Beyond Bandung: the 1955 Asian-African Conference and its legacies for international order

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ABSTRACT

The special issue this article opens examines the systemic impact, limits, achievements and legacies of the 1955 Asian-African 'Bandung' Conference. The Bandung conference is typically celebrated as a high point of Indonesian foreign policy activism and a key milestone in the emergence of the 'Third World'. By contrast, mainstream international relations has paid comparatively less attention to its broader impact in the evolution of the modern international order. The special issue contributors here seek to correct this lacuna by interrogating Bandung's significance in challenging, affirming and amending key aspects of the post-war global order. They also consider its relevance in setting important precedents that simultaneously foreclosed and enabled different manifestations of South–South cooperation thereafter. Beyond its historical significance, they finally explore Bandung's enduring legacies for both domestic Indonesian order-building projects and Indo-Australian efforts to bridge the 'Bandung divide' in their responses to contemporary threats to international order. This article opens this inquiry by historically situating Bandung within its broader global context, unpacking its four 'faces' (order-challenging, order-affirming, order-building and order-transforming) and finally delineating the key axes of debate around which this special issue is organised.

Introduction

From April 18 to 24, 1955, representatives from 29 Asian and African states and territories met in Bandung, Indonesia, hoping to remake the world. Fired with anti-colonial zeal, the participants at the first Asian-African Conference sought to challenge a global order still infused with racist hierarchy and imperialism. Alongside a common resentment of colonialism, Bandung's leaders also aimed to win greater foreign policy independence for newly independent states, and to fortify South–South economic and cultural cooperation. The culmination of a series of anti-colonial conclaves dating back to the early 1900s (see, for example, Kuck 2014; Langley 1969; Richard 2014), Bandung nevertheless also stands on its own terms as a singular moment in Afro-Asian cooperation. Concluding with a declaration of 10 guiding principles (*Dasasila*) to promote international peace and cooperation, Bandung was pivotal in bringing the 'Third World' into being as a self-

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conscious category of actors in world politics, and instrumental in laying the foundations for the Non-Aligned Movement (Lee 2009, 88).

Notwithstanding its undoubted historical significance, the larger systemic impact and long-term legacies of Bandung remain contested. While contemporary Western observers fretted about the Asian-African Conference's likely impact on patterns of Cold War alignment and international stability (Jones 2005, 860; Tarling 1992, 75), fears that the meeting would spawn a separate Afro-Asian bloc to rival the United Nations (UN) proved unfounded. Likewise, though Bandung sabotaged the further expansion of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (see Acharya in this issue) , the meeting did not fundamentally undermine the USA's 'hub and spokes' alliance system in East Asia. Nor did it prefigure communist China's diplomatic ascendancy over its Asian neighbours, which many in Washington, London and Canberra had feared. To the disappointment of some of its most radical sponsors, neither did Bandung inaugurate a new era of Afro-Asian unity. Instead, commercial ties between African and Asian states remained at a low ebb for the decades immediately following Bandung. Cold War geopolitics meanwhile cemented many participants' close security alignment with Western patrons, often despite their rhetorical commitment to pursue more independent foreign policies.

What was the Bandung conference's long-term systemic impact on the evolution of the global international order? What opportunities for Afro-Asian cooperation did Bandung either foreclose or enable? And in what ways does Bandung's legacy still shape Indonesia's approaches to domestic and regional order-building? These are the three fields of inquiry that form the focus of this special issue.

This collection originated from a joint workshop between the University of Queensland and Universitas Gadjah Mada, which the latter hosted in Yogyakarta in April 2015 to coincide with the Bandung conference's sixtieth anniversary. Beyond the chronological convenience of revisiting Bandung at this time, developments in both world politics and the field of international relations (IR) invested our enterprise with particular urgency.

