EN
IT
Obiettivi Formativi
OBIETTIVI FORMATIVI: Lo scopo del corso è quello di introdurre gli studenti al ragionamento strategico mediante lo studio della teoria dei giochi ed applicare questo strumento all'analisi della competizione tra imprese. In particolare, svilupperemo gli ingredienti basilari della teoria dei giochi non cooperativi e le nozioni di equilibrio appropriate ai diversi contesti. Infine studieremo come applicare questi strumenti alla progettazione di politiche pubbliche a contrasto
CONOSCENZA E CAPACITÀ DI COMPRENSIONE:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di comprendere e applicare l'approccio logico della teoria dei giochi all’analisi del contesto strategico in cui le imprese operano. Studieremo le condotte anti-concorrenziali e le politiche pubbliche a contrasto. Particolare enfasi sarà data ad algoritmi e mercati digitali quali motori di ricerca, social media e online marketplaces.
CAPACITÀ DI APPLICARE CONOSCENZA E COMPRENSIONE:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di identificare autonomamente condotte potenzialmente anti-concorrenziali.
AUTONOMIA DI GIUDIZIO:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di comporre un quadro normativo e suggerire interventi e strumenti utili al contrasto.
ABILITÀ COMUNICATIVE:
Alla fine del corso gli studenti dovrebbero essere in grado di analizzare condotte di mercato e preparare delle presentazioni per discuterne gli effetti sulla concorrenza.
LEARNING OUTCOMES: the aim of this course is to introduce students to strategic reasoning through a formal training in game theory and a parallel set of lectures on applications to competition policy. Specifically, we will formally introduce the basic ingredients of non cooperative games and a number of equilibrium concepts used to solve them. These will be applied to studying strategic interaction among firms and to design incentive schemes to achieve a number of basic public policy goals.
KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to understand and apply the logical approach of game theory to analyse the strategic environment that firms face in regime of oligopoly. In particular, we will study anti-competitive conducts put forth by firms and public policies to address them. Emphasis will be given to the role of algorithms and digital markets such as search engines, social media or online marketplaces.
APPLYING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to apply the knowledge to identify potential anti-competitive practices.
MAKING JUDGEMENTS:
Given a firm's conduct, the student should be able to (i) sketch its overall impact on economic surplus and its redistributive impact on the individual surplus of the parties involved and (ii) suggest potential interventions.
COMMUNICATION SKILLS:
At the end of the course students should be able to analyse market practices and prepare presentations to discuss their effects on competition.
Learning Objectives
LEARNING OUTCOMES: the aim of this course is to introduce students to strategic reasoning through a formal training in game theory and a parallel set of lectures on applications to competition policy. Specifically, we will formally introduce the basic ingredients of non cooperative games and a number of equilibrium concepts used to solve them. These will be applied to studying strategic interaction among firms and to design incentive schemes to achieve a number of basic public policy goals.
KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to understand and apply the logical approach of game theory to analyse the strategic environment that firms face in regime of oligopoly. In particular, we will study anti-competitive conducts put forth by firms and public policies to address them. Emphasis will be given to the role of algorithms and digital markets such as search engines, social media or online marketplaces.
APPLYING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING:
At the end of the Course students should be able to apply the knowledge to identify potential anti-competitive practices.
MAKING JUDGEMENTS:
Given a firm's conduct, the student should be able to (i) sketch its overall impact on economic surplus and its redistributive impact on the individual surplus of the parties involved and (ii) suggest potential interventions.
COMMUNICATION SKILLS:
At the end of the course students should be able to analyse market practices and prepare presentations to discuss their effects on competition.
Programma
Prima parte: informazione completa
Giochi statici di informazione completa. Equilibrio di Nash in strategie pure. Equilibrio di Nash in strategie miste. Modello di Cournot. Modello di Betrand. Giochi dinamici di informazione completa. Giochi in forma estesa e induzione a ritroso. Equilibrio di Nash Perfetto nei Sottogiochi. Duopolio di Stackelberg. Giochi ripetuti. Dilemma del Prigioniero e coordinazione. Il Folk theorem.
Seconda parte: informazione incompleta
Giochi statici di informazione incompleta. Equilibrio di Nash Bayesiano. Un esempio di asta. L’interpretazione delle strategie miste di Harsanyi. Giochi dinamici di informazione incompleta. Equilibrio Bayesiano Perfetto. Elementi di teoria della Segnalazione.
Program
First part: Complete Information
Static games of complete information. The Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Cournot model. Bertrand model. Dynamic games of complete information. Extensive form games and backward induction. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Stackelberg model of duopoly. Repeated games. The Prisoner’s dilemma and coordination. The Folk theorem.
