Cold War History

ISSN: 1468-2745 (Print) 1743-7962 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcwh20

Constructing 'Peaceful Coexistence': China's Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954–55

Shu Guang Zhang

To cite this article: Shu Guang Zhang (2007) Constructing 'Peaceful Coexistence': China's Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954–55, Cold War History, 7:4, 509-528, DOI: 10.1080/14682740701621846

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740701621846

Published online: 08 Oct 2007.

Cold War History
Vol. 7, No. 4, November 2007, pp. 509–528

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Constructing 'Peaceful Coexistence': China's Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954–55

Shu Guang Zhang

In the heyday of the Cold War, China remained confrontational toward the United States and other Western powers but at the same time seemed conciliatory toward Asian nations. This was largely reflected in Beijing's diplomacy of 'peaceful coexistence' and 'united front' at the Geneva and Bandung conferences. Based on recently declassified archives and material in China and probing into the insights of China's foreign policy calculations in the mid-1950s, this article argues that, through actively participating in multilateral diplomacy, the Chinese leaders expected to construct an image of a 'normal state' and play a leading role in normalizing international politics in Asia.

'It is my view', Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Mao Zedong proclaimed in Moscow on 18 November 1957, 'that current situation is characteristic of the east wind prevailing over the west wind, that is, the forces of the socialist [camp] is prevailing over that of the imperialist [world].'[1] Much a metaphysician himself, Mao was using this traditional Chinese proverb to describe his take of the Cold War posture. His 'wind' metaphor entailed a dual implication: on the one hand, the East referring to the positive side in Chinese was overtaking the West, the negative side; on the other hand, the Asian Orientals were taking a lead over all Westerners. Mao's confidence derived partly from China's daring a dual with the mighty America in Korea, Indochina and the Taiwan Strait but more so from Beijing's successful

Shu Guang Zhang is distinguished visiting professor at Shanghai International Studies University and professor of international history at the University of Maryland. He is author of *Deterrence and Strategic Culture:* Chinese–American *Confrontations, 1949–58*, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–53*, and *Economic Cold War: America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963*. He also co-edited *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*. Correspondence to: Shu Guang Zhang, Shanghai International Studies University, Administrative Building, Room 603, 550 Dalian Road (West), Shanghai, China 200083. Email: shgzh@shisu.edu.cn

ISSN 1468-2745 (print)/ISSN 1743-7962 (online)/07/040509-20

DOI: 10.1080/14682740701621846

diplomatic outreach in Asia, primarily through the Geneva and Bandung conferences in 1954–55, during which China tried to construct a system of 'peaceful coexistence' in Asia so as to portray a benevolent image in the international politics.

What persuaded the CCP to accept more a cooperative foreign policy than the confrontational one? What type of 'peaceful coexistence' did Beijing try to construct in Asia? What exactly did the Chinese leaders expect to achieve? How would the more conciliatory members of the leadership reconcile with the more belligerent ones in the course of action? Existing literature has touched on these issues, for example, Chang and Zhang see 'threat perceptions' as one of the driving forces while Chen Jian places emphasis on the framing role of ideology,[2] but there is room for more discussion. By focusing on China's diplomacy toward Geneva and Bandung, this article tries to reconcile constructivist arguments about normalizing rules of international politics and constructing a nation-state's identity in the world community[3] with the newly available historical evidence.[4]

I

As the military conflict in Korea approached its end in the summer of 1953, the Chinese leadership found two top priorities in its immediate policy making: getting prepared for the 'First Five Year Plan' at home, and reducing as much as possible the hostilities from abroad. On the latter, China was faced with two choices: either to continue its belligerent foreign policy, or to resort to a more conciliatory diplomacy. Although rhetorically celebrating China's 'great success' in beating 'the mighty imperialists' in Korea, Mao and his colleagues began to take a more realistic look at the international environment that China found itself in and the strategic options that it might have.

Framed in the ideological confrontations, the Chinese leaders came to believe, the Cold War would not invariably lead to a general war between the two superpowers. 'The major contradiction in today's world', Premier Zhou Enlai asserted in a meeting with a group of senior Chinese diplomats on 5 June 1953, 'is that of peace or war.' The protracted war in Korea, seen by Zhou as 'a three-year war with two-year negotiations', showed clearly that 'another world war has been put off', because 'the strength for peace has grown and America's difficulty has increased'. Therefore, Zhou pointed out, the Korean War entailed 'special implications' as far as the postwar world was concerned: it 'has resolved for us many puzzles we encountered about international affairs', of which one was that a general war could be averted.[5] As the war in Korea stalemated further, Mao also declared that 'if it can not even win the war in Korea, how can the US provoke another world war?'[6]

The significant reduction in the danger of another world war, in the CCP leadership's view, was a result of new changes in geopolitics. Before engaging in a head-on confrontation with one another, Mao Zedong had predicted earlier, the two superpowers had to compete for the vast land of 'intermediate zones' which consisted of those formal colonies and 'semi-colonies' in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[7]

In the 1950s, a 'second intermediate zone' began to emerge and set the two superpowers further apart. 'As far as I can see', Mao told a delegation of the British Labour Party in Beijing in August 1954, '[Washington's] first set of priorities still is to control the intermediate zone between Japan and Britain.' America's goal was to bring under its control all the nations within this 'vast' zone 'so as to bully them, control their economies, build military bases on their territories, and make sure that these nations will forever remain weak'.[8] Along the same lines, Zhou had explained to his associates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1953 that the Cold War politics had been further diversified and the two-dimensional confrontation between Washington and Moscow had become 'four-dimensional': 'war versus peace; democracy versus anti-democracy; imperialist countries versus colonial nations; and between the imperialists'. The contradictions among all the capitalist countries began to gain currency. With the Cold War in full play, Zhou believed, the three groups of capitalist nations that Washington had relied on were falling apart: first, the 'vanguard' nations including South Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina along with the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey proved 'unreliable'; second, the core allies of West Europe were against any expansion of armed conflict, evident in their unwillingness to cooperate with the US in Korea; and, third, the rearmament of Japan and (West) Germany was a distant possibility, offering no immediate help.[9]