Internationally, we are now seeing a profound ongoing power shift from the West to 'the rest', as Asian states in particular reclaim their historical economic centrality and seek global diplomatic influence proportionate to their burgeoning material power. Concerned primarily but not exclusively with China's rise, Western policymakers and academics have become fixated with resolving how best to manage the advent of this supposedly 'post-Western' world (see, for example, Serfaty 2011). Prescriptions for managing the 'rise of the rest' inevitably vary with commentators' political and intellectual commitments, from realists counselling strategies of either containment (Mearsheimer 2010) or accommodation (Kirshner 2012), to liberals and constructivists recommending strategies of integration (Ikenberry 2012) or socialisation (Legro 2007). These important differences notwithstanding, much of this commentary presupposes both that the current international order is the product of exclusively Western authorship, and that non-Western powers' current assertiveness in seeking to shape that order is unprecedented.

Against this position, a growing body of scholarship now foregrounds non-Western powers' key role in shaping the post-World War II international order. The mid twentieth-century 'revolution in sovereignty' (Philpott 2001) that propelled the sovereign state's universal spread; the closely allied consolidation of a global human rights regime (Reus-Smit 2011, 2013); the 'forgotten [non-Western] foundations' of the Bretton Woods system (Helleiner 2014); the 'localisation' of collective security norms and practices by

South-East Asian states (Acharya 2004)—each testifies to an international order crafted through contestation among a much more diverse range of actors (non-Western as well as Western) than many IR scholars have conventionally presumed. Within this context, Bandung provides IR scholars with an invaluable opportunity to revisit a key moment where Asian and African states collectively sought to shape international order, and to reassess its significance as a potential critical juncture in that order's evolution.

Did Bandung constitute a true turning point, in which African and Asian polities successfully wielded their collective soft power to radically recast a global order still importantly constituted through empire and racist hierarchy? Or did it merely dramatise and hasten an existing shift towards a global sovereign-state monoculture, which the European empires' post-war exhaustion had already foreordained? Addressing these questions is key to understanding how the contemporary international system came to be, and identifying with greater precision the role African and Asian leaders played in shaping this evolution. Revisiting Bandung is also valuable because it offers the chance more generally to evaluate the extent and ways that materially weak actors can harness 'soft power' resources to attempt to shape the international system. That 'norm entrepreneurs' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) can exert a transformative impact on world politics through the force of argument remains one of constructivism's signature insights. A consideration of Bandung with the benefit of over 60 years' hindsight provides us with a useful test case for examining the ways non-Western actors sought to rewrite the rules of the international system through soft power mobilisation, and the long-term impacts—both anticipated and unintentional—of this mobilisation for the constitution of international order.

In addition to engaging with substantive concerns about rising non-Western powers and the international system's contested evolution, this special issue contributes to the growing momentum within IR to recast the field on more self-consciously global terms. As Amitav Acharya explains in this issue, in recent years a growing chorus of IR scholars has been seeking to unmoor IR from its Eurocentric foundations. This movement for a 'global IR' has entailed efforts to expand IR beyond its traditional North Atlantic focus to incorporate a greater focus on non-Western agents as key actors in world politics, and to enrich IR's theoretical and historical imaginary through engagement with concepts, ideas and narratives drawn from non-Western settings. While engaging critically but appreciatively with traditional IR, global IR aims to advance the discipline by opening it up more systematically to the intellectual resources and experiences of the non-Western world (see, for example, Acharya 2014a) . As Acharya argues here, Bandung offers an indispensable entrée for doing this through systematically examining a key instance of non-Western agency in shaping world politics. In drawing together a team of Western and non-Western IR scholars to debate Bandung's meaning, limits, possibilities and legacies, we aim, then, not merely to engage with this special issue's substantive concerns, but also to actively contribute to advancing this broader movement towards a genuinely global IR.

The remainder of this introduction proceeds in three sections. I begin by locating the Bandung conference in its proper historical context, noting in particular its origins at a time of radical systemic fluidity, when the fundamental architecture of the global order remained in flux. For us to properly apprehend Bandung's systemic significance, it is crucial that we start from a firm understanding of the international system's unsettled nature in 1955, and the contours of contestation that were then shoving and shaping it.

