EN
IT
Obiettivi Formativi
OBIETTIVI FORMATIVI:
CONOSCENZA E CAPACITÀ DI COMPRENSIONE:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di comprendere e applicare l'approccio logico della teoria dei giochi e della microeconomia per:
Studiare pratiche anticoncorrenziali negli oligopoli e ruolo della politica di concorrenza
Studiare i mercati con limiti alla concorrenza e la loro regolazione.
CAPACITÀ DI APPLICARE CONOSCENZA E COMPRENSIONE:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di applicare le conoscenze sulle pratiche anticoncorrenziali e sulle politiche di regolazione negli oligopoli e e nei mercati con limiti alla concorrenza
AUTONOMIA DI GIUDIZIO:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di analizzare pratiche di mercato e capire la ratio di diverse tesi sugli effetti sulla concorrenza e della regolazione dei mercati
ABILITÀ COMUNICATIVE:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di analizzare le pratiche anticoncorrenziale e le politiche di regolazione, e preparare delle presentazioni per discuterne gli effetti
Learning Objectives
LEARNING OUTCOMES:
KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to understand and apply the logical approach of game theory and microeconomics to :
Study anticompetitive practices in oligopolies and the role of competition policy
Study markets with limits to competition and the regulatory policies
APPLYING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to apply the knowledge on anticompetitive practices and regulatory policies in oligopolistic/monopolistic markets
MAKING JUDGEMENTS:
At the end of the course students should be able to analyze market practices and regulatory policies.
COMMUNICATION SKILLS:
At the end of the course students should be able to analyze ex-ante and ex-posts regulation in markets with limits to competition and prepare presentations to discuss their effects
PAOLO BUCCIROSSI
Prerequisiti
Microeconomia
Prerequisites
Microeconomics
Programma
Il modulo si concentra su le norme e l'economia della politica antitrust. Tutti gli argomenti saranno studiati da una prospettiva sia teorica che applicata. Saranno utilizzati modelli di teoria microeconomica per spiegare gli incentivi di imprese e consumatori. I casi di studio consentiranno di comprendere le applicazioni del mondo reale.
Program
The course focuses on the law and economics of competition policy.
All the topics will be studied from both a theoretical perspective and an applied one. Microeconomic theory models will be used to explain incentives of firms and consumers. Case studies will allow to understand real world applications.
Testi Adottati
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Books
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Bibliografia
• Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010.
• Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
• Lear, The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, 2006, only chapter 2, available at http://www.learlab.com/publication/the-cost-of-inappropriate-interventionsnon-interventions-under-article-82/
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Bibliography
• Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010.
• Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
• Lear, The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, 2006, only chapter 2, available at http://www.learlab.com/publication/the-cost-of-inappropriate-interventionsnon-interventions-under-article-82/
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Modalità di svolgimento
Lezioni frontali, discussioni di gruppo e presentazioni di gruppo
Teaching methods
Traditional lectures, group discussions and group presentations
Regolamento Esame
Esame scritto. Lo studente o la studentessa che non supera o si ritira durante un esame non potrà ripetere l'esame nella medesima sessione d'esami.
Exam Rules
Written exam. Students who withdraw or fail an exam may NOT take the exam again in the same exam session.
ALBERTO IOZZI
Prerequisites
Microeconomia
Programma
Il corso si concentra sullo studio delle poltiche di regolamentzione. Tutti gli argomenti saranno studiati da una prospettiva sia teorica che applicata. Saranno utilizzati modelli di teoria microeconomica per spiegare gli incentivi di imprese e politici. I casi di studio consentiranno di comprendere le applicazioni del mondo reale.
Program
The course focuses on three main topics: the law and economics of antitrust policy and the economics of regulation.
All the topics will be studied from both a theoretical perspective and an applied one. Microeconomic theory models will be used to explain incentives of firms and politicians. Case studies will allow to understand real world applications.
Testi Adottati
• Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
Books
• Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
Bibliografia
• Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
Bibliography
• Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
Modalità di svolgimento
Lezioni frontali e discussioni di gruppo
Teaching methods
Traditional lectures and group discussions
Exam Rules
Written exam. Students who withdraw or fail an exam may NOT take the exam again in the same exam session.