What strategic implications would these new changes mean to China? The CCP leadership calculated that the new situation offered China both risks and opportunities. Fighting for the two 'intermediate zones', Mao asserted in August 1954, the US found China standing in the way of it taking complete control over the countries falling in the zones; as a result, US hostilities toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) would surely be intensified and last for a long time. Along with its effort to create the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and persistent support for Jiang Jieshi's 'harassment' of China's mainland, US advocacy for a continued international economic embargo against the PRC was strong evidence. 'If a great power like the United States does not want peace', the CCP chairman stressed, 'we won't have [a minute of] tranquillity, and no one else can have [a minute of] tranquillity.'[10] On the hand, however, China faced no imminent danger of US invasion. 'The law of imperialist war', Zhou said in June 1953, 'is that the weakest will be the first target of attack.' As long as China continued to build up its strength and influence, it was highly likely that 'the US may not dare to attack China'. In order to win time to become 'as strong as walls of bronze [*Tongqiang tiebi*]', China should strike for peaceful coexistence in diplomacy.[11]

To this end, Zhou told senior Chinese diplomats in June 1953, the current focus of China's foreign policy was that 'we advocate resolving all international disputes through peaceful negotiations.... We should practice peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition among all different systems'. This type of diplomacy was possible, he explained, '[because] the US war threats will widen the gap between the US and the Western European countries and cause most of the nations in Asia, Middle East and

North Africa to keep a distance from America... [the people's] voice for peace will sound stronger and stronger'.[12]

While sticking to its anti-imperialism stance, Beijing felt the need to win international sympathy and support. Continuing to 'expose and criticize US imperialism', the CCP hoped to demonstrate that the new regime was capable of acting benevolently and responsibly in international politics, so long as it preserved '[ideological] principles'. Attempting to exploit world opinion so as to 'shame' America, Beijing stressed the need to respect national sovereignty and non-interference in others' domestic affairs, which, the CCP propaganda asserted, was the cornerstone of 'peaceful coexistence'. As the US government could hardly stay away from others' affairs, China's adherence to 'non-intervention and non-interference' would help galvanize the peoples around the world, including the American people, to disfavour war or confrontation. It was imperative, Zhou Enlai pointed out at a meeting of the foreign ministry in June 1953, to persuade world opinion that 'we are the ones who advocate to resolve all international disputes through peaceful consultation and negotiation, and the other side is the one who insists on the use of force or hostility in resolving [international] conflicts'. Should military conflict occur, the US, as the 'perpetrator of war', would then be blamed rightly and squarely.[13]

The CCP also looked upon its pursuit of 'peaceful coexistence' as a weapon to weaken US ties with its chief allies. Seeing its international position greatly enhanced as a result of its armed intervention in Korea, the CCP leadership believed that America's prestige and strength were strained. The US would encounter much greater difficulties than before in maintaining control of its allies and gaining influence over other non-communist countries. As France and Germany were, in particular, opposed to belligerent US policies, Zhou explained in June 1953 that 'America's [European] allies have already been proven [to Washington] as unreliable'. Moreover, America's attempt to round up support from the colonies and semi-colonies had so far been in vain, because these nations 'have merely waved flags and shouted battle cries' for Washington and hardly followed US policy.[14]

More specifically, Beijing believed that China's willingness to accept peaceful coexistence would enhance its chance to defeat the Western isolation of China. As international peace would forge an environment conducive to economic development, many capitalist countries including Britain, France, Germany, and Japan which had suffered greatly during World War II and remained anxious for their own economic reconstruction, would find it highly desirable to trade with China. Zhou Enlai told his associates at the foreign ministry on 12 August 1954 that Western Europe 'has to look for a way out by finding a vast [foreign] market in its efforts to restore its economy, and the East–West trade certainly provides that outlet'. The Western countries, Zhou continued, all understood that, 'given its 600 million population, China has always been a very large market and thus to trade with China has enormous potential'. To improve the PRC's relations with West European countries, 'we will stress [world] peace in our political [propaganda] and foreign trade in our economic policy'. These two weapons would hit America's central nerves. 'Because of its fear of peace',

Zhou Enlai explained, '[the US] sticks to arms race and belligerent policies, and because of its fear of losing control in [economic] competition, it is afraid of the resumption of trade [between China and other countries].' To advocate world peace and, at the same time, strive for international trade, China could 'form a united front with the Western [European] countries' in order to sever the US policy of political isolation and economic embargo.[15]

A first step for China's diplomatic offensive, then, was to construct a new identity in Asia. To Mao, China could stress several benevolent, not belligerent, 'images' in its persuasion campaigns with its Asian neighbours. First, China was a backward country, thus having no capability to expand externally. Speaking to a delegation of the British Labour Party in August 1954, he made it clear that 'China is an agrarian country and it will take China many years to get industrialized'; and it was imperative that 'we must continue our efforts toward constructing a peaceful environment'.[16] Second, China's economy was internally oriented, thus having no need to acquire external markets through either economic or military means. To the same British delegation, Mao explained that China had 'only two [strategic] assets', namely, 'a vast land and a huge population'. Much the same as Russia, China was economically 'relying on domestic market, not foreign market' and had no incentive to expand.[17] Third, China had the same experiences with many non-Western countries in the age of imperialism, thus tolerating no more foreign bullies. Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on 19 October 1954, Mao pointed out that 'all the Orientals have in the past been bullied by Western imperialists' and 'we are emotionally attached to one another and have the same feelings toward self-defence'. Although adopting different political and economic systems, 'we have one thing in common, that is, we all must deal with imperialism'.[18] Fourth, China as a nation was culturally conciliatory and tolerant. Citing traditional Chinese philosopher Mentze's saying that 'diversity and difference represents the very nature of the world', Mao told Nehru that he completely agreed and thus would respect cultural, social, and political diversity.[19]

With this new image, China could participate in the norm-building of international relations. Meeting with an Indian delegation in Beijing on New Year's Eve of 1953, Zhou pointed out that 'we have already established several basic principles in the Sino-Indian relations: they include mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence'.[20] These soon became Zhou's famous 'five principles' of international relations. Meeting with Nehru in October 1954, Mao urged the Indian prime minister that the two countries should work together to 'popularize the five principles', so that, hopefully, they would become widely acceptable norms 'to govern all aspects of international relations'.[21]

II

A much celebrated effort of the Beijing diplomatic offensive was its participation in the Geneva Conference of 1954. At Geneva, the CCP aimed to demonstrate that the PRC

was a serious and responsible player in international politics. Beijing had explicitly supported Moscow's proposal of 28 September 1953 that a five-power (including China) conference be convened to resolve international conflicts in Asia.[22] On 9 January 1954, Zhou Enlai called upon all 'the big powers' involved in the military conflicts in Asia to 'consult' one another on how to restore peace. Later that month, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov followed Zhou's call by proposing in Berlin that a five-power international conference be held to deal specifically with the conflicts in Korea. Echoed by Britain and France, the Molotov proposal brought China into a great-power conference on Korea and Indochina.[23]

