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Syllabus

EN IT

Learning Objectives

LEARNING OUTCOMES:

KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to understand and apply the logical approach of game theory and microeconomics to study markets with limits to competition and the regulatory policies

APPLYING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to apply the knowledge regulatory policies in oligopolistic/monopolistic markets

MAKING JUDGEMENTS:
At the end of the course students should be able to analyze market practices and regulatory policies.

COMMUNICATION SKILLS:
At the end of the course students should be able to analyze ex-ante and ex-posts regulation in markets with limits to competition and prepare presentations to discuss their effects.

ALBERTO IOZZI

Prerequisites

Microeconomics

Program

The module focuses on the economics of regulation. This topic will be studied from both a theoretical and applied perspective. Microeconomic theory models will be used to explain the incentives of firms and regulators. Case studies will allow to understand real world applications.
The detailed syllabus is:
- Industries with limits to competition (week 1)
- Regulation of a Monopoly with Full Information (week 1)
- Regulation of a Monopoly under Informational Constraints (week 2)
- Non-bayesian models of price regulation (week 3)
- Regulation of Quality (week 3)

Books

Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.

Bibliography

Auriol, E., C. Crempes e A. Estaches, 2022. Regulating Public Services: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice. CAmbridge University Press.
Panzar, J C, 1989. Technological Determinants of Firms and Industry Structure. in Schmalensee, R and R Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization (vol. 1), Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Armstrong, M. and D.E.M. Sappington, 2007. Recent advances in the theory of regulation. in M. Armstrong and R. Porter (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization (vol. 3), Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Armstrong, M, S Cowan and J Vickers, 1994. Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Laffont, J-J and J Tirole, 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.

Teaching methods

Traditional lectures and group discussions.

Exam Rules

Written exam, composed of four open questions, two for each module. Students who withdraw or fail an exam may NOT take the exam again in the same exam session. The final grade is the unweighted average of the grade in each question.
The grading of the student's answers to each question is based on the following criteria:
- 0-17: significant deficiencies and/or inaccuracies in knowledge and understanding of the topics; limited analysis and synthesis skills; frequent generalizations.
- 18-20: just sufficient knowledge and understanding of the topics with possible imperfections; Sufficient analytical, synthesis, and independent judgment skills.
- 21-23: Knowledge and understanding of routine topics; Correct analysis and synthesis skills with coherent, logical argumentation.
- 24-26: Fair knowledge and understanding of the topics; good analytical and synthesis skills with rigorously expressed arguments.
- 27-29: Complete knowledge and understanding of the topics; remarkable analytical and synthesis skills. Good independent judgment.
- 30-30L: Excellent level of knowledge and understanding of the topics. Remarkable analytical and synthesis skills and independent judgment. Arguments expressed in an original way.

PAOLO BUCCIROSSI

Program

The detailed syllabus is:
- Introduction to competition law, market power and relationship between market power and various notions of efficiency (1 lecture)
- Determinants of market power and theories of compaetitive harm (1 lecture)
- Theory of collusion, standard of proof and assessment of evidence (1 lecture)
- Horizontal merger assessment, unilateral effects and UPP tests (1 lecture)
- Foreclosure theories, predatory pricing refusal to deal and chain store paradox (1 lecture)
- Tying and bundling, sanction policy and leniency programs (1 lecture)

Books

Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.

Bibliography

Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010.
Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.