EN
IT
Obiettivi Formativi
CONOSCENZA E CAPACITÀ DI COMPRENSIONE:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di comprendere e applicare l'approccio logico della teoria dei giochi e della microeconomia per:
Studiare pratiche ratiche anticoncorrenziali negli oligopoli e ruolo della politica di concorrenza
Capire i benefici ed i costi del partenariato pubblico privato e il disegno ottimale di pratiche per acquisto di servizi pubblici.
CAPACITÀ DI APPLICARE CONOSCENZA E COMPRENSIONE:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di applicare le conoscenze sulle pratiche anticoncorrenziali negli oligopoli e del procurement dei servizi pubblici
AUTONOMIA DI GIUDIZIO:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di analizzare pratiche di mercato e capire la razio di diverse tesi sugli effetti sulla concorrenza e del procurement
ABILITÀ COMUNICATIVE:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di analizzare pratiche di mercato e per gli acquisti pubblici, e preparare delle presentazioni per discuterne gli effetti
Learning Objectives
KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to understand and apply the logical approach of game theory and microeconomics to :
Study anticompetitive practices in oligopolies and the role of competition policy
Understand benefits and costs of Public Private Partnerships and the optimal design of public procurement
APPLYING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to apply the knowledge on anticompetitive practices and procurement of public services.
MAKING JUDGEMENTS:
At the end of the course students should be able to analyze market practices and understand the impact of different procurement instruments.
COMMUNICATION SKILLS:
At the end of the course students should be able to analyze marke
PAOLO BUCCIROSSI
Prerequisiti
Microeconomia
Prerequisites
Microeconomics
Programma
Il corso si concentra su tre argomenti principali: le norme e l'economia della politica antitrust e le poltiche di regolamentzione. Tutti gli argomenti saranno studiati da una prospettiva sia teorica che applicata. Saranno utilizzati modelli di teoria microeconomica per spiegare gli incentivi di imprese e politici. I casi di studio consentiranno di comprendere le applicazioni del mondo reale.
Program
The course focuses on three main topics: the law and economics of antitrust policy and the economics of regulation.
All the topics will be studied from both a theoretical perspective and an applied one. Microeconomic theory models will be used to explain incentives of firms and politicians. Case studies will allow to understand real world applications.
Testi Adottati
• Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Books
• Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Bibliografia
Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
• Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010.
• Becker, GS., and GJ. Stigler (1974), Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No 1, pp 1.18.
• Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
• Dufwenberg Martin and Giancarlo Spagnolo (2015), Volume53, Issue2, pp: 836-853.
• Lear, The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, 2006, only chapter 2, available at http://www.learlab.com/publication/the-cost-of-inappropriate-interventionsnon-interventions-under-article-82/
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Bibliography
• Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
• Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010.
• Becker, GS., and GJ. Stigler (1974), Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No 1, pp 1.18.
• Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
• Dufwenberg Martin and Giancarlo Spagnolo (2015), Volume53, Issue2, pp: 836-853.
• Lear, The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, 2006, only chapter 2, available at http://www.learlab.com/publication/the-cost-of-inappropriate-interventionsnon-interventions-under-article-82/
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Modalità di svolgimento
Lezioni frontali, discussioni di gruppo e presentazioni di gruppo
Teaching methods
Traditional lectures, group discussions and group presentations
Regolamento Esame
Esame scritto (70%) + progetto di gruppo (30%). L'esame scritto è composto di due domande di tipo aperto. Lo studente dovrà dimostrare di individuare e presentare le nozioni teoriche che consentono di analizzare il problema presentato nella domanda, e formulare una valutazione e/o una proposta in merito alle politica di regolazione e della concorrenza riguardanti il problema presentato nella domanda.
Exam Rules
written exam (70%) + group project (30%). The written exam is made of two essay-type questions. The student will be able to show he/she is able to identify and illustrate the theoretical arguments allowing the analysis of the issues in the questions, and formulate a valuation and/or a proposal about the regulatory and competition policies regarding the issues in the questions.
ALBERTO IOZZI
Bibliografia
Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
• Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010.
• Becker, GS., and GJ. Stigler (1974), Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No 1, pp 1.18.
• Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
• Dufwenberg Martin and Giancarlo Spagnolo (2015), Volume53, Issue2, pp: 836-853.
