MICROECONOMICS 2
Syllabus
EN
IT
Learning Objectives
LEARNING OUTCOMES: Introduction to strategic reasoning.
KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: Make students familiar with analytical reasoning when modeling social interactions.
APPLYING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: Make students able to stress the strategic aspects of monopolistic and oligopolistic contexts in the presence of asymmetric information.
MAKING JUDGEMENTS: Make students aware of the common logic underlying different approaches to social interactions.
COMMUNICATION SKILLS: Make students able to formalize their intuitions and to communicate them to non-specialists.
LEARNING SKILLS: Improve the students’ problem-solving skills.
KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: Make students familiar with analytical reasoning when modeling social interactions.
APPLYING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: Make students able to stress the strategic aspects of monopolistic and oligopolistic contexts in the presence of asymmetric information.
MAKING JUDGEMENTS: Make students aware of the common logic underlying different approaches to social interactions.
COMMUNICATION SKILLS: Make students able to formalize their intuitions and to communicate them to non-specialists.
LEARNING SKILLS: Improve the students’ problem-solving skills.
Prerequisites
Basic knowledge of neoclassical consumer theory, production theory under certainty and uncertainty. Notions of concavity of sets and of functions. Basic knowledge of correspondences. Weierstrass' theorem and Brower's fixed point theorem.
Program
Static games of complete information: main solution concepts. Existence theorem for a Nash equilibrium. Applications: models of imperfect competition. Dynamic games of complete information. Representation through extensive form and backward induction. Subgame perfection. Introduction to repeated games. Applications: bargaining models. Games of incomplete information and Bayesian equilibria. Applicazioni: first and second-price auctions. Introduction to mechanism design. Revelation Principle. Introduction to adverse selection. Applications: A model of screening in the labor market. Introduction to moral hazard. Application: Strategic default in financial markets and/or credit rationing.
Books
R. Gibbons “A Primer in Game Theory”, 1992, Pearson Education Limited.
Mas Colell, A., Whinston M., and J Green “Microeconomic Theory” , 1995, Oxford University Press.
Mas Colell, A., Whinston M., and J Green “Microeconomic Theory” , 1995, Oxford University Press.
Bibliography
R. Gibbons “A Primer in Game Theory”, 1992, Pearson Education Limited.
Mas Colell, A., Whinston M., and J Green “Microeconomic Theory” , 1995, Oxford University Press.
Mas Colell, A., Whinston M., and J Green “Microeconomic Theory” , 1995, Oxford University Press.
Teaching methods
Frontal lectures and practices. Class discussions. Flipped classroom.
Exam Rules
Ongoing evaluation by means of problem sets (30-40% of the final grade) to be handed in during the course. The individual solutions to the assigned problem set will be graded and the exercises/questions will be then corrected in class.
Written final exam (70-60% of the final grade), to evaluate the ability to develop a logical and coherent mathematical reasoning. Active participation during class lectures and open discussions will also be aprt of the evaluation. The lecturer can propose to orally discuss advanced topics.
Written final exam (70-60% of the final grade), to evaluate the ability to develop a logical and coherent mathematical reasoning. Active participation during class lectures and open discussions will also be aprt of the evaluation. The lecturer can propose to orally discuss advanced topics.