




F6.1 Public goods: vertical summation - SMALL GROUP




F6.1bis Private (market) goods: horizontal summation




F6.2 LARGE GROUP




F6.3 The Lindahl strategy: Pareto but no-equilibrium




F6.4 Derivation of 'demand' curves in the (G,s) space




F6.4bis Derivation of 'demand' curves in the (G,p) space



F6.5 The N-L theorem: 2 equal agents




F6.5bis The N-L theorem: different agents




F6.6 Alternative proof of $NS < LS$, with 2 equal agents (Cesi-Gorini 2014*)

*Cesi B. & Gorini S. (2014), "The failures of collective action. A formal game-theoretic revisitation of the Olson theory", Chapter 2 (Figure 4.7) in Castellucci L. (ed.), *Government and the Environment. The role of the modern state in the face of global challenges*, Abingdon, Routledge.



F6.6bis As the group size increases the NS equilibrium G decreases. The case of 3 equal agents (Cesi-Gorini 2014)



F6.7 Enforced cooperation. Lindahl shares and unanimity. Benefit versus ability to pay

