Login
Student authentication

Is it the first time you are entering this system?
Use the following link to activate your id and create your password.
»  Create / Recover Password

GAMES, INFORMATION AND CONTRACT THEORY AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION AND COMPETITION POLICY

GAMES, INFORMATION AND CONTRACT THEORY

Syllabus

Updated A.Y. 2016-2017

Part I

Static games of complete information. Iterated elimination of strictly.
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Cournot's model. Bertrand's model. Hotelling's model.

Reference: Gibbons (1992, Ch. 1), Osborne (2003, Ch. 2&3)

Part II
Dynamic games with complete information. Extensive form games and backward induction. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Stackelberg  model of duopoly. Repeated games: two-stage repeated games and infinitely repeated games.

Reference: Gibbons (1992, Ch. 2).

Part III
Static Games of incomplete Information. Normal-form representation of static bayesian games. Bayes-Nash equilibrium.

Reference: Gibbons (1992, Ch. 3).

Exam
The final exam consists of a written test only.

Textbooks:

  1. Gibbons, Robert (1992): A Primer in Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  2. Osborne, Martin (2003): An introduction to Game Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.