Having situated Bandung in its historical context, I then sketch four alternative readings of Bandung, which alternatively stress its order-challenging, order-affirming, order-building and order-transforming aspects. Detractors and champions alike have too often reduced Bandung to being simply a collective Afro-Asian assault against colonialism. But this reading casts Bandung as an overwhelmingly negative, order-challenging exercise. In so doing, it obscures the creative and constructive dimensions of the Bandung project. This reading also falsely characterises Bandung as a one-dimensional 'revolt against the West'. It thereby overlooks the important elements of agreement between Bandung's sponsors and the UN's founders, and Bandung's important role in affirming and reinforcing the post-war order's commitment to a pluralist world grounded in ideals of national self-determination.

Finally, I map out the structure of this special issue, identifying the major themes and axes of debate around which the contributions are organised, and telegraphing their key findings.

April 1955: the Bandung moment at a time of contested constitutions

For us to properly comprehend Bandung's importance, we must first acknowledge the international system's immense fluidity in 1955. In particular, we must avoid the fallacy that the modern international order of sovereign states came into being fully formed with the Axis powers' defeat and the UN's establishment in 1945. On the contrary, the post-1945 world order was rent by a key contradiction between a consolidating global order of sovereign states and a decaying but still salient world of empires. While Britain had relinquished India—'the jewel in the Crown'—with the India–Pakistan partition in August 1947, the loss of the Raj did not signal a more comprehensive abandonment of Britain's imperial aspirations. Indeed, following Churchill's return to Downing Street in 1951, Britain recommitted itself to a grand strategy in which its residual 'fourth empire' would continue to help resuscitate Britain's economy and secure its continued role as a global power (Darwin 2009, 566). The Dutch, Portuguese and French likewise tried to double down on their status as imperial powers. Though the Dutch were rapidly humbled with their defeat in the Indonesian War of Independence by 1949, the Portuguese and French tenaciously clung to their imperial dreams for far longer and remained, in the lead-up to Bandung, determined to maintain their dominance over their African and Asian subjects.

As historian Mark Mazower (2009) reminds us, the UN's founders were *not* committed to a world order predicated on the universal spread of ideas of national self-determination. Rather, key architects of the UN, such as South African statesman Jan Smuts, remained beholden to world views that were thoroughly imbued with racist hierarchy, as well as being committed to a world in which European empires would ideally continue to play a pivotal role in securing international order (Mazower 2009, 30). To be sure, this commitment to empire was contested by the Soviet Union (excepting its own brutally imposed informal empire in Eastern Europe) and also—albeit less consistently—by the USA. Crucially, early advocacy by India in particular had also by 1948 secured the UN's commitment to a universal human rights regime that sat uneasily alongside the perpetuation of empires (Mazower 2009, 153). But the fact remained that the Axis powers' defeat did not inevitably foretell the death of empire and the universal spread of national

sovereign states. Bankrupted by war but still possessing immense overseas interests, key European allies of the USA were determined to retain the privileges of empire, both to fund their own reconstruction and to uphold their strategic objectives and economic investments overseas. The existence of large-scale settler colonial societies in Africa (for example, Algeria, Kenya and Rhodesia) and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), which saw their own security as being strongly entwined with the perpetuation of empires, provided a further pro-imperial constituency in the post-war period (Curran 2009; Schwarz 2011, 59).

Despite their commitment to the preservation of empires, the major European colonial powers did acknowledge the need to reorganise and modernise imperial systems of rule. Indeed, what is striking in the immediate post-war period is Europeans' great creativity in trying to reinvent empires for the modern age. Unwilling to abandon their empires, Europeans were keen to modernise imperial structures, not only to maximise their revenue-extractive capacities, but also to at least minimally accommodate growing local aspirations for greater self-government. While the Portuguese admittedly clung to the absurd fiction of pluri-continentalism—the idea that Portugal constituted one indivisible, directly ruled polity scattered across multiple continents (MacQueen 1999, 210)—the French and British proved far more adaptive. In the French case, the older model of empire gave way to first the French Union and then the French Community. These models of imperial governance departed extensively from the classic French empire in that they yoked the empire's polities under an umbrella of shared institutions (a common president, a shared senate), while leaving Paris with extensive powers of suzerainty (for example, control of foreign, defence and monetary policy) over its extra-European vassals (Betts 1998, 32–33; Krasner 1999, 199–200). The British Commonwealth, while less ambitious, initially also envisaged a far closer model of association between its former dominions and colonies than ultimately eventuated (Krasner 1999, 232–233).

