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GAME THEORY AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

GAME THEORY

Program

Updated A.Y. 2021-2022

Part II: Static and Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

The second part of the course will first deal with repeated games in a complete information setting. Then, most of the second part will be dedicated to the analysis of static and dynamic games in incomplete information settings, that is, we will explore games similar to the ones seen in the first part of while now allowing for some uncertainty. For that matter, we will have to enrich the previous models and develop new equilibrium concepts, namely, Bayesian Nash equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 

 

Detailed topics

Repeated games. The Prisoner’s dilemma and coordination. The Folk theorem.

Static games of incomplete Information. Bayesian Nash equilibrium. An auction game. Harsanyi’ interpretation of mixed strategies.

Dynamic games of incomplete information. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Basics of signalling.

 

References

The reference book for the class is "Gibbons, R. (1992), Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press".