Aggiornato A.A. 2017-2018
Law and Economics
LM in Economics
Academic year 2017-2018
6 credits
MODULE Convenor
Prof. Elisabetta Iossa
Elisabetta.Iossa@uniroma2.it
Office hours: to be agreed by email
Elisabetta Iossa is Professor of Economics at the University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’, Research Fellow of the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in London, and IEFE-Bocconi. She studied in Napoli, University of York and Universitè Libre de Bruxelles, and worked in London at Brunel University for ten years. Her main research interests are in the provision of public services, public procurement and public-private partnerships. On these topics, she has advised many international institutions such as Competition Commission, Financial Service Authority, Office of Fair Trading, International Fund for Agricultural Development and World Bank. Her main publications and further details are available on https://sites.google.com/site/profelisabettaiossa/
Prof. Paolo Buccirossi
Paolo.Buccirossi@learlab.com
Office hours: to be agreed by email
Paolo Buccirossi is the Director and founder of Lear. Paolo has been working in the field of competition policy since 1994. After five years spent as an economic advisor at the Italian Competition Authority, Paolo set up Lear in 1999. Since then he has advised private clients and public institutions on a wide range of competition issues, including cartels, abuse of dominance, vertical agreements and mergers in a variety of industries, before the European Commission and several national competition authorities. His main publications and further details are available on http://www.learlab.com/our-people/paolo-buccirossi-lear/
PROGRAM
Focus
The course focuses on three main topics: the law and economics of procurement of public services and in particular Public Private Partnerships and the law and economics of corruption, and the law and economics of antitrust policy;
All the topics will be studied from both a theoretical perspective and an applied one. Microeconomic theory models will be used to explain incentives of firms and politicians. Case studies will allow to understand real world applications.
Objectives
By the end of the course, students will have acquired an understanding of the main law and economics issues in competition policy and the delegation of public services to the private sector. Students will then be able to critically assess an antitrust case and to discuss the potential benefit and cost of delegating the provision of a public service to a private firm through public private partnerships.
OPPORTUNITIES
Selected students interested in these topics will be offered the possibility to undertake a stage (“tirocinio curriculare”) at Proxenter, the Center of Research in Procurement and Supply Chain (www.proxenter.it) and at Lear (www.learlab.com).
ASSESSMENT
The assessment method combines a written exam (70% weight) and a group project (30% weight), provided the project is submitted within the course deadline, given by 22 December 2017. Students retain the option of being evaluated on the exam only with 100% weight.
LECTURES
o In house vs Outsourcing (traditional procurement)
o Main characteristics of PPPs
o PPPs vs traditional procurement
o Risk allocation in PPPs
o Case studies: London Underground; Prisons; Students accommodations
Reading
Albano et al (2006)
Bennett & Iossa (2006)
Hart Shleifer and Vishney (1997)
Iossa & Martimort (2014)
• The Economics of Corruption (Iossa)
o How to measure corruption
o The microeconomics of corruption
Reading
Tirole (1986)
Piga (2011)
Website to be consulted
OECD Antibribery Convention:
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm
Transparency International website: https://www.transparency.org/
Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione: http://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/
• Antitrust law (Buccirossi)
o Introduction and objectives of law enforcement agencies
o Anticompetitive agreements
Cartel
Other horizontal agreements
Vertical agreement
o Abuse of dominance
Exploitative abuses
Exclusionary abuses
o The relationship between market power and efficiency
Market power and allocative efficiency
Market power and productive efficiency
Market power and dynamic efficiency
o Theories of harm in antitrust cases
Softening competition (unilateral effects)
Collusion
Foreclosure
o Sanction policy, leniency programs and action for damages
Reading
Motta (2004)
• Ch. 1, pp. 17-38;
• Ch. 2, pp. 39-58 – but not sec. 2.3.5
• Ch. 4, pp. 137-166
• Ch. 6, sec. 6.2.5.1 and pp. 362-377
Bailey et al. (2010)
Lear (2006), only chapter 2
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007)
Website to be consulted
AGCM (www.agcm.it)
DG Competition (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html)
READING
• Albano, GL. Calzolari, G. Dini, F., Iossa, E, Spagnolo G. (2006) “Procurement Contracting Strategies”. Handbook of Procurement, Capitolo 4, N. Dimitri, G. Piga, and G. Spagnolo, eds., Cambridge University Press. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=908220
• Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010,
• Bennett, J. Iossa, E. (2006) “Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services”. The Journal of Public Economics, vol. 90 (10-11), pp. 2143-2160.
• Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
• Hart, Oliver, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1997), `The proper scope of government: theory and an application to prisons,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 1119-58.
• Iossa E., Martimort, D. (2015)_ “The Simple Micro-economics of Public Private Partnerships”. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 17 1: Pages 4–48.
• Lear, The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, 2006, only chapter 2, available at http://www.learlab.com/publication/the-cost-of-inappropriate-interventionsnon-interventions-under-article-82/
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
• Piga, G. (2011) “A fighting chance against corruption in public Procurement”, in International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, edited by Rose-Ackermann e T Soreide.
• Tirole, Jean (1986) Hierarchies an d Bureaucracies : On the Role of Collusion i n Organizations, Journal of Law, Economics & Organizations, 2: 181-214.