Second part: Incomplete Information
Static Games of incomplete Information. Bayesian Nash equilibrium. An auction game. Harsanyi’ interpretation of mixed strategies. Dynamic games of incomplete information. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Basics of signalling.
Testi Adottati
Gibbons, R. (1992), Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press.
Books
Gibbons, R. (1992), Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press.
Bibliografia
Gibbons, R. (1992), Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press.
Osborne, M.J., 2004. An introduction to game theory (Vol. 3, No. 3), New York: Oxford university press.
(advanced) Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A course in game theory, MIT Press
Tadelis S. (2013), Game Theory: An Introduction, Princeton University Press
Bibliography
Gibbons, R. (1992), Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press.
Osborne, M.J., 2004. An introduction to game theory (Vol. 3, No. 3), New York: Oxford university press.
(advanced) Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A course in game theory, MIT Press
Tadelis S. (2013), Game Theory: An Introduction, Princeton University Press
Modalità di svolgimento
Il modulo si compone di lezioni ed esercitazioni.
Politica di tolleranza zero riguardo la disonestà accademica
La disonestà accademica include copiare agli esami, citazione impropria, lavoro riciclato, assistenza non autorizzata, o azioni simili. Compiti e progetti sono specifici per corsi individuali; presentare lo stesso lavoro in due corsi differenti (inclusi corsi precedenti) è considerato riciclaggio è non è accettato.
Gli Studenti che commettono un atto di disonestà accademica riceveranno un voto insufficiente all’esame.
La puntualità è obbligatoria.
Gli studenti sono tenuti ad arrivare a lezione con puntualità e sono tenuti a non andarsene prima della fine della stessa senza una specifica ragione. E' responsabilità esclusiva dello studente di recuperare la spiegazione persa. Una partecipazione corretta, attiva, e responsabile è altamente incentivata. E' richiesto un comportamento appropriato in classe.
Teaching methods
The module is composed of classes and practice sessions.
Zero tolerance policy regarding academic dishonesty
Academic dishonesty includes cheating on exams, plagiarism, improper citation, recycled work, unauthorized assistance, or similar actions. Assignments and projects are specific to individual courses; presenting the same work in two different courses (including previous courses) is considered recycling and is unacceptable.
Students who commit an act of academic dishonesty will receive a failing grade.
Punctuality is mandatory.
Students must arrive in class on time and must not leave before the end of the class without a specific reason. It is the responsibility of the student to catch up on any missed work. Correct, active and responsible participation is insisted on. Proper behavior must be observed in class.
Regolamento Esame
Il metodo di valutazione si basa interamente su una prova scritta. L'esame si compone di due o tre esercizi, eventualmente comprensivi di domande teoriche. Richiede che gli studenti siano in grado di risolvere i giochi trattati nel modulo.
Il voto dell'esame è espresso in trenta punti.
Poiché gli studenti EEBL sostengono l'esame contestualmente all'esame di Organizzazione Industriale, il voto ottenuto in ciascuno dei due moduli avrà un peso del 50% nella determinazione del voto finale del corso. In particolare:
Voto finale = 0,5 x (Voto nel modulo Teoria dei giochi) + 0,5 x (Voto nel modulo Organizzazione industriale).
Gli studenti dovranno ottenere almeno 18/30 in ciascuno dei due moduli per superare l'esame.
Exam Rules
The assessment method is entirely based on a written exam. The exam is composed of two or three exercises, possibly including theoretical questions. It requires students to be able to solve games covered in the module.
The grade for the exam is expressed out of thirty points.
Since EEBL students take the exam at the same time as the exam in Industrial Organization, the grade obtained in each of the two modules will have a 50% weight in determining the final grade for the course. In particular:
Final Grade = 0.5 x (Grade in Game Theory Module) + 0.5 x (Grade in Industrial Organization Module).
Students will have to obtain at least 18/30 in each of the two modules to pass the exam.
Aggiornato A.A. 2021-2022
Aggiornato A.A. 2021-2022
Part II: Static and Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
The second part of the course will first deal with repeated games in a complete information setting. Then, most of the second part will be dedicated to the analysis of static and dynamic games in incomplete information settings, that is, we will explore games similar to the ones seen in the first part of while now allowing for some uncertainty. For that matter, we will have to enrich the previous models and develop new equilibrium concepts, namely, Bayesian Nash equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Detailed topics
Repeated games. The Prisoner’s dilemma and coordination. The Folk theorem.
Static games of incomplete Information. Bayesian Nash equilibrium. An auction game. Harsanyi’ interpretation of mixed strategies.
Dynamic games of incomplete information. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Basics of signalling.
References
The reference book for the class is "Gibbons, R. (1992), Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press".