Excited at being a participant in the process, Beijing expected to make an impact. With Mao's approval, Zhou immediately began a thorough preparation for the conference. In early March, Zhou supervised the drafting of the key document 'Our Estimation of the Geneva Conference and Preliminary Instructions on Our Preparation'. This document pointed out that 'the United States, France and Britain disagree with each other, especially on the Indochina issue, and they have great difficulty in reconciling their views'; the internal conflicts of the Western bloc could be further 'exploited to our advantage'. The instructions then directed that 'our delegation at Geneva should take all possible initiatives and seize every chance to contact the British, the French, and the neutral [countries]... [so as] to make our positions for a settlement and preference for peace known and understood by them'. The document directed that the Chinese delegation should try hard to generate positive outcomes. To this end, 'we should concentrate on the issues which contain no big differences of opinion and try to accomplish at least a tentative agreement on them. We shall not allow the conference to the end without any result'.[24] Shortly after the Chinese delegation was formed in April, the CCP's central leadership charged Zhou Enlai, the head of the delegation to exercise 'active diplomacy' at Geneva in order to break the US policy of political isolation of and economic embargo against China. Their primary mission was to make every possible effort to reach agreements 'so as to set a precedent for solving international problems through big-power consultations'.[25]

The Geneva team worked 'day and night making all kinds of preparations' for the PRC's first attendance at an international conference. As spokesman for the Chinese delegation, for example, Huang Hua practised his press releases and question-and-answer handling at a mock press conference in accordance with 'international standards' before doing it in front of world media. Anxious to achieve a substantive result at Geneva, in early April Zhou made a special trip to Moscow to consult the Soviet leaders on the upcoming talks. During their three meetings with Zhou, both Khrushchev and Molotov expressed low expectations of the Geneva Conference. Zhou, however, argued differently: 'That China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam can jointly participate in this international conference is in itself an unexpected event and one of our [diplomatic] victories. It will be a bigger success if we can take this opportunity to express our positions and principles on all the issues and offer explanations on certain questions so as to resolve some disputes.'[26]

At a meeting with Indian ambassador to Beijing N. Raghavan on 19 April, Zhou also declared that China would do everything possible to ensure that 'the Geneva Conference must not fail'. Although anticipating grave difficulties in reaching agreements on all the issues on the agenda, he said that 'whatever the Chinese delegation will propose will be in the spirit of peace, justice, equality, opposition to aggression, and non-belligerency'. What Beijing expected to convey through the venue of Geneva consisted of three messages:

> first, it is certain that the US will invade Asia; second, the most urgent issue that Asian nations and peoples must tackle is how to self-help, namely, how to get united and be friendly to one another, oppose aggression, and not become a part of any military aggressive bloc; third, England, France and all other Western countries must understand that their only choice is to strike a good relationship with Asian nations so as to preserve some of their interest, and should they reject this opportunity and choose to take the road with the US, they will lose all of their interests and be spat on for ever by the Asian peoples.

Zhou urged India to watch closely how China would perform at Geneva and to give feedback and suggestions throughout.[27] Since it was the first time for Beijing to take part in such a conference, Zhou told his aides just before heading for Geneva on 20 April that 'China is a major power [*daguo*] and [we] go to Geneva to attend formally an international conference, thus getting on the international stage'; China was ready put on 'a formally staged performance'.[28]

The PRC delegation of more than 200 arrived in Geneva on 24 April. The principals of the PRC delegation settled in luxurious accommodation at the *Grand Mont-Fleur* estate at Versoix. Priceless antiques and furnishings were shipped from China to ready the stately rooms and corridors for the international spotlight.[29] The peak of the PRC's active diplomacy at Geneva was Zhou's articulation of the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence'. To challenge the US policy of 'using Asians to fight Asians', Zhou said at the third plenary session on Indochina on 12 May that:

> Asian countries must mutually respect each other's independence and sovereignty and not interfere in each other's internal affairs; they must solve their disputes through peaceful negotiation and not through threats and military force; they must establish normal economic and cultural relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and disallow discrimination and limitation.

Only in this way could 'the Asian countries avoid the neo-colonialist exploitation of the unprecedented catastrophe of Asians fighting Asians and achieve peace and security'.[30]

Zhou Enlai could not have done better in reiterating his 'five principles of peaceful coexistence', but encountered difficulties when coming to specific issues. On Korea, Beijing had little control over Pyongyang. The head of North Korean delegation Nam Il kept blasting US 'imperialism'. Molotov did not want to start negotiating 'in a hurry' so as to show that 'our side is not the one anxious to negotiate'.[31] Neither did the US delegate John Foster Dulles give China's conciliatory diplomacy any hope.[32] There seemed to be hardly any chance for an agreement on Korea, a disappointed Zhou reported to Mao on 28 April, because 'the US does not want a solution, France is in no

position to talk about the Korean issue, and Britain is unwilling to speak on the issue'. Meanwhile, France seemed 'anxious to get on to the Indochina issue' and thus, it was 'likely that Indochina would be discussed earlier than planned'.[33] To salvage the talks on Korea, Mao Zedong endorsed Zhou's proposal on 17 May to formulate a solution that after all foreign forces were withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, a general election would be held and monitored by selected neutral governments.[34] Although close to that of many sides, the Chinese proposition did not go very far. On 15 June, the session on Korea ended with no agreement. Dismayed at the result, however, Zhou believed that the Chinese scored by 'completely exposing US intentions to rupture the negotiations at any cost'.[35]

The Chinese leaders were not surprised when France pushed for the talks on Indochina the day after Dienbienphu fell on 7 May. Beijing was determined to achieve a substantive agreement. Having genuinely followed Molotov's lead in the Korean sessions, Zhou was now ready to make a move on his own.[36] To soften Paris' position, on 28 May, he pressured Hanoi to release a total of 858 French soldiers captured at Dienbienphu.[37] He calculated that the French would no longer hesitate to accept a peaceful solution to the Indochina problem, and the British would certainly lend their support. Without British and French cooperation, the US would eventually have to accept peace terms in Indochina.[38] In addition to the formal sessions, Zhou had frequent meetings with Soviet and North Vietnamese representatives (on 5, 12, 15, 29 and 30 May, and 2 June) and private meetings with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (on 14, 20 and 27 May) and French Foreign Minister George Bidault (on 7 June), pushing for a 'mutually acceptable settlement' on Indochina.[39]