As late as the 1950s, European imperialists—supported in many cases by colonial collaborators—were busy imagining a wide range of options that would preserve imperial systems of governance in some form. Imperial elites were not beholden to a binary choice between preserving pre-war modes of imperial hierarchy unchanged or abandoning empire entirely to make way for a world exclusively populated by sovereign national states. Equally, neither were empires' most radical opponents hostage to the empire–nation state binary. As Joseph Hongoh reminds us in this issue, anti-colonialists were hardly passive victims of the 'territorial trap' (Agnew 1994) of seeing the sovereign nation state as the sole possible vehicle for securing their hopes for liberation . Instead, nationalist ideas of liberation competed with more geographically capacious visions of political community, anchored in a variety of pan-Africanist, pan-Arabist and pan-Asian models of solidarity. From today's vantage point, it is all too easy to dismiss these alternatives to the nation state as instances of hopeless idealism, which were doomed to failure. But such dismissiveness ignores the hugely important role various 'pan' movements played in shaping non-Western opposition to imperialism from the interwar period onwards (see, for example, Aydin 2007), and their continuing dynamism in influencing post-war Afro-Asian contests over the future of world order. That some of the Third World's most prominent leaders, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah, indeed briefly experimented with pan-Arab and pan-Africanist models of federation after Bandung further attests to the diversity of anti-imperial projects in the lead-up to the Bandung moment (Jankowski

2002; Martin 2012, 58), and the far from inevitable post-Bandung transition to a global sovereign-state monoculture.

Metropolitan projects of imperial reinvention, subaltern visions of transnational and pan-national solidarity, and more conventional anti-colonial nationalisms jostled for supremacy on Bandung's eve. In April 1955, the UN was, moreover, less than a decade old and failed to include communist China, the world's most populous country and one of Asia's greatest powers, in its ranks. World politics played out at this time in a moment of 'contested constitutions' (Philpott 1999, 576), in which the most fundamental questions of international order—what constituted a legitimate polity, what the rules were for becoming one of these polities, and what legitimate sovereign prerogatives these polities could claim—remained hotly disputed (Philpott 1999, 567). Acknowledging this radical fluidity is critical to situating Bandung within its proper historical context, and so framing an inquiry into its overall systemic impact and long-term legacies.

The four faces of Bandung

Four interpretive frames—stressing, respectively, its order-challenging, order-affirming, order-building and order-transforming aspects—are helpful in making sense of Bandung.

Interpretations of Bandung that stress its order-challenging aspect foreground the conference's common-denominator message of anti-racism and anti-colonialism. With racist hierarchy and imperialism still powerfully present in the international system in 1955, Bandung was notable in providing African and Asian peoples with a unified forum in which to forcefully challenge these structures of inequality. More generally, the conference was marked by attendees' critique of Western attempts to either preserve or reconstitute the asymmetrical ties linking Asian and African polities to metropolitan states, whether in the economic or security domains. As Acharya notes in particular in his contribution, Bandung was generative of a nascent movement for non-alignment, which powerfully undermined great-power-led security arrangements such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. We should not overstate the depth of consensus at Bandung, for the presence of Western-aligned states substantially diluted the radicalism of actors (for example, Sukarno) who preferred a more unequivocal repudiation of great power (especially Western) privileges. This caveat notwithstanding, Bandung is rightly remembered above all for its assault on racism and empire. That 29 states (at the time almost half the UN's membership) combined to condemn colonialism served to powerfully discredit European projects of imperial modernisation. In organising and mobilising such a potent anti-imperial constituency, Bandung played a vital order-challenging role in corroding the legitimacy of colonialism—at the time one of the modern international system's most tenacious and adaptive ordering institutions (Holsti 2004, 239).

