first whether Japan should be asked to co-sponsor the resolution lest the PRC should interpret it as 'ganging up on [the] Chinese'.³ However, when, in September 1971, the United States overcame its doubts and asked for Japan's support, it was Japan's turn to hesitate.

The level of disagreement in Tokyo following Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in July was unprecedented. To resolve it, Satō made the politically suicidal decision to sponsor the resolutions by promising to take personal responsibility for the consequences. It is not clear why Satō made this decision: perhaps it was his conviction of the strategic importance of Taiwan, worry that refusing might set back the negotiations with the United States over the return of Okinawa, personal friendship with ROC leaders, or unwillingness to pass a poisoned chalice to his successor.⁴ Although the US ambassador, Armin Meyer, described the decision as 'courageous', Satō himself was thinking about the PRC's response. On 20 October, he stated in the lower house of the national diet that Japan could 'understand' the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Five days later, Japan lost the battle at the United Nations.⁵

By the time the general assembly resumed the discussion of China's representation in October 1971, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada had all declared their support for the PRC. On the 24th, the day before the final vote, several other Western states decided to stay away from the 'important question variation' after they learned of Kissinger's arrival in

dent's Assistant for National Security Affairs', 27 May 1971, *FRUS: 1969-76*, v. nos. 354 and 358.

¹ 'Meeting among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs', 27 May, and record of meeting, Nixon, Rogers, and Kissinger, 22 July 1971, *ibid.*; 'China and the United Nations: Japanese Views', 28 May 1971, FCO 21/864.

² 'Chūgoku daihyōken mondai ni kansuru nichibei hikōshiki kyōgi yōroku', 12 March 1971, MOFA, DD 2002-1008.

³ Telecons (at 11.47 a.m. and 2.47 p.m.), 7 Sept. 1971, USNA, N[ixon] P[residential] M[aterials], Kissinger telecons, box 11.

⁴ E. Satō, *Satō Eisaku nikki dai 4 kan* (Tokyo, 1997), pp. 421, 423; M. Kusuda, *Kusuda Minoru nikki* (Tokyo, 2001), pp. 647-8, 650-1; S. Ogata, *Sengo nichū, beichū kankei* (Tokyo, 1992), pp. 73-7; embassy, Tokyo, to FCO, no. 704, 22 Sept. 1971, FCO 21/811.

⁵ Embassy, Tokyo, to state dept., no. 9356, 22 Sept. 1971, *FRUS: 1969-76*, v. no. 411; Kusuda, *Kusuda Minoru nikki*, pp. 660-1.

Beijing to prepare for Nixon's visit. The visit vitiated the last-ditch attempt to save Taiwan's membership and buttressed the consensus that the PRC's admission should be postponed no longer.¹ US and Japanese officials lobbied painstakingly on behalf of the ROC; during the final vote on the 25th, US state department officials patrolled the assembly chamber to twist arms and Japanese diplomats even chased the delegate of Oman, who opted at the last minute to be absent, to his hotel.² To no avail. After the 'important question variation' was defeated by 55 to 59, the ROC delegation walked out of the general assembly. Minutes later, a landslide victory by 76 to 35 for Albania's resolution ended the dispute over who should represent China. The 'dual representation' formula was not even put to the vote.

* * * * *

THE ROC'S CLAIM TO membership of the United Nations as the sole legal representative of 700 million Chinese was one of the most peculiar features of the post-war international system. Its supporters sympathized with the US policy of confronting the PRC's challenge to the West-centred global order by denying it membership in the United Nations and were reluctant to evict a friendly and ardent anti-Communist regime. The ROC's supporters disagreed, however, about whether the PRC should forever be denied UN membership. Japan, like the United States, doubted whether membership would change the PRC's behaviour in international affairs, while others, epitomized by the United Kingdom, thought the opposite. The schism was entangled with a disagreement about the future of Taiwan. Whether any state supposed that the independence of Taiwan was vital to its own security is doubtful. Even the leading advocate in the Japanese foreign ministry of independence for Taiwan, the consul general at Hong Kong, Ogawa Heishirō, admitted to Kosaka on 20 February 1961 that the idea was a 'hunch' and that he needed 'advice' about how to justify it strategically.³

The United Kingdom represented the view that, whatever the ROC's moral claims to UN membership, they should not stand in the way of realistic judgements. As the head of the United Nations (political) department of the foreign and commonwealth office, John Lambert, predicted in 1970: 'Loyalty to "gallant little Taiwan" might quickly wane if it began to

¹ *Normalization of US-China Relations: An International History*, ed. W. Kirby, R. Ross, and L. Gong (Cambridge, 2006), p. 35; 'Aichi shuseki daihyō kisha kaiken (chūgoku daihyōken mondai)', 26 Oct. 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-572.

² Mission, New York, to FCO, no. 1482, 26 Oct. 1971, FCO 21/812; mission, New York, to MOFA, no. 2544, 26 Oct. 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-572; M. Ōtaka, 'Kokuren Daihyōbu Zaikin Tōji no Omoide', *Keizai to Gaikō*, Dec. 1976, p. 47.