Beijing's expectation was close to realization at Geneva by mid-June 1954. The new Mendes-France government of France proclaimed that it would agree to restore peace in Indochina on two conditions: a temporary partition of Vietnam, and self-determination and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia under the supervision of an international control commission.[40] In a meeting with Zhou on 23 June, newly elected French Prime Minister Mendes-France also assured the Chinese premier that Paris would not support any intended US efforts to build military bases in Indochina.[41] Zhou undoubtedly liked the French attitude, but worried that the Viet Minh might not be accommodating. To persuade the Vietnamese, Zhou flew back to China and had a three-day meeting with Ho Chi Minh at Liuzhou, Guangxi, on 3–5 July. He explained to Ho that the Viet Minh was now at the crossroads of either continuing to fight or accepting peace now and fighting later. It would be wise, Zhou stressed, for Ho to cease hostilities with the French and consolidate control now, and look for other opportunities later. 'We should do our best to support the Mendes Government', he said to Ho, 'so that we can prevent the war-like elements in France from overthrowing [it].' Specifically, Hanoi should be prepared to accept the proposed division of Vietnam at the 16th parallel or along the 9th Road and ask for no more in Laos or Cambodia for now which, in his view, 'would be certainly beneficial to both of us'. With Zhou's promise of continuous Chinese aid, Ho took Zhou's advice and accepted the conditions.[42] What Zhou achieved with Ho was also endorsed by Mao and the politburo on 7 July.[43]

Mao and the politburo also instructed Zhou to get Moscow's endorsement. Flying back to Geneva, Zhou stopped at Moscow on 10 July. Meeting with the top Kremlin leaders (Georgiy Malenkov, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar Kaganovich, Anastas Mikoyan–Nikita Khrushchev was out of Moscow), he reached an agreement that 'if we rejected Mendes' proposal, the US would seize the chance to replace the Mendes government with a more belligerent one, which would make the settlement of the Indochina conflict even more difficult'.[44] To ensure that Hanoi would not change its mind, on the evening of his arrival at Geneva on 12 July, Zhou had a long meeting with Hanoi's representative until midnight. Informing him of the consensus he had earlier secured with Ho Chi Minh and the Soviet leaders, the Chinese premier stressed that '[Hanoi] should seize the initiative to resolve the issue quickly, actively, and directly'. To that end, the Chinese–Soviet–Vietnamese side should establish a few principles including: 'trying to simplify the issues so as to avoid complicating the negotiations; focusing on France as the primary counterpart which requires considering the possibility of its acceptance before raising any requests; and being willing to compromise by accepting slightly different arrangements toward an agreement as long as no primary interest endangered'.[45] As a result of Zhou's efforts, the Chinese, Vietnamese and Soviet delegations jointly proclaimed their acceptance of the Mendes proposal and even counter-offered to designate the 16th parallel as demarcation line as opposed to the French-proposed 18th parallel. That paved the way for the final signing of the Geneva Accords on Indochina on 21 July, providing for an immediate cease-fire in Indochina, a partition of Vietnam, and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia. This settlement satisfied the Chinese, since most of Vietnam was under the control of a friendly government and 'no foreign forces or military bases or military alliance' would be placed in Laos and Cambodia.[46]

The PRC leaders seemed very pleased with the result and encouraged by the Geneva experiences. Even before the signing of the Geneva Accords, Mao already felt that China had succeeded diplomatically in Geneva. Speaking to an enlarged CCP politburo meeting on 7 July, the CCP chairman said that 'in Geneva, we have adhered to the slogan of peace, thereby portraying an image of being for peace; whereas the US refuses to adhere to such a slogan and thus forges an image of being for belligerency which makes no sense and can not be accepted'. As more and more nations advocated peace, 'we therefore can and will form collaborative relations with all of those willing to live in peace'.[47] On the way back to Beijing, when asked by his aides to reflect on Geneva, Zhou also drew several interesting lessons. First, in negotiating a solution to international disputes, 'as long as both sides have a good will and understand each other and no matter how complicated the issue is, there will be a path toward its solution'. Second, 'all the formal speeches and debates are read line by line from a prepared text [zhaoben xuanke], and speakers often indulge in exaggeration without substance for the purpose of either saving face or propagandizing', but 'activities after a formal meeting including private contacts provide an opportunity for participants to have a frank exchange of views, probe into each other's intentions, put one's cards on the table, negotiate and bargain and reach detailed agreements, which are the practical

and fine methods used to resolve problems'. Third, 'to find effective solutions always requires mutual understanding, accommodating each other's needs, yielding to the other's reasonable demands, and showing consideration for each other's interests, so as to seek a common ground to reach an agreement. If neither side can agree on certain issues, they ought to be shelved for the time being. This is what compromise is all about'. Finally, he stressed, 'when we deal with small and weak nations we must pay special attention to their face [mian zi]; in other words, we must never hurt their national pride. As a major power we should and could understand this'.[48]

III

Although achieving no final settlement of the Korean conflict, the CCP leadership believed that the PRC was able to construct a new image at Geneva: 'New China' was not necessarily belligerent but could be benevolent. Showing willingness to play an active, flexible, responsible and conciliatory role in resolving international disputes, the regime wished to be recognized as a 'normal' and major power in the Cold War politics. The Geneva success, no doubt, inspired the CCP leadership to pursue further the construction of peaceful coexistence, this time, through the Bandung Conference of 1955.