While the order-challenging elements of the Bandung conference were its most conspicuous, it would be wrong to characterise the event as being predominantly iconoclastic. As Richard Devetak, Tim Dunne and Ririn Tri Nurhayati point out in this special issue, Western policymakers and academic commentators at the time seized with the fear that Bandung epitomised an incipient breakdown of international society. These fears rested on the (as it turned out) incorrect assumption that the ordering institutions of international society depended on a bedrock of cultural consensus to function—a consensus that new Asian and African entrants to international society supposedly threatened. But

as Devetak *et al.* convincingly argue, Bandung was equally important for dramatising international society's resilience, as the Asian and African participants largely affirmed many of the existing order's key organising principles and practices. This was most evident in the conference's privileging of the sovereign nation state over alternative models of political organisation as colonised peoples' preferred vehicle for liberation. The conference attendees' emphatic endorsement of the principles of the UN human rights regime provides another important example of Bandung's order-affirming aspect, as does its parallel commitment to the 'development project' (see Weber and Winanti's contribution in this issue), conceived in conventional nation-statist terms.

Far from constituting a full-spectrum 'revolt against the West', Bandung critically broadened the global support base for an international order grounded in originally Western models of political organisation (the nation state) and dedicated towards the advancement of a universal human rights regime that drew powerfully (though by no means exclusively) on Western intellectual and cultural traditions. From 1955 to 1962, no less than 78 countries won independence from colonial rule (Philpott 1999, 584). Likewise, building on Bandung's anti-colonial consensus, the UN General Assembly had by 1960 (with Resolution 1514) endorsed as universal the right to national self-determination, and condemned colonialism as being contrary to both human rights norms and the UN Charter. As the contributions of both Hongoh and Weber and Winanti caution, Bandung's endorsement of nationalism and the nation state closed off alternative institutional pathways to emancipation, which may have been more in keeping with the progressive aspirations of Bandung's more revolutionary participants. But these admonitions merely confirm Bandung's importance as a critical juncture where Asian and African leaders affirmed key institutions and principles of the existing international order, thereby cementing their global extension.

Both the order-challenging and order-affirming dimensions of Bandung's position underscore its character as a *reaction to* an existing Western-dominated international order. But this should not blind us to Bandung's more creative dimensions, which are illuminated in its order-building and order-transforming aspects. As the contributors to this special issue illustrate, Bandung was as much a proactive Afro-Asian attempt at 'world making' (Bruner 1991, 76–77) as it was an effort to either negate or affirm different aspects of the existing international order. On the order-building front, the conference explicitly pushed for greater 'South–South' cooperation. In so doing, it prefigured the Group of 77 and later Third World calls for a new international economic order (see Weber and Winanti's contribution). But what it also sought to do was to resuscitate an earlier Afro-Asian commercial 'ecumene' (Chaudhuri 1990; Hodgson and Burke 1993), which Western imperialism had enfolded but never entirely eclipsed (Bose 2009).

From the late eighteenth century in particular, Western actors had tried to monopolise Afro-Asian polities' external diplomatic and commercial relations through 'divide and rule' strategies aimed at retarding Afro-Asian cooperation. These strategies ranged from the English East India Company's 'subsidiary alliance' system in India, which prevented Indian polities from coordinating their diplomacy against the Company (Peers 1988, 15), to the partition of Africa following the 1885 Congress of Berlin, which carved up existing African polities and so subordinated existing patterns of diplomacy and trade to the demands of European statecraft.

In calling for greater South–South cooperation, the Bandung states hoped not merely to reverse this artificially imposed division. Rather, in evoking an earlier era of extensive

Afro-Asian cultural, commercial and diplomatic exchange, they hoped also to inspire a new international order grounded in more 'horizontal' forms of Afro-Asian cooperation, rather than the 'vertical' patron–client ties that had previously linked an Afro-Asian periphery to the Western core. Far from simply engaging with a Western-dominated order on its own terms, then, Bandung attendees aimed to revive and recentre Afro-Asia within the world economy, in a way restoring the more equal intercivilisational commercial order that had predated Western hegemony (Abu-Lughod 1991; Acharya 2013; Phillips and Sharman 2015a, 2015b).

