


The SSM

Meeting with the practitioners

Rome, 7^o March 2017

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An integrated system of national supervisors and ECB ...





How? The architecture: SIs, LSIs, JSTs and decision making

Allocation of tasks


- **DGs-MS 1 and 2:** conduct of day-to-day supervision of Significant Institutions **via JSTs**
- **DG-MS 3:** oversight of the supervision of Less Significant Institutions performed by NCAs
- **DG-MS 4:** ensure consistency, identification of risks and promote best practices **via experts' networks between NCAs and ECB**

- **DGs-MS 1 :** conduct of day-to-day supervision of Significant Institutions **via JSTs**
- **DG-MS 2:** conduct of supervision of Less Significant Institutions
- **DG-Regulation:** ensure consistency, early identification of risks and promote best practices **via experts' networks between NCAs and ECB**



The Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs)

Decision making: SB proposing complete draft decisions to the Governing Council (non objection procedure)



What is the SSM?

... focused on prudential supervision

Responsibility of the ECB for institutions within the euro area

- Credit institutions, (mixed) financial holding companies
- Micro-prudential supervision
- Early prudential intervention
- Granting / withdrawal of authorizations and acquisitions of qualifying holdings

No responsibility of the ECB

- Supervision of insurance companies, factoring- and leasing companies
- Asset management companies and payment service providers
- Resolution of banks
- Consumer protection
- Money-laundering, terrorism financing

Business models and profitability drivers


- Business models and profitability drivers continue to be a priority area in 2017, especially in view of protracted ultra-low/negative interest rates.
- European banking supervision will therefore continue to drive forward its thematic review of banks' business models and profitability drivers.
- A further point of supervisory attention will be the possible repercussions of the UK's referendum on EU membership for supervised banks and their business models.
- In addition, European banking supervision will explore potential risks for banks' business models emanating from the emergence of "FinTech" and non-bank competition.

Non-performing loans (NPLs) a key issue in some Member States: draft guidance to bank was submitted for public consultation. Focused on:

- Need to define strategy on NPL reduction targets
- Set up of dedicated NPL workout units
- Compliant and prudent NPL recognition
- Sound NPL provisioning and collateral approaches
- Beyond the banks, Member States requested to improve their legal and judicial frameworks in order to facilitate the timely workout of NPLs

Asset Quality of the Italian Banks 2/2

Non Performing Loans




Bank loans secured by collateral amount to €160 billion, about 50 per cent of gross non-performing exposures (67 per cent including personal guarantees).

With respect to bad debts, the value of the collateral exceeds the net exposure.

Coverage ratio of NPLs and Texas ratio for a sample of European banks (1)

(per cent; December 2015)



Non-performing loans are slightly greater than the sum of common equity tier 1 capital and provisions: the Texas ratio (the ratio of gross NPLs to the sum of common equity tier 1 capital and loan loss provisions) though relatively high by international comparison, is actually only slightly more than 100 per cent.

Root causes of the NPLs in Italy

- Length of the recovery procedures
- Length and severity of the economic crisis
- Management of the NPLs stock
- Small NPL market

.... NPL burden varies significantly accross the sector

Key indicators of the Italian Banking System by segments

Indicator	SIs	LSIs	LSIs: BCCs	LSIs: non-BCCs
Total assets (EUR billion)	2,304.0	558.0	236.0	323.0
Stock of customer loans (EUR billion)	1,517.4	314.3	133.2	181.1
Stock of non-performing loans (EUR billion)	271.2	63.4	26.4	37.0
Stock of bad loans (EUR billion)	163.2	37.0	14.6	22.4
Non-performing loan ratio	17.9%	20.2%	19.8%	20.4%
Bad loan ratio	10.8%	11.8%	11.0%	12.4%
Non-performing loan coverage ratio	46.6%	43.6%	42.3%	44.5%
Bad loan coverage ratio	58.8%	57.6%	56.1%	58.6%
Loan value adjustments as % of operating income	80.3%	70.8%	95.5%	55.4%
CET 1 ratio (Basel 3 phased-in)	11.7%	15.5%	16.3%	14.9%
Total capital ratio (Basel 3 phased-in)	15.1%	16.6%	16.8%	16.5%
Return on equity (net of goodwill impairments)	2.2%	2.2%	-0.5%	4.6%
Cost-to-income ratio	67.8%	69.9%	68.5%	70.7%

GACS

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
On February 2016 the Government has introduced a guarantee for senior tranches of securitized nonperforming loans.

Main Figures:

- Not Mandatory
- Remuneration of Guarantee at Market Prices to the Treasury in order to ensure the state aid-free nature of the scheme.
- Senior tranches of the ABS rated at least Investment Grade
- Guarantee is effective after that half of the junior tranches have been sold.
- The riskiest tranches (i.e. junior and mezzanine) shall not be repaid until the senior tranches guaranteed by the State have been fully repaid.
- Banks will have up to 18 months to access this scheme

GACS

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Atlante Fund

On 11 April a variety of banks, insurance companies, pension funds and other institutional investors agreed to participate in the launch of the alternative investment fund known as 'Atlante', which will be managed by Quaestio Capital Management SGR SpA.

Investment Mandate of Atlante: (i) shares of banks that need to increase their capital in accordance on request of the supervisory authority, and (ii) tranches of bad debt securitizations. Specifically, the investments will concentrate on the riskiest tranches of securitizations (junior and mezzanine), whose market is particularly small

Investors of the Atlante: i) belong to the private sector; ii) don't affect the financial investment of the fund; iii) should invest up to a minimum of €4 billion.

Civil Proc.re Code and Bankruptcy Law Reforms

Scope of the reforms

- Improve the legal framework for early intervention, promoting early action and making restructuring more likely.
- Reduce the length of judicial foreclosure.

Direct Benefits for the Borrowers

- the average length of the bankruptcy process should drop from more than 6 to around 3 years in a favorable scenario (around 4-5 in a less favorable one).
- The overall average length of the judicial foreclosures should drop from more than 4 to around 3 years.

Indirect Benefits for the Whole Banking System

The new rules are expected to have important beneficial effects on banks' NPLs (also in terms of bid-ask spread).

Final Scope

Increase lending to the economy.

Thanks for your attention!

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