What the top leaders learned from Geneva was that China's active participation in international diplomacy would help relax international tensions. Shortly before signing the Geneva Accords, Zhou Enlai flew back to Beijing on 6 July 1954 to report to an enlarged politburo meeting the next day. China's Geneva experiences, he explained, consisted of two major achievements. First, 'united front' policy proved effective even in an 'international struggle'. The chief policy line the Chinese delegation adopted was 'to get united with France, England, countries in Southeast Asia and Indochina, and all international forces that can be united so as to isolate America and restrict and defeat its plan to expand hegemony globally'. The final agreement on Indochina was evident of the effectiveness of such a policy. Second, it was possible to have international tensions relaxed through non-military means. Although merely achieving a ceasefire over the Indochina crisis, Zhou asserted, Beijing together with Moscow and Hanoi worked vigorously to establish a truce in Indochina and possibly a peaceful solution of the conflict which, in effect, 'was a major step forward toward relaxing international tensions and containing America's plan to expand its global hegemony'.[49]

The Chinese leaders then came to a firm belief that 'to open the door wider' would serve China's interests better than political isolation. At the 7 July enlarged politburo meeting, Zhou Enlai raised the issue of whether or not China should open up further to the outside world. Mao's earlier call to 'have the house swept first and then invite guests in', he explained, had served as 'one of the most important diplomatic principles' over the years; however, based on his own observations of the changes in international politics, it was high time to reconsider 'the earlier decision to keep the door closed for another year' and, in his view, 'it looks like we can no longer keep

the door closed'. Now that 'New China enjoys a very high reputation, the Soviet Union also wishes that our country would participate in international affairs'. It seemed to have become 'inevitable that we must open up'. Concurring with Zhou's assessment, Mao Zedong decided that 'the door can no longer and should not be kept closed and, moreover, [we] should walk out'. What convinced him was that 'the call for tension relaxation and peaceful coexistence originated from us and now is adopted by both [British Prime Minister Anthony] Eden and Nehru, showing that the situation has greatly changed'. To keep up with the momentum, he directed, 'we must develop a working relationship with all the countries that are willing to establish relations with us; ... to that end, [we] must assign a number of people to assume diplomatic work'. Diplomatic work, the CCP chairman stressed, was the 'equivalent of any constructive work'.[50]

As 'China must walk out of its door' becoming Beijing's new principle on diplomacy, the nearest targets would be South and Southeast Asian countries. However, it seemed easy to proclaim but difficult to accomplish. Being traditionally a 'Sino-centric empire', China imprinted no favourable image among these mostly weak and small nations. Other than social and religious differences and existing border disputes, there existed a common fear that China might realize its expansionist aims by supporting the overseas Chinese communities in these countries to instigate a Communist revolution.[51]

Beijing decided to make a diplomatic breakthrough with India and Burma first. While in Geneva, India's representative passed to Zhou Enlai Prime Minister Nehru's invitation to meet with him in New Delhi. Since it would be the very first summit with a head of a non-socialist country and since Nehru was 'the most important leader of India's independence movement and highly reputable among not only newly independent nations but other parts of the international society', Mao approved Zhou's request to accept the invitation.[52] During his six meetings with Nehru on 25–28 June 1954, Zhou conducted a campaign of diplomatic persuasion. First, he repeatedly portrayed a 'peaceful' and benevolent China. In responding to Nehru's proposition to establish 'a peaceful zone' in Asia which would be 'neutral, free of [foreign] military bases, and no interference or aggression', Zhou said that the PRC would be fully committed to constructing such a zone and, more specifically, would apply 'the five principles of peaceful coexistence' not only to India, but also to Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Laos, Cambodia and other Southeast Asian nations. Second, in addressing the commonly felt fear of China's expansion, Zhou pointed out that the key to reducing the fear level was to build mutual confidence. As a positive measure of confidence building, he suggested that China would no longer allow dual citizenship for any overseas Chinese. More important, he proclaimed that although the PRC was founded after a revolution, Beijing did not believe that 'revolutions can be exported'. Third, given the differences and disputes between China and India, Zhou urged Nehru to work together to construct 'an example for the world proving that all the nations can coexist peacefully'.[53] Right after his visit to India, Zhou flew to Burma and held two meetings with Premier U Nu. Reiterating the same points expressed

in New Delhi, Zhou declared that 'it is the view of the Chinese Communist Party that revolution can never be exported; if exported, it is bound to fail; and therefore, only by relying on its own strength can any Communist Party have a hope to succeed'.[54]

Zhou's 'walk-out' diplomacy in Asia seemed to have scored a high mark but soon met new challenges largely from the US. After Geneva, the Eisenhower administration hastily moved to prop up its alliance-building efforts in Asia. More worrisome to Beijing was Washington's effort toward a mutual defence pact with the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan. Meeting with Khrushchev in Moscow on 29 July, Zhou Enlai stated that refusing to accept the setbacks at Geneva, the US was 'negotiating a common defence treaty with Jiang Jieshi', increasing its military aid to Taiwan, and 'extending its [naval] blockade against us to the Guangdong coast and even the Tongkin Gulf area'; therefore, 'still faced with another existing war, that is, a war against the Jiang clique on Taiwan, we are now challenged with another task, that is, to liberate Taiwan'. To take on the challenge, he reasoned, would aim, at least, to 'defeat the US–Jiang attempt toward a military treaty'.[55] Zhou's conversation with the Soviet leader, indeed, reflected exactly the essence of Mao's instruction to him dated 23 July.[56] After intensive military preparations, Beijing decided to exert counter-pressures by shelling Jinmen and Mazu, Jiang-controlled islands off the mainland, early in September. In a notification to the United Nations on 10 October, the PRC condemned US 'armed intervention of China's Taiwan' and claimed that China would 'liberate' the Dachen and Yijiangshan offshore islands.[57]

Beijing's belligerency, although limited, caused Asian capitals to wonder about China's declared benevolence toward peaceful coexistence. Beijing soon felt the need to counter criticism from the neighbouring countries. Early in September, Zhou Enlai explained to his senior aides that although a declared policy, the liberation of Taiwan was 'a strategic task and a long-term complex struggle'. As long as the US was not directly involved, he believed, '[we] should resort to diplomatic struggle' which involved 'enlarging the international united front and isolating the US aggressive bloc so as to win eventual liberation of Taiwan'.[58] Partly to this end, Beijing decided to invite Nehru and U Nu for a summit in Beijing, whose visits, Zhou explained to the task team for the preparations on 18 October, offered China a chance to become further 'united' with the international 'peace-advocating and neutral forces [*heping zhongli pai*] headed by India' so as to 'isolate America ... not only postponing war but changing its direction'.[59]

To that end, Mao and Zhou seemed very patient with Nehru and U Nu. During his four long meetings with Nehru on 19–27 October, Mao repeatedly stressed that 'China is very much in need of friends'. India and China were bound to be friends, because 'we don't have to fight in resolving problems; although we may quarrel over differences, our arguing is fundamentally different from our fight with [John Foster] Dulles'. Although with little in common in social and political systems, both were faced with one 'major challenge', namely, 'how to deal with imperialism'. In his view, countries such as India, Indonesia, Burma 'don't have to follow America's suit' because 'there's little to gain from a bandwagon with the US'.[60] When U Nu came to China

early in December, Mao also emphasized that China strived for a real and long-term peaceful coexistence with all Asian countries and would 'not export revolutions'. Only in some future day 'when we all are truly independent and strong can we not suffer wrong', Mao declared.[61]