Finally, alongside its order-challenging repudiation of colonialism, its order-affirming endorsement of the nation state, and its order-building call for greater South–South cooperation, an undeniably utopian, order-transforming undercurrent also informed Bandung. Of course, the Bandung attendees affirmed key elements of the existing international society, so strengthening its pluralist character by consolidating its extension into Asia and Africa (see Devetak *et al.*'s contribution in this issue). But this endorsement sat uneasily with the attendees' consistent rhetorical appeals to transcend Western-imposed visions of political order, with the hope of establishing a more peaceful, inclusive and cosmopolitan order in their place. It is easy in hindsight to dismiss these sentiments as rhetoric, and even to draw parallels between the idealism at Bandung and equally ephemeral cosmopolitan gestures at other key ordering moments (for example, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference or the 1945 San Francisco conference) in the twentieth century. But the danger in this dismissiveness is that it can lead us to mischaracterise the attendees' diverse intentions and overlook key political contests (for example, between a more conservative pluralist internationalism and a more radical Third World solidarist internationalism) that played out at the conference. In his retrospective, Acharya offers us the sobering reminder that Bandung—for all its progressive intentions—may have served to accentuate domestic authoritarianism in many developing countries. Certainly, the conference marked a long-term victory for 'sovereigntists' at the expense of solidarists. Efforts to fortify Afro-Asian states against external intervention typically prevailed over appeals to a cosmopolitan ethics grounded in ideals of moral responsibility transcending the nation state (see Hongoh's essay in this issue). But the fact that Bandung saw a defeat of some participants' order-transforming aspirations should not absolve us from acknowledging them, lest we ignore the high-stakes political struggles that led to their marginalisation.

Beyond Bandung: axes of debate and the structure of this special issue

Like other key ordering moments in the modern international system's development, Bandung was inherently multifaceted. Different interpretations of Bandung typically place varying emphases on its order-challenging, order-affirming, order-building and order-transforming aspects, preventing the emergence of a definitive consensus on Bandung's significance and legacies. The contributors here have engaged with the special-issue theme from a diverse range of normative and theoretical commitments, and implicitly stressed different 'faces' of Bandung in their respective analyses. Consequently, rather than trying to retrospectively contrive an artificial consensus from this conversation, my remaining task is to map out the key axes of debate among the participants and relate their significance to the issue's broader themes.

Bandung's systemic significance

The special issue's first two contributions (Acharya and Devetak *et al.*) assess Bandung's systemic impact on the modern international order.

In the context of a more general endorsement of global IR, Acharya celebrates Bandung as a pivotal episode in the modern international order's development. Specifically, Acharya characterises Bandung as an important moment at which non-Western actors exerted a concerted and constructive influence in adapting the international order to better accommodate Asian and African concerns. This ranged from the conference's important role in laying the foundations for the Non-Aligned Movement to its precedent in creating space for the rise of a South-East Asian regionalism led by small and medium states, rather than one dominated by either India or China. Throughout his analysis, Acharya foregrounds Bandung's order-challenging and order-building dimensions as not only an assault on Western privilege, but also an attempt to reform international practices (especially in the realm of security) in ways that maximised weak states' autonomy while guarding against a reassertion of Western intervention.

While privileging Bandung's order-challenging and order-building aspects, Acharya also recognises the conference's order-affirming dimension. This is evident in his discussion of Bandung's role in strengthening and deepening the sovereign state's global spread, and in reaffirming Afro-Asian support for universal human rights. This order-affirming dimension finds even greater focus in Devetak *et al.*'s appraisal of Bandung. Here, the authors begin by reminding us of the West's great apprehensiveness in the lead-up to Bandung. This fear—which was especially pronounced in Australia—was grounded in the assumption that a broadening of international society beyond its Euro-American core might lead to a dilution in support for its fundamental ordering institutions and constitutional values. In contrast to this view, the authors argue that Bandung in fact demonstrated international society's resilience in the face of the expanded cultural diversity of its member states. Far from weakening international order, they show that Bandung strengthened support for a pluralist international order grounded in rulers' twin commitments to state sovereignty and universal human rights. Intriguingly, the authors show that Afro-Asian leaders' endorsement of these practices and ideals was not an instance of passive mimicry. Rather, it entailed non-Western actors' creative repurposing of Western values, norms and arguments to secure Western recognition of Afro-Asian claims to sovereignty and full inclusion within a global human rights regime. Bandung through this lens is thus less radically iconoclastic than its Western detractors feared (a case of more Paul Revere than Robespierre), but no less revolutionary in its impact in securing the universalisation of both the sovereign state and human rights norms.

