

# ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT



# PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

- *Public procurement* is the process by which government departments or agencies purchase goods, services and works from the private sector.
  - It takes place at both a national and regional level, and the process will usually be subject to specific rules and policies covering how the relevant decisions are made.
- The goal of public procurement is to award timely and cost-effective contracts to qualified contractors, suppliers and service providers for the provision of goods, work and services to support government and public services operations

# PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

- total amount of public procurement in the UE (16% of EU GDF (€1500 billion on 2002))
- **Beneficiaries of Public Procurement**
  - All inhabitants of a country (citizens) are beneficiaries of the public procurement system through public goods and services available and provided
    - transportation systems,
    - public utilities,
    - educational systems,
    - medical services and facilities
    - ...

# UN APPALTO PUBBLICO.....



Procurer



Market  
(suppliers)



# PUBLIC PROCUREMENT & EU

European legislation on PP (public procurement) has the following objectives:

- Cost effectiveness
- open
- Best value for money

# PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

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# PP LAW IN EU

## EU Directives on “Public Procurement”

- *2014/23/UE*
- *2014/24/UE*
- *2014/25/UE*

# *PUBLIC PROCUREMENT (CTD)*

European Commission

- Communication from the Commission to the Institutions: Making Public Procurement work in and for Europe

# PP LAW IN EU

## Italy:

- Public Procurement code
- dlgs n. 50/2016 (Codice appalti), modified by dlgs n. 564/2017.
- National Recovery Resilience Facility (Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza (PNRR))
  - DL 31 May 2021, n. 77
  - Law 29 July 2021, n. 108

# PNRR AND PP CODE

- RRF (Italian PNRR) updates the PP code:
  - Negotiation vs competitive procedures
  - Vendor rating
  - Ease access to SME
  - Extension of Subcontracting

# PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: TARGETS

- Instruments:

1. Competition (open competitive procedures)
2. Transparency
3. Modernization and market openness

# ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES

**Maximization:**     **Value for Money** = Quality – Price – Cost of the process

**Under the constraints:**

- Minimum needs for the buyer
- budget (reserve price)
- Laws




- Administrative costs
- timing
- Information gathering
- Lawsuit risks
- Enforcing contractual aspects

EU approach shows a strategic economic policy target for the PP

Budget	• Cost effectiveness
Effects on the mkt structure	• Dominant position, risk of <i>lock-in</i> , SME • Internal EU mkt
Sustainability	• Environment • Social
Innovation	• Innovation in the PA • Innovation in the mkt

# Applications: Procurement


- Procurement structure




# MAIN PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS

Ex-ante asymmetric information:  
hidden information, Adverse  
Selection

Ex-post asymmetric information:  
Hidden action (monitoring  
problems), Moral Hazard



# ECONOMIC ANALYSIS



# INSTRUMENTS

- Methods:
- restricted procedures, negotiation e/o competitive procedures
- Direct contracting (sole source): offers required only from specific firms
- COMPETITIVE PROCEDURES (Auctions)

# First price auction with complete information

- bidders know their own value and the value of the rivals (in procurement this value is the production cost)
- buyer does not know the firms' costs

2 bidders, with  $c_1 < c_2$ , simultaneously offer a price bid at which they will offer the good/service/work

Nash Equilibrium (Asymmetric Bertrand):

$$p_1 = c_2 - \epsilon$$

$$p_2 = c_2$$

$$\pi_1 = (c_2 - \epsilon)q$$


$$\pi_2 = 0$$

# Incomplete Information:

- ✗ bidder only know their own cost
- ✗ buyer does not know the bidders' cost

- Assume 2 bidders, costs are iid over 0 and 1, following an uniform distribution.
- Assume 2 bids its cost, is it optimal for 1 bidding its cost?

$$\max(p_1 - c_1) \text{prob}(c_2 \geq p_1)$$


$$F(p_1 \leq c_2) = 1 - p_1$$
$$\frac{d\pi_1}{dp_1} = 0 \rightarrow p_1 = \frac{c_1 + 1}{2} > c_1 \dots\dots\dots \text{NO}$$

- Same argument for 2