Addressing concerns over China's military action in the Taiwan Strait, Mao and Zhou stressed that China had no intention to provoke war but was compelled to protest against bullies. 'The American terror', Mao complained to Nehru on 19 October, 'has gone too far by extending its defence line to South Korea, Taiwan and Indochina which is far away from America but too close to us, causing us difficulty falling asleep'. Washington paid no attention to how its action might affect others: 'For example, before creating the SEATO, it never consulted China or India, but only Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines.' China, therefore, had no choice but to confront the terror.[62] Focusing on Taiwan, Zhou made it even more explicit to Nehru that China's action aimed to signal to Taipei and Washington Beijing's stance: 'no tolerance of blockade on our maritime transportation and foreign trade, no recognition of any form of "neutralizing" [Taiwan] or [turning it into] "mandated territory", and no acceptance of any act of aggression'.[63] To show Beijing's willingness to relax tensions, with Mao's approval, Zhou let U Nu publicly quote his remarks that 'if the US government is willing to relax tensions by withdrawing all of its armed forces from Taiwan, Penghu and the Taiwan Strait and cease its interference with internal Chinese affairs, there will exist a possibility of peaceful liberation of Taiwan', and 'there will be a possibility that China and the US will not only coexist peacefully, but engage in friendly relations'.[64]

Beijing's campaign of persuasion seemed effective. In late December 1954, the Colombo powers decided at Bogor, Indonesia, to invite China to attend the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, scheduled for 18–24 April 1955.[65] Deeply concerned about the possible escalation of the Offshore islands crisis as China took control of Yijiangshan and Dachen in January, however, Nehru suggested calling an international conference–either under the UN's auspices or of all the Asian countries–to resolve the conflict. Beijing was torn: on the one hand, it might fall into a 'two-China' scheme if the Taiwan issue became an international agenda or Jiang was brought into an international negotiation; on the other hand, Beijing would look bad if it were to reject the peaceful resolution of an international crisis. Meeting with the Indian ambassador to Beijing on 6 February, Zhou expressed China's position on Nehru's proposition: China was willing to talk directly with the US about Taiwan in an international conference setting, or to participate at an international conference on Taiwan but without Jiang's representation.[66]

The CCP leaders saw China's participation at Bandung as yet another formidable task to construct a peace-advocating image and hopefully a diplomatic breach of US containment of the PRC. The 'Draft Plan for Attending the Afro-Asian Conference' approved by the politburo on 4 April asserted that Bandung was a special occasion which would exclude all the 'imperialist powers' and be attended by the majority of the Afro-Asian nations. Much to China's delight, the multilateral dynamic brought

together delegations from 29 Asian and African countries for the first time to challenge 'imperialism'. The international gathering, in his view, took place at a crucial juncture of the Cold War where 'the US is organizing and enlarging its aggressive bloc, aiming to strengthen its control over Afro-Asian nations so as to get actively prepared for a new war'. Seeing the conference would not serve its objectives, Washington 'conspires to disrupt it through its agents'. Given the situation, the plan claimed, China's participation would facilitate 'a favourable condition under which to grow peaceful forces in Africa and Asia and even in the world'.[67]

China would, however, encounter enormous challenges at Bandung. Of all the 29 participating countries, as many as 22 had no diplomatic relations with the PRC: many had never even had any contact with Beijing but maintained official relations with Taipei. Moreover, because of the grave differences, both socially and politically, most of these states remained 'suspicious and even fearful of the new China'. Even more challenging was that 'controlled by the US, several countries are hostile' toward Beijing and were not prepared to accomplish anything.[68] What, then, could China realistically do to generate positive results?

'Our general guideline for the Afro-Asian conference', the politburo-approved plan stipulated, 'to strive for the extension of an international united front, promotion of national independent movements, and creation and strengthening of conditions thereby to forge official and diplomatic relations with a number of Afro-Asian countries'. The plan also positioned China's stance over several crucial issues. First, in regard to 'friendly cooperation under the framework of peaceful coexistence', China would advocate that 'friendly cooperation must be guided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence and based on opposition to aggression and war'. Second, concerning Taiwan, China would 'insist on relaxing and resolving international tensions, including the one in the Taiwan area, through international negotiations'. Third, regarding the nuclear arms race, 'we favour restricting the production of, and disarming all of the nuclear weapons and weaponry of mass destruction'. Fourth, with regard to interference and 'revolution', the plan stated that 'it is right not to discuss the issue of communism at the conference but we shall hint on some appropriate occasions … that although preferring not to discuss the issue we are not afraid of discussing it'. The Chinese delegation 'must make it clear: although no domestic affairs should be interfered with, it is impossible to contain the spread of communist ideas; although revolution can not be exported, interference with people's acceptance of any common ideology in a nation should be not permitted'.[69]

Much as at Geneva, Zhou Enlai insisted that China had not come to the conference to force resolutions on admittedly difficult issues such as China's recognition at the UN, nor had China come to raise differences of ideology and political systems; rather, China had come to discuss the central commonality of the colonial experience and its economic implications, implying that all Asian and African countries ought to watch out for the rise of US neo-colonialism. Patiently but effectively, Zhou established China's position on the basis of 'seeking common ground while reserving differences [*quitong cunyi*]', which in the end became the organizational basis for the application

of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In his persuasion campaign, the Chinese premier did not even insist on retention of the wording 'peaceful coexistence' which he was aware had caused some suspicions among the Afro-Asian states, and proposed instead 'living together in peace'. 'The wording of the Five Principles', Zhou declared, 'can be revised, and the number of the principles may be increased or reduced; for what we seek is to identify our common aspirations.' Toward that goal, he recommended that the Afro-Asian countries should at least establish economic and cultural relations on the basis of 'mutual benefit and equality'.[70]

Extremely exhausted at the end of the conference on 28 April, Zhou flew to Kunming for recuperation and sent Mao and the central committee four reports the next day. These reports detailed his judgements of what China had achieved at Bandung. The first was on how 'political issues were discussed'. From the very beginning, he asserted, the political debate reflected 'two clearly divided lines: one, with anti-Soviet and anti-Communist slogans, attempting to entrap the debate into a dispute over ideology in order to ensure no accomplishment with the conference; the other trying its best to affirm all the commonalities on the basis of anti-colonialism and world peace protection for the purpose of expressing as much as possible the common will of the Afro-Asian peoples'. With China firmly on the latter's side, Zhou asserted, 'the second line proved basically successful'.[71] For that course, China put up a tough but effective fight: firm on principles but flexible on persuasion, and thus was able to win sympathy and understanding.