Bandung's limits and precedents

While continuing to consider Bandung in its larger systemic context, Hongoh and Weber and Winanti mainly focus on assessing Bandung's impact in either foreclosing or enabling subsequent efforts at South–South cooperation.

Hongoh agrees with Devetak *et al.* that one of Bandung's most important legacies was to confirm the sovereign nation state as the world's dominant form of political community. But while Devetak *et al.* see this outcome as a positive vindication of international society's

resilience, Hongoh contrarily laments the fact that the sovereign state's universal triumph at Bandung foreclosed other, potentially more emancipatory alternatives. In particular, Hongoh notes the powerful influence that pan-African ideals and schemes for transnational solidarity exerted on both Africans and the larger African diaspora in the lead-up to Bandung and also in its immediate aftermath. This influence notwithstanding, Hongoh argues that Bandung's state-centrism importantly contributed to the subsequent triumph of sovereign-statist nationalism over pan-African alternatives, with detrimental consequences for Africa's subsequent political development, which its leaders are only now belatedly trying to undo. From Hongoh's vantage point, Bandung's order-affirming aspect ultimately eclipsed the more emancipatory, order-transforming aspirations of many of its participants, thereby preserving many of the inequities inherited from the colonial era.

Weber and Winanti also acknowledge Bandung's limits, noting especially the constricted field of vision that the Bandung participants adopted when endorsing a conception of economic development beholden to ideals of sovereign statism and modernisation theory. This commonality notwithstanding, Weber and Winanti are more cautiously positive in their assessment of Bandung. Specifically, they argue that the Third World solidarism Bandung helped forge proved extremely consequential for later Afro-Asian efforts to establish a more equitable world economic order. Though cautious not to overstate Bandung's significance, Weber and Winanti make an important case for acknowledging Bandung as a key catalysing event for both the later rise of the Group of 77 at the UN and 1970s calls for the establishment of a new international economic order. In this respect, Bandung is most important here for its order-building precedent. Undeniably, early efforts to invoke the 'Bandung spirit' to rally South–South cooperation disappointed their sponsors' expectations. The ingrained inequalities of the post-colonial economic order, moreover, proved more resilient than many had expected. But the appeal of South–South economic cooperation has nevertheless proved tenacious. As not only Asian, but also increasingly African states now grow in commercial dynamism and diplomatic heft, and key non-Western states increasingly craft institutions of economic cooperation outside the Bretton Woods order, the possibility that the 'Bandung spirit' may yet yield a practical renaissance of South–South cooperation grows apace.

Bandung's legacies in a world of durable diversity

Remembered to this day as the high point of Indonesia's foreign policy achievement, Bandung continues powerfully to resonate in Indonesia and exert a meaningful influence on its domestic and foreign policies. In recognition of this importance, the last two articles in this special issue shift their primary focus from the global to the regional in order to consider Bandung's long-term legacy for Indonesian approaches to domestic and regional order-building.

As the world's largest Muslim-majority country and with an economy predicted to be the world's fourth largest by 2050 (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2015, 2), many commentators both within and outside Indonesia expect that it will soon play an international leadership role commensurate to its growing material capabilities and consistent with its high global profile at the time of Bandung (see, for example, Roberts 2015). In particular, Indonesia's democratic transition and its apparently successful management of its internal diversity have spurred a belief that Indonesia might be especially suited to aid and inspire many

developing countries' integration into the current liberal international order (see, for example, Acharya 2014b). Without diminishing Indonesia's leadership potential, Morgan Brigg, Lee Wilson, Frans de Jalong and Muhadi Sugiono contest the idea that Indonesia's democratisation will necessarily promote a Western-style liberalisation of its foreign policy.