• Lear, The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, 2006, only chapter 2, available at http://www.learlab.com/publication/the-cost-of-inappropriate-interventionsnon-interventions-under-article-82/
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Regolamento Esame
Esame scritto (70%) + progetto di gruppo (30%)
Exam Rules
written exam (70%) + group project (30%)
Updated A.Y. 2021-2022
Updated A.Y. 2021-2022
MODULE Convenors
alberto.iozzi@uniroma2.it
Office hours: to be agreed by email
Alberto Iozzi is a Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics and Finance of the Università di Roma "Tor Vergata" and Professorial Research Associate in the Department of Financial and Management Studies of SOAS, University of London. His main research areas are industrial economics, public economics and economics of regulation. He has published articles in the Journal of Public Economics, American Economic Journal: Micro, Journal of Urban Economics, BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Journal of Economics, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Bulletin of Economic Research, and Annals of Regional Sciences. He has advised several governmental bodies, including the Italian Energy Regulatory Authority, the Italian Ministries of the Economy and the Infrastructures, as well as private firms such as Ferrovie dello Stato, Telecom Italia, Infostrada and Autostrade per l'Italia. He has a magna cum laude degree in economics from the Università di Roma "La Sapienza", and hold a MSc and a PhD in economics from the University of York (UK) and a Dottorato di Ricerca in economics from the Università di Roma "Tor Vergata". His main publications and further details are available on https://sites.google.com/view/albertoiozzi/home
Paolo.Buccirossi@learlab.com
Office hours: to be agreed by email
Paolo Buccirossi is the Director and founder of Lear. Paolo has been working in the field of competition policy since 1994. After five years spent as an economic advisor at the Italian Competition Authority, Paolo set up Lear in 1999. Since then he has advised private clients and public institutions on a wide range of competition issues, including cartels, abuse of dominance, vertical agreements and mergers in a variety of industries, before the European Commission and several national competition authorities. His main publications and further details are available on http://www.learlab.com/our-people/paolo-buccirossi-lear/
Teaching Assistant: TBA
PROGRAM
Focus
The course focuses on three main topics: the law and economics of antitrust policy and regulation. All the topics will be studied from both a theoretical perspective and an applied one. Microeconomic theory models will be used to explain incentives of firms and politicians. Case studies will allow to understand real world applications.
Objectives
By the end of the course, students will have acquired an understanding of the main law and economics issues in competition policy and regulation. Students will then be able to critically assess an antitrust case and to understand theoretical and practical issues in regulatory policies.
OPPORTUNITIES
Selected students interested in these topics will be offered the possibility to undertake a stage (“tirocinio curriculare”) at Proxenter, the Center of Research in Procurement and Supply Chain (www.proxenter.it) and at Lear (www.learlab.com).
LEARNING OUTCOMES
At the end of the Course student should:
- be able to understand the logical approach of game theory to study collusive practices among firms in static and dynamic contexts
- be able to use incentive theory tools to study the optimal design and implementation of regulatory policies.
ASSESSMENT
The course comprises front lectures and group discussions, including public debates. The assessment method for first “appello” (December and Jan/Feb) combines a written exam (70% weight) and one group project in Buccirossi's part (30% weight).
For subsequent “appello” students will be evaluated on the exam only with 100% weight.
LECTURES
Antitrust law and policy (Buccirossi)
- Introduction and objectives of law enforcement agencies
- Anticompetitive agreements
- Cartel
- Other horizontal agreements
- Vertical agreement
- Exploitative abuses
- Exclusionary abuses
- The relationship between market power and efficiency
- Market power and allocative efficiency
- Market power and productive efficiency
- Market power and dynamic efficiency
- Theories of harm in antitrust cases
- Softening competition (unilateral effects)
- Collusion
- Foreclosure
- Sanction policy, leniency programs and action for damages
Readings
- Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ.
- 1, pp. 17-38;
- 2, pp. 39-58 – but not sec. 2.3.5
- 4, pp. 137-166
- 6, sec. 6.2.5.1 and pp. 362-377
- Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010.
- Lear, The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, 2006, only chapter 2, available at http://www.learlab.com/publication/the-cost-of-inappropriate-interventionsnon-interventions-under-article-82/
- Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
Website to be consulted
Regulation of public services (Iozzi)
- Regulating a Monopoly with Full Information
- Regulating under Informational Constraints
- Non-Linear Pricing in Regulation
- On the Regulation of Quality
- On the Regulation of Investment
Readings
Auriol, E., C. Crampes and A. Estache, 2022. Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press
Additional reading will be provided during the lectures