In the second report, Zhou described how he discussed the Taiwan issue with other leaders. At altogether 12 meetings involving the topic, he had consistently conveyed that the issue by nature entailed two different but correlated dimensions: on the one hand, 'since the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese people is to exercise their sovereign rights for the territorial integrity and China's eventual unification, the dispute between China and the Jiang regime is a domestic matter'; on the other hand, 'as the US tries to intervene against the PLA's effort to liberate the offshore islands by occupying Taiwan and has escalated the tensions in the Taiwan area, the conflict between China and the US is an international one'. The only solution to the latter conflict was for Beijing and Washington to 'sit down and talk'. However, he had been vigorously against any proposition for a ceasefire talk which, he explained, would lead China to fall for 'a US deal: to trade the withdrawal of Jiang's forces from Jinmen and Mazu for the PLA's renouncing the liberation of Taiwan, eventually to legitimize US armed occupation of Taiwan by forcing China to accept the existence of two Chinas'. Such an eventuality, Zhou stressed, was 'absolutely unacceptable to China in any time or under any circumstances'. Moreover, concerning some inquiry that China had only mentioned 'liberating Taiwan' but never said 'liberating Taiwan by force', Zhou had to declare that 'the Chinese people have the right to resort to any means toward having Taiwan liberated, including peaceful means', but 'only until the US gives up invading and intervening and withdraws all of its armed forces from Taiwan would the peaceful liberation of Taiwan toward China's eventual unification be possible.' Tough as it might sound, he reported that his announcement on 23 April–that 'the Chinese

people don't want war with the US; the Chinese government is willing to sit down and talk with the US government to discuss how to relax tensions in the Far East, in particular, the one in the Taiwan area'[72] – 'already proved effective and played a role in pushing for the final agreements at the conference'. As for the next step Beijing might undertake, he suggested, it would be better 'to wait for further reactions from all sides involved'.[73]

The third and fourth reports dealt with the issues of dual citizenship and economic cooperation. What Zhou regarded as a major achievement was to abolish dual citizenship by signing a treaty with Indonesia where the overseas Chinese community had been a source of 'the China fear'. Not only did the Indonesian government applaud the treaty as a historically controversial issue that was finally resolved, but the Thai and Philippine governments also reacted with enthusiasm. It was, in his judgement, 'a timely and important step' toward enhancing China's good image with Southeast Asian countries. However, it proved difficult to persuade the overseas Chinese, although Zhou had several private meetings with the leaders in Bandung.[74] With regard to economic cooperation, Zhou found it less difficult to convince the other leaders that as long as it was based on 'peaceful means, independence, and self-determination', economic cooperation among all the Afro-Asian nations was highly possible. In his view, almost every leader shared China's position on international economic cooperation: believing in 'self-reliance', convinced that 'only the Afro-Asian experiences suit the Afro-Asian peoples', and being against attaching any political condition to economic assistance.[75]

On 4 May, immediately before departing for Beijing, Zhou sent his fifth report to Mao on his own observations of other leaders during the conference. After getting connected with different leaders, he asserted, 'our classification of their countries before the conference was basically correct'. Following the politburo's instructions, the Chinese delegation 'tried to seek common ground while reserving differences, show patience in persuasion so as to reach a general agreement, and meanwhile, respect all the participating countries so as to win sympathy and good feelings of the majority countries among whom even those with the most furious anti-Soviet and anti-Communist attitude have somewhat changed their prejudice against new China'. It is interesting to note that Zhou attributed such achievements to the validity of Mao's 'united front' diplomacy and affirmed that 'it is highly likely that all the Afro-Asian countries can cooperate peacefully on the basis of seeking common ground while putting aside differences'.[76]

The focus of Beijing's diplomatic offensive from 1954 through 1957 was without doubt on the Afro-Asian countries. Mao confirmed this focus during a conversation with Indonesian president Ahmed Sukarno on 30 September 1956. As to 'where do we concentrate our effort to carry out [diplomatic] work and make friends', he told Sukarno, 'our emphasis has been placed on three continents, that is, Asia, Africa, and Latin America'. If China could establish friendly relations with countries in these regions, there would only be 'a small part of Europe, a half of America, and Australia' which would remain hostile or unfriendly to China. It would not matter if these

countries insisted on opposing the PRC, Mao asserted; and 'we are prepared to wait for them [to come around] in one hundred years'.[77] Beijing evidently made breakthroughs with this diplomatic focus. Almost all the countries which established diplomatic relations with the PRC during this period were Afro-Asian states, including Afghanistan (20 January 1955), Nepal (1 August 1955), Egypt (30 May 1956), Syria (1 August 1956), Yemen (24 September 1956) and Sri Lanka (7 February 1957).[78]

IV

In foreign policy discourse, constructivists have argued, nation-states tend to pursue subjectively normalizing rules of foreign behaviours, thus constructing a self-conscious identity thereby either to fit in or shape the functioning of the international community. Unconsciously, though, such a subjective role can not be ignored in understanding international politics.[79] To some extent, Beijing's attempts to construct 'peaceful coexistence' in the mid-1950s seem supportive of the constructivist assumption.

Although ideologically committed to the Socialist camp, the Chinese leaders in practice intended to construct a new image in the international community. Such an orientation derived partly from their perception of external threat and partly from their concerns over China's 'aggressive image' after its 'voluntary' intervention in Korea. Holding high the flag of 'anti-imperialism', the CCP leaderships launched a persuasion campaign to portray a China that was backward, thus having no capability to expand externally, with an internally oriented economy, thus having no need to acquire external markets, and had the same experiences with many non-Western countries in the age of imperialism, thus having no desire to conquer other's territory. Beijing expected the countries falling into the two 'intermediate zones' to identify China with these images.