Aggiornato A.A. 2017-2018
Law and Economics
LM in Economics
Academic year 2017-2018
6 credits
MODULE Convenor
Prof. Elisabetta Iossa
Elisabetta.Iossa@uniroma2.it
Office hours: to be agreed by email
Elisabetta Iossa is Professor of Economics at the University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’, Research Fellow of the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in London, and IEFE-Bocconi. She studied in Napoli, University of York and Universitè Libre de Bruxelles, and worked in London at Brunel University for ten years. Her main research interests are in the provision of public services, public procurement and public-private partnerships. On these topics, she has advised many international institutions such as Competition Commission, Financial Service Authority, Office of Fair Trading, International Fund for Agricultural Development and World Bank. Her main publications and further details are available on https://sites.google.com/site/profelisabettaiossa/
Prof. Paolo Buccirossi
Paolo.Buccirossi@learlab.com
Office hours: to be agreed by email
Paolo Buccirossi is the Director and founder of Lear. Paolo has been working in the field of competition policy since 1994. After five years spent as an economic advisor at the Italian Competition Authority, Paolo set up Lear in 1999. Since then he has advised private clients and public institutions on a wide range of competition issues, including cartels, abuse of dominance, vertical agreements and mergers in a variety of industries, before the European Commission and several national competition authorities. His main publications and further details are available on http://www.learlab.com/our-people/paolo-buccirossi-lear/
PROGRAM
Focus
The course focuses on three main topics: the law and economics of procurement of public services and in particular Public Private Partnerships and the law and economics of corruption, and the law and economics of antitrust policy;
All the topics will be studied from both a theoretical perspective and an applied one. Microeconomic theory models will be used to explain incentives of firms and politicians. Case studies will allow to understand real world applications.
Objectives
By the end of the course, students will have acquired an understanding of the main law and economics issues in competition policy and the delegation of public services to the private sector. Students will then be able to critically assess an antitrust case and to discuss the potential benefit and cost of delegating the provision of a public service to a private firm through public private partnerships.
OPPORTUNITIES
Selected students interested in these topics will be offered the possibility to undertake a stage (“tirocinio curriculare”) at Proxenter, the Center of Research in Procurement and Supply Chain (www.proxenter.it) and at Lear (www.learlab.com).
ASSESSMENT
The assessment method combines a written exam (70% weight) and a group project (30% weight), provided the project is submitted within the course deadline, given by 22 December 2017. Students retain the option of being evaluated on the exam only with 100% weight.
LECTURES
• Public Procurement and Public Private Partnerships (Iossa)
o Main characteristics of PPPs
o PPPs vs traditional procurement
o Risk allocation in PPPs
o Case studies: London Underground; Prisons; Students accommodations
Reading
Albano et al (2006)
Bennett & Iossa (2006)
Iossa & Martimort (2014)
• The Economics of Corruption (Iossa)
o How to measure corruption
o The microeconomics of corruption
Reading
Tirole (1986)
Piga (2011)
Website to be consulted
OECD Antibribery Convention:
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm
Transparency International website: https://www.transparency.org/
Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione: http://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/
• Antitrust law (Buccirossi)
o Introduction and objectives of law enforcement agencies
o Anticompetitive agreements
Cartel
Other horizontal agreements
Vertical agreement
o Abuse of dominance
Exploitative abuses
Exclusionary abuses
o The relationship between market power and efficiency
Market power and allocative efficiency
Market power and productive efficiency
Market power and dynamic efficiency
o Theories of harm in antitrust cases
Softening competition (unilateral effects)
Collusion
Foreclosure
o Sanction policy, leniency programs and action for damages
Reading
Motta (2004)
• Ch. 1, pp. 17-38;
• Ch. 2, pp. 39-58 – but not sec. 2.3.5
• Ch. 4, pp. 137-166
• Ch. 6, sec. 6.2.5.1 and pp. 362-377
Bailey et al. (2010)
Lear (2006), only chapter 2
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007)
Website to be consulted
AGCM (www.agcm.it)
DG Competition (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html)
READING
• Albano, GL. Calzolari, G. Dini, F., Iossa, E, Spagnolo G. (2006) “Procurement Contracting Strategies”. Handbook of Procurement, Capitolo 4, N. Dimitri, G. Piga, and G. Spagnolo, eds., Cambridge University Press. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=908220
• Bailey, E. M., G. K. Leonard, G. S. Olley, and L. Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure”, The Antitrust Source, February 2010,
• Bennett, J. Iossa, E. (2006) “Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services”. The Journal of Public Economics, vol. 90 (10-11), pp. 2143-2160.
• Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?, V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.) The Political Economy of Antitrust, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
• Iossa E., Martimort, D. (2015)_ “The Simple Micro-economics of Public Private Partnerships”. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 17 1: Pages 4–48.
• Lear, The cost of inappropriate interventions/non interventions under Article 82, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, 2006, only chapter 2, available at http://www.learlab.com/publication/the-cost-of-inappropriate-interventionsnon-interventions-under-article-82/
• Motta M., Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, 2004 Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
• Piga, G. (2011) “A fighting chance against corruption in public Procurement”, in International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, edited by Rose-Ackermann e T Soreide.
• Tirole, Jean (1986) Hierarchies an d Bureaucracies : On the Role of Collusion i n Organizations, Journal of Law, Economics & Organizations, 2: 181-214.
Prof.ssa Lucia Leonelli
