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Regulation of Public Services


Updated A.Y. 2022-2023

MODULE Convenors

  • Alberto Iozzi


Office hours: to be agreed by email

Alberto Iozzi is a Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics and Finance of the Università di Roma "Tor Vergata" and Professorial Research Associate in the Department of Financial and Management Studies of SOAS, University of London. His main research areas are industrial economics, public economics and economics of regulation. He has published articles in the Journal of Public Economics, American Economic Journal: Micro, Journal of Urban Economics, BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Journal of Economics, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Bulletin of Economic Research, and Annals of Regional Sciences. He has advised several governmental bodies, including the Italian Energy Regulatory Authority, the Italian Ministries of the Economy and the Infrastructures, as well as private firms such as Ferrovie dello Stato, Telecom Italia, Infostrada and Autostrade per l'Italia. He has a magna cum laude degree in economics from the Università di Roma "La Sapienza", and hold a MSc and a PhD in economics from the University of York (UK) and a Dottorato di Ricerca in economics from the Università di Roma "Tor Vergata". His main publications and further details are available on https://sites.google.com/view/albertoiozzi/home

  • Paolo Buccirossi


Office hours: to be agreed by email

Paolo Buccirossi is the Director and founder of Lear. Paolo has been working in the field of competition policy since 1994. After five years spent as an economic advisor at the Italian Competition Authority, Paolo set up Lear in 1999. Since then he has advised private clients and public institutions on a wide range of competition issues, including cartels, abuse of dominance, vertical agreements and mergers in a variety of industries, before the European Commission and several national competition authorities. His main publications and further details are available on http://www.learlab.com/our-people/paolo-buccirossi-lear/

Teaching Assistant: TBA




The course focuses on three main topics: the law and economics of antitrust policy and regulation. All the topics will be studied from both a theoretical perspective and an applied one. Microeconomic theory models will be used to explain incentives of firms and politicians. Case studies will allow to understand real world applications.


By the end of the course, students will have acquired an understanding of the main law and economics issues in competition policy and regulation. Students will then be able to critically assess an antitrust case and to understand theoretical and practical issues in regulatory policies.


Selected students interested in these topics will be offered the possibility to undertake a stage (“tirocinio curriculare”) at Proxenter, the Center of Research in Procurement and Supply Chain (www.proxenter.it) and at Lear (www.learlab.com).


At the end of the Course student should:

  1. be able to understand the logical approach of game theory to study collusive practices among firms in static and dynamic contexts
  2. be able to use incentive theory tools to study the optimal design and implementation of regulatory policies.


The course comprises front lectures and group discussions, including public debates. The assessment method for first “appello” (December and Jan/Feb) combines a written exam (70% weight) and one group project in Buccirossi's part (30% weight).

For subsequent “appello” students will be evaluated on the exam only with 100% weight.


Antitrust law and policy (Buccirossi)

  • Introduction and objectives of law enforcement agencies
  • Anticompetitive agreements
  • Cartel
  • Other horizontal agreements
  • Vertical agreement
  • Abuse of dominance
  • Exploitative abuses
  • Exclusionary abuses
  • The relationship between market power and efficiency
  • Market power and allocative efficiency
  • Market power and productive efficiency
  • Market power and dynamic efficiency
  • Theories of harm in antitrust cases
  • Softening competition (unilateral effects)
  • Collusion
  • Foreclosure
  • Sanction policy, leniency programs and action for damages


  • Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ.
    • 1, pp. 17-38;
    • 2, pp. 39-58 – but not sec. 2.3.5
    • 4, pp. 137-166
    • 6, sec. and pp. 362-377
  • Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010.
  • Lear, The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, 2006, only chapter 2, available at http://www.learlab.com/publication/the-cost-of-inappropriate-interventionsnon-interventions-under-article-82/
  • Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.

Website to be consulted

Regulation of public services (Iozzi)

  • Regulating a Monopoly with Full Information
  • Regulating under Informational Constraints
  • Non-Linear Pricing in Regulation
  • On the Regulation of Quality
  • On the Regulation of Investment


Auriol, E., C. Crampes and A. Estache, 2022. Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press

Additional reading will be provided during the lectures