To this end, the CCP leaders placed high expectations on the diplomacy of 'peaceful coexistence' and 'united front'. Convinced that capitalist countries would always be profit-driven, they harboured the belief that China's market was so huge that no one in the capitalist world could afford to shut themselves off from it for long. Also convinced that most of the Afro-Asian nations shared the same experiences with and concerns about colonialism or 'imperialism', the Chinese authorities reasoned that there existed no insurmountable gulf between China and these nation-states. Pushing for the emergence of a new international community, they expected the five principles of peaceful coexistence to be normalized in actual diplomacy which, in turn, would help China breach the political isolation, economic embargo, and strategic containment instituted by the US.

A conciliatory and pragmatic Zhou, however, faced the challenge of reconciling with a belligerent and idealistic Mao. Although going along with the peaceful coexistence, Mao felt the need to exercise a 'tension diplomacy' against a perceived US 'intervention' in Taiwan during 1954–55. Although pleased at the end results of Zhou's 'united front' diplomacy toward Afro-Asian nations, Mao could only promise

that China would not 'export revolution' to its neighbours but insisted that if the peoples wanted revolution, no authority could suppress it.

Notes

[1] *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 291.
[2] Chang, *Friends and Enemies*; Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*; and Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*.
[3] Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It".
[4] In the spirit of 'transparency', the Chinese foreign ministry archives have been declassifying diplomatic papers of the 1950s. The very recent one, covering through the early 1960s, took place in April 2006.
[5] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, 58.
[6] Ibid., 58.
[7] Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 15–16.
[8] *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 159–62.
[9] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, 59–61.
[10] *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 159–62.
[11] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, 61.
[12] Ibid., 62.
[13] Ibid., 101.
[14] Ibid., 58–61.
[15] Ibid., 81. For the Western embargo against China and China's counter efforts, see Zhang, *Economic Cold War*.
[16] *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 160.
[17] Ibid., 161.
[18] Ibid., 163.
[19] Ibid., 167.
[20] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, 63.
[21] *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 165.
[22] Waijiaobu Dang'an Guang (Foreign Ministry Archives, Beijing, China), K113-00162, 8 October 1953.
[23] Foreign Ministry Archives, K109-00396-01, 17 February 1954; K109-00396-01, 2 March 1954; also see Han, *Dangdai Zhongguo Waijio*, 64–5.
[24] Jing, *Zhou Enlai Zhuan*, 1112–14.
[25] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 355.
[26] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y0054, 7 April 1954; also see Shi, *Zai Lishi Juren Shengbian*, 539–41.
[27] Foreign Ministry Archives, 105-Y062, 19 April 1954.
[28] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 361.
[29] Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai*, 62.
[30] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, 70.
[31] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y049, 26 April 1954.
[32] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 362.
[33] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y049, 30 April 1954; 206-Y0049, 14 May 1954.
[34] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y049, 17 May 1954.
[35] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y050, 6 June 1954, 13 June 1954, and 17 June 1954.
[36] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y049, 12 May, 13 May, and 15 May.

[37] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y0049, 30 May 1954; also see Central Division of Archives, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 365–6.
[38] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y0050, 1 June, 3 June, 4 June, 5 June, 7 June, 10 June, and 11 June 1954.
[39] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 365–78. Also see Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y049, 1 May 1954; 206-Y0050, 17 June 1954.
[40] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y050, 14 June 1954.
[41] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y0007, 23 June 1954.
[42] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 394–5; Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y0055, 4 July 1954.
[43] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 395.
[44] Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y0054, 10 July 1954.
[45] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 397; Foreign Ministry Archives, 206-Y0005, 12 July 1954; 206-Y0054, 14 July 1954.
[46] Xiao, *Wushinian Guoshi Jiyao*, 125.
[47] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 395.
[48] Shi, *Zai Lishi Juren Shengbian*, 563–4.
[49] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 395.
[50] Jing, *Zhou Enlai Zhuan*, 1147.
[51] Xiao, *Wushinian Guoshi Jiyao*, 126.
[52] Jing, *Zhou Enlai Zhuan*, 1149.
[53] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 390–93.
[54] Ibid., 393–4.
[55] Ibid., 405.
[56] Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 193.
[57] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 406; Xiao, *Wushinian Guoshi Jiyao*, 153.
[58] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 412.
[59] Ibid., 412.
[60] *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 164–76.
[61] Ibid., 177–96.
[62] Ibid., 164–5.
[63] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 421.
[64] Ibid., 430.
[65] U Nu orally extended the invitation while meeting with Zhou Enlai on 2 December 1954, and Indonesian ambassador to Beijing formally submitted the invitation on 22 January 1955 and Zhou accepted it. Ibid., 428 and 442–3.
[66] Ibid., 448.
[67] Jing, *Zhou Enlai Zhuan*, 1158–9.
[68] Ibid., 1157–8.
[69] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, pp. 460-461.
[70] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, 112–63; Jing, *Zhou Enlai Zhuan*, 1165–76.
[71] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 474.
[72] CCP, Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan, 134.
[73] CCP, *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, 474–5.
[74] Ibid., 475.
[75] Ibid., 475–6.
[76] Ibid.
[77] *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 263–74.
[78] Han, *Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao*, 477.
[79] Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It", 424–5.

References

CCP Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials. ed. *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan* (Selected works of Zhou Enlai on diplomacy). Beijing, CN: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 2000.

———, ed. *Zhou Enlai Nianpu* (The chronicle of Zhou Enlai), 1949–1976 Vol. 1. Beijing, CN: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 1989.

Chang, Gordon H. *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Chen, Jian. *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

Han, Nianlong, ed. *Dangdai Zhongguo Waijio* (China today: diplomacy). Beijing, CN: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Press, 1987.

Jing, Chongji, ed. *Zhou Enlai Zhuan* (The biography of Zhou Enlai). Vol. 3. Beijing, CN: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 1998.

Keith, Ronald. *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai*. New York: St. Martin's, 1989.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CCP Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials, ed. *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan* (Selected works of Mao Zedong on diplomacy). Beijing, CN: Zhongyang Wenxuan Press, 1994.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organizations* 46, no. 32 (1992): 391–425.

Shi, Zhe. *Zai Lishi Juren Shengbian* (Together with historical giants: Shi Zhe memoirs). Beijing, CN: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1991.

Xiao, Donglian. *Wushinian Guoshi Jiyao: Waijiao Juan*. (Fifty-year state affairs on the record: the volume on diplomacy) Changsha, HN: Hunan People's Press, 1999.

Zhang, Shu Guang. *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese–American Confrontations, 1949–1958*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.

———. *Economic Cold War: America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963*. Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press–Stanford University Press, 2001.