³ Con. gen., Hong Kong, to MOFA, no. 176, 20 Feb. 1961, MOFA, DD 2006-725.

look as if there were a real chance of the [PRC] actually joining the UN.¹ Depriving the ROC of membership was the 'lesser evil' compared with the denial of representation to the mainland. Japan was perceived as extraordinary in its commitment to the ROC without adjusting its bilateral relations with the PRC.²

In fact, Japan had adapted its stance towards Taiwan by ceasing to support the idea of independence while continuing to support its membership of the United Nations. A statement declaring Japan's wish to normalize relations with the PRC was scheduled to be delivered once the ROC lost its membership. Two months after the historical vote to replace the ROC with the PRC at the United Nations, Satō, on a visit to the United States in January 1972, told Nixon that, unlike the United States, which could ignore the United Nations, Japan would have to recognize the PRC and cease to recognize the ROC as a result of the change in China's representation at the United Nations.³ Senior officials at the ministry of foreign affairs argued that Japan's prolonged defence of the ROC should forestall criticism from Taiwan of the shift.⁴

Most states which criticized the ROC for refusing to renounce its claim to be the ruler of China had no wish to force it to concede that it ruled only Taiwan. Rather, the ROC leaders' inflexibility saved their Western allies from a possible dispute with the PRC, which would not tolerate Taiwan's secession. Thus, neither the ROC nor its supporters but the PRC decided the outcome of the debate over China's representation at the United Nations. As Nakagawa Tōru – the Japanese ambassador to the United Nations when the PRC was voted in – recalled in 1986, the success of the 'important question' formula throughout the 1960s had depended on the PRC's intolerance of the outside world. Once the PRC, around 1970, changed its stance, formulas devised to postpone its admission proved ineffective.⁵

Despite the confrontation among UN members about the representation of China, it is not easy to tell whether anyone lost. The PRC was pleased to replace the ROC, and the Communist Party chairman, Mao Zedong, was particularly pleased to see Western powers such as the United Kingdom acting as 'the Red Guards' who confronted the United States at the United

¹ 'Chinese Representation at the United Nations', 9 Feb. 1970, FCO 21/656.

² 'Japanese Views on Chinese Representation', 23 June 1971, FCO 21/816.

³ 'Arubania ketsugian saitaku no sai no seifu kenkai (an)', 25 Oct., 1971, MOFA, DD 1006-798; Kusuda, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki*, pp. 814-17.

⁴ 'Dai 26 kai kokuren sōkai honkaigi hyōketsu tōjitsu ni okeru chūgoku daihyōken mondai shingi no naimaku', 8 Nov. 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-23; embassy, Bangkok, to state dept., A-142, 24 April 1972, USNA, SNF 1970-3, box 2405.

⁵ *Nihon to kokuren no 30 nen*, ed. Kokuren Kōhō Sentā (Tokyo, 1986), p. 151.

Nations.¹ The ROC was disappointed but not surprised: 'It has been a millstone around our neck for [twenty-one] years, and we can do now what we were inhibited from doing,' the ROC foreign minister, Chow Shu-kai, told the press upon walking out of the general assembly.² Judging by Taiwan's subsequent economic development, the statement rings true.

The United Kingdom was criticized by both Japan and the United States for lobbying for the PRC.³ The Heath government, recognizing that it had switched too late to support for PRC membership, abandoned Taiwan to reach the goal of an exchange of ambassadors. A joint communiqué issued in March 1972 stated that the United Kingdom 'acknowledged' the PRC's claim that Taiwan was a province of China, and, in a separate note, the United Kingdom stated that it would withdraw the claim that Taiwan's status was undetermined.⁴ A similar line was taken by Japan, who felt sold out by its allies during the attempt to protect the ROC's seat, in response to the PRC's admission. Japan announced its plan to normalize relations with Beijing immediately after the vote at the United Nations. Without clarifying its stance on the status of Taiwan, the Tanaka Kakuei government signed an agreement with the PRC on 29 September 1972 that stated that it 'fully understands and respects' the PRC's stance.⁵ Within fifteen months after the vote at the United Nations, ambassadors from the PRC arrived at London and Tokyo.

The defence of the ROC's membership in the United Nations was an endeavour to maintain an unreasonable status quo based upon the reasonable need to stabilize the balance of power during the turbulent days of the cold war. After 1971, the erstwhile players of this diplomatic game accepted the call to change the rules of international politics by learning how to coexist with the PRC. On 28 October 1971, three days after the last battle in the general assembly, the UK ambassador at the United Nations, Sir Colin Crowe, wrote to a colleague in London: 'It was not a historical occasion that one will remember without a sour taste in the mouth. With these thoughts we gird ourselves for the Pekinese.'⁶

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¹ Xiong, *Wai Jiao*, p. 358.

² Mission, New York, to MOFA, nos. 2572, 2573, 26 Oct. 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-572.

³ 'Note for the Record', 12 Oct. 1971, FCO 21/812; embassy, London, to state dept., no. 9496, Dec. 1971, USNA, NPM, National Security Council Files, box 950; mission, New York, to MOFA, no. 2589, 28 Oct. 1971, MOFA, DD 2003-572.

⁴ Mission, Beijing, to FCO, no. 117, 18 Feb., memo, Royle to Rogers, 'Exchange of Ambassadors with China', 9 March 1972, FCO 21/986.

⁵ 'Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the People's Republic of China', 29 Sept. 1972, MOFA website, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html> (last accessed, 22 March 2009).

⁶ Crowe to Parsons, 28 Oct. 1971, FCO 21/813.