Harking back to Sukarno at Bandung, Brigg *et al.* note that diversity formed the touchstone of Sukarno's vision of domestic and international order in 1955, and that this overriding commitment to diversity and pluralism departed radically from Western conceptions of political community, which frequently assume that social cohesion presupposes cultural commonality and shared values. In contrast to the programmatic and prescriptive liberalism of the West, Brigg *et al.* note that Sukarno's 'everyday liberalism' took the reality of Indonesia's (and the world's) cultural diversity as its starting point. For Sukarno, the imperative of accommodating this diversity took precedence over attempts to impose more substantive political programs. This prioritisation put him at odds with both Western liberal internationalism and Soviet socialist internationalism, laying the foundations for the Non-Aligned Movement that developed in Bandung's wake. But it also left Indonesia with a tendency to favour diversity and pluralism—even when they are at odds with other core tenets of liberalism—which has endured beyond both Sukarno and the New Order regime that succeeded him, and continues to profoundly condition Indonesia's domestic and regional order-building efforts.

Reflecting on this mixed legacy of 'everyday liberalism' combined in messy synthesis with illiberalism, Brigg *et al.* convincingly argue against the view that Indonesia's democratisation predisposes it to unequivocally champion the liberal international order's further consolidation. Despite radical differences between Sukarno's 'guided democracy', the New Order and post-*Reformasi* Indonesia, Brigg *et al.* trace an important continuity in Indonesian foreign policy in its overriding commitment to 'unity in diversity' as the lodestar of its domestic and international order-building strategies. Seen in this light, Bandung was importantly generative of a particular Indonesian order-building sensibility, which helps us make sense of Indonesia's otherwise seemingly contradictory retention of liberal and illiberal characteristics in its approach to the world. At the same time, Brigg *et al.*'s analysis must also qualify hopes that a now democratic Indonesia will perforce be an unproblematic ally in supporting Western liberal order-building projects.

Finally, Andrew Phillips and Eric Hiariej's contribution continues the emphasis on diversity and its impact on regional order by examining the continuing salience of the 'Bandung divide' as a potential obstacle to bilateral security cooperation between Indonesia and Australia. Harking back to Bandung, Phillips and Hiariej note that the two countries were then radically opposed in their orientations towards the prevailing international order. Whereas Indonesia under Sukarno was at the vanguard of post-colonial revisionism, Australia conversely evinced a strongly loyalist orientation towards the Western-dominated international order of the time. These differences in orientation produced correspondingly divergent approaches to regional order-building, which have endured in the decades beyond Bandung. Indonesia to this day favours a regional order centred on South-East Asian institutions (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations since 1967), which seeks to insulate local powers as much as possible from the destabilising consequences of great power competition and interference. Conversely, Australia since the 1950s has consistently favoured a regional order grounded as far as possible in the integration of Western great powers (principally Britain and the USA) in local security architectures.

While they abjure a simple form of historical determinism, Phillips and Hiariej argue that the resulting 'Bandung divide' between Indonesia and Australia meaningfully inhibits bilateral security cooperation and forecloses the possibility of any grand strategic partnership between the two countries. Bandung's legacy does not preclude issue-specific forms of security cooperation—a caveat the authors illustrate in considering the two countries' highly successful collaboration on counterterrorism. But Indonesia and Australia nevertheless remain importantly divided by different approaches to regional order-building, even in the face of external pressures (for example, Chinese revisionism in the South China Sea) that should otherwise be promoting strategic convergence. This is not to suggest that 'all roads lead to Bandung'—that is, that the complexities of the bilateral relationship can be reduced to a critical divergence in the two countries' foreign policies since 1955. However, the authors' findings do reinforce one of this special issue's key themes: that Bandung should be of concern to IR scholars not merely for its historical interest, but also because of the varied and important ways in which it continues to shape the international order's contested evolution into the present day.

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