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Learning Objectives

LEARNING OUTCOMES: This course provides the tools used by policy to solve problems related to imperfect competition markets, such as taxation and regulation. The course focuses on Natural Monopoly, Monopolistic Competition, Oligopoly making a comparison with perfect competition. We will develop strategic interaction, game theory through rational and behavioral approach.

KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: The course aims to provide students with both theoretical and methodological tools through which they can have an organic framework of basic knowledge useful to understand: 1) the market structures of imperfect competition; 2) which are the instruments of the policy able to encourage solutions that optimize the welfare of the community and regulate monopolistic markets; 3) the taxation system.

APPLYING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: Students will participate in several exercises on imperfect markets and experimental games where they will make decisions in a strategic context through experiments in a virtual or in-person (or mixed) lab.

At the end of the course, students will be able to have the tools of critical analysis necessary to interpret and deal with autonomous judgment the main issues related to: 1) markets in imperfect competition and their regulation; 2) interactive, strategic and behavioral relationships.

COMMUNICATION SKILLS: The student will acquire the ability to communicate, expressing himself with economic-technical language properties, his own knowledge acquired in the context of the topics covered during the course.

LEARNING SKILLS: At the end of the course, students will have at their disposal the conceptual tools and the knowledge necessary to continue their studies, also analyzing critically: 1) the motivations underlying the choices in the contexts of strategic interaction; 2) the different contexts of imperfect market and the related public regulations.


Basic knowledge of microeconomics and elementary algebra is required.


Natural Monopoly
Natural monopoly regulation
Monopoly competition
Comparisons with perfect competition
Competition policies
Dominant and dominated strategy.
Pure and mixed strategy, Nash equilibrium.
Sequential games, credible and non-credible threats,
Equilibrium of Cournot, of Bertrand, of Stackelberg,
Entry game, the credible and not credible threats,
Experimental games: Dictator game, ultimatum game, Trust game, Public good game. Social preferences (distributional, psychological, and moral)
Distinctions of the motivations underlying the choice
The role of communication
Psychological and moral costs.
Students will participate in experimental games in behavioral economics labs in presence or virtual or blended.


D. Acemoglu, D. Laibson e J. A. List Economics - Pearson (second edition 2018)
Microeconomics, By David Besanko; Ronald Braeutigam, Wiley Editor


Forsythe, Robert; Horowitz, Joel L.; Savin, N.E.; Sefton, Martin (1994). "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments", Games and Economic Behavior, 6: 347– 369.
Güth, W.; Schmittberger, R. & B. Schwarze (1982). "An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3: 367-388.
Berg J., Dickhaut J. and McCabe K. (1995) "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History", Games and Economic Behavior, 10:122-142.
Cox (2004), "How to identify trust and reciprocity", Games and Economic Behavior, 46: 260-281.
Di Bartolomeo G. e S. Papa (2016): “ Trust and reciprocity: Extensions and robustness of triadic design", Experimental Economics, Springer: 19 (1): 100-115.
Charness, G. and Dufwenberg M. (2006), "Promises and Partnership" Econometrica 74: 1579-1601.
Vanberg, C. (2008), “ Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations", Econometrica, 76: 1467-1480.
Di Bartolomeo G., Martin Dufwenberg, S. Papa e F. Passarelli (2019): “ Promises, expectations & causation", Games & Economic Behavior, 113: 137-146.

Teaching methods

Lectures, exercises, and laboratory or virtual experiments

Exam Rules

The exam consists of a written exam, (plus a mandatory experimental laboratory), necessary to verify the level of knowledge of the topics indicated in the program and treated during the lessons by Prof. Papa.
The task consisting of different questions and exercises. It focuses on everything done in class.
The assessment will be based on the following criteria: Knowledge of the topics, ability to apply rational or behavioral theory to specific problems, language properties and analytical skills.
Possible outcomes, as the average of the two written exams of the two parties: Best result: 30 cum laude; excellent result from 30 to 28; good result from 27 to 26; fair result from 25 to 23; from 22 to 20 satisfactory outcome; from 19 and 18 sufficient outcome.
As said above, in addition to the written exam, it is necessary to carry out an experimental laboratory during the course with the